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                                                             Abstract 
      Human Migrations can be defined as the movement or displacement of peoples from one 
place to another, in particular from one country (emigration) to another (immigration) for 
political, social, economic, or personal reasons.  They have been the fact of life for populations 
integrating into a wider world.  Historically, Senegalese migrations to Europe started under 
colonialism with the massive recruitments by the French colonial administration within the 
Senegalese territory.  This practice of European colonial administration caused the first wave of 
Senegalese migrations towards Europe to conform to French colonial needs and expectations.  
Senegalese migrations to Europe continued in the post-colonial period as part of France’s post-
war reconstruction and its need for labor to revitalize its economy. In the 2000s, Senegalese 
migrations to Europe increased tremendously with the “Barca or Barsaakh” phenomenon, 
involving a whole generation of Senegalese youth. Throughout this research, I provide three 
broad theoretical frameworks (colonialism and dependency, post-colonialism, globalization and 
its neoliberal ideology) that may explain this phenomenon.  However, I rely on colonialism and 
dependency and post-colonialism to propose the two leading hypotheses of the study:  
H1:  If a dependency relationship develops between a colonial power and its former colony, then 
the former colony’s economy is likely to be weak and unproductive.  France’s relationship with 
Senegal is a dependent relationship in which Senegal’s monoculture economy and general 
development depend on France’s economic, financial and technical assistance.  By weakening 
the Senegalese economy, the colonial dependent situation has created conditions of generalized 
poverty and lack of economic opportunities for young people. This situation causes migrations to 
Europe and elsewhere. 
 
 
H2:  The more post-colonial holders of state power resort to authoritarian rule and the 
privatization of the state, the more likely they will loot national resources for their private 
interests.  In Senegal, post-colonial rulers have used authoritarian means of governance and 
appropriated the state resources as personal property.  This has created a situation of generalized 
poverty and lack of economic opportunities for young people.  The outcome has been massive 
migrations to Europe and elsewhere. 
      I attempt to test these two hypotheses using recent statistical databases and empirical and 
historical evidence that I collected from the intensive field research I conducted in Senegal 
during the 2019 summer externship.  Based on the evidence, I discuss migrations from Senegal 
by linking them to the issues of poverty and economic deprivation.  Although my hypotheses are 
largely supported by the evidence, the persistence of poverty in Senegal and its similarities in 
some aspects with other poor countries suggest that my two causal factors may not completely 
explain poverty in Senegal.  Poverty in Senegal may be partly caused by factors (such as drought 
and globalization-induced structural adjustment programs of IMF) not accounted for in my 
hypotheses.  This means that migrations in Senegal are partly explained by these other factors.   
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Background Information on Senegal 
    
 
 
        
      
Senegal Political Map with capital Dakar, national borders, important cities, rivers and lakes. English labeling and 





   Senegal is a rather small West African Country bordered by Mauritania in the North, Mali to 
the East, Guinea to the southeast, and Guinea-Bissau to the Southwest.  It has an estimated 
population of around 16 million people and a national territory of 196722km2.  The most 
populous city is its capital, Dakar, the only city whose population surpasses the 1-million mark.  
But, its population is essentially rural with 60% that still live in these areas (Aina, Chachage, and 
Yao, 2014, p. 109) while the other 40% is concentrated around the urban cities and surrounding 
zones.  Throughout history, Senegal was perceived as one of the stable nations in Africa, getting 
its independence on April 4, 1960, from France, and transitioning respectively from each of the 
following political head of state: Senghor, Abdou Diouf, Abdoulaye Wade, and Macky Sall.  
Today, Senegal is a presidential republic structured into 14 administrative regions. The official 
language is French, but many native languages and dialects, such as Wolof or Pulaar, are widely 
spoken.  Most of the Senegalese population is young with an estimated 60% of its population 
under the age of 24.  7,509,273 young people under 15 years old (3,772,424 males / 3,736,848 
females), and 9,348,629 persons between 15 and 64 years old (4,392,138 males / 4,956,491 
females).1 
      In religious terms, almost 95% of the population is Muslim though they are subdivided into 
various Sufi orders or brotherhoods to which a growing number of Senegalese Muslims belong.  
The three major Sufi brotherhoods are the khadriya the Tijaniya, and the Muridiyya.  The 
khadriya, which is the oldest Muslim Sufi order, was founded in the twelfth century by Cheikh 
Abdou Khadre Djeylani.  It was originally from the Maghreb, expanding across the Sahara 
                                                          






(Adrar and Walata), Tombouctou and then down into West Africa to Senegal.2 Even though a 
minority of Senegalese belong to this Sufi order, it historically has influenced other Senegalese 
brotherhood. 
      Tijaniya was founded in the eighteen century by Cheikh Ahmad al-Tijani in Morocco.  It is 
the Sufi order that has the largest followers in Senegal.  It is divided into various branches with 
different religious leaders in each region in Senegal.  Among them, we can cite Ibrahima Niass 
of Kaolack (in the North), Maodo Malick Sy of Tivaoune (in the West), Omar Futiwou Tall of 
Fouta-Toro (in the North), and Mouhamadou Saidou Ba of Medina Gounass (in the South).  It is 
the Sufi order that nearly all Pulaar-Speakers belong to. 
      Finally, the Muridiyya is the only Sufi order that was founded in Senegal by Cheikh 
Ahmadou Bamba in the late nineteenth century in Touba (located in the North of Senegal).  In its 
expansion in Senegal, it has reached the heart of many Wolof (the largest ethnic group) and other 
ethnic groups such as the Serere and Halpoular. 
       All these three major Sufi brotherhoods in Senegal became intertwined with the colonial and 
post-colonial administrations and have been playing a significant leadership and influential role 
in the country’s politics.  
 Statement of the Problem 
        Migrations have been the subject of numerous scholarly works reflecting various conceptual 
formulations.  They have attempted to provide a better understanding of Migrations as a process, 
their causes and effects on the global scale.   
                                                          




        Historically, Senegalese migrations to Europe started during colonialism.  In fact, during 
colonial times, French colonizers settled in the Senegalese’s land.  Once installed, the European 
colonial administration created the four townships of Dakar, Rufisque, Goree and Saint Louis.  
The creation of these four European townships served as a way to integrate the Senegalese 
community, to spread their hegemony and to have total control over the Senegalese territory for 
their own sake.  In order to operate its plan and business, the European colonial administration 
started collaborating with the Senegalese local chiefs who had at that time the power over the 
Senegalese people.  The collaboration was based on bribery: The European colonial 
administration procured them with diamonds, guns, coppers, and ivories, and the chiefs served 
them as indispensable channels through which to get access to the Senegalese people.  Once the 
collaboration was effective, the European colonial administration started their recruiting process.  
They took many Senegalese individuals from their own land, embarking them on boats and sent 
them to Europe.  Many of those Senegalese sent to Europe were transformed into soldiers and 
defenders of French colonies.  They were given the name of “Tirailleurs” in order to reflect the 
policing needs generated by the European colonization phase and to fight for France during the 
Two World Wars.  This practice of European colonial administration within the Senegalese 
territory led to many Senegalese migrations to Europe during that time to conform to Europe’s 
needs and expectations.              
         Senegalese migrations to Europe continued in the post-colonial period.  In fact, during the 
post-colonial period, there was an international mobility that was partly the result of France 
facing a demographic challenge: a declining birth rate, an aging population, and the loss of many 
French young soldiers during the two successive world wars. Setting its sight on industrial 
recovery, which would require significant labor power, France turned to its former colonies. As 
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part of post-war reconstruction, migrants from across francophone Africa, particularly Senegal, 
were courted to work in French industries and on infrastructure projects. Known as the “Thirty 
Glories”, the three decades after the war saw the dirigiste revitalization of France’s economy, 
which was made possible in part by the importation of cheap labor from North and West Africa.  
France established official recruitment centers in eight foreign countries, one of which was 
Senegal.  The economic logic of immigration legislation between 1945 and 1973 enabled France 
to remedy its domestic labor shortage by extracting labor from its former colonies (Maher, 2017, 
pp. 77-91).  This led to a massive migration of Senegalese people to Europe for the latter’s labor 
needs. 
         Since the 2000s, migrations towards Europe have increased tremendously.  According to 
the Country Profile report published in 2007, approximately 32,000 migrants reached the Canary 
Islands, compared to only 4,800 the year before.3  Recently, in the specific case of Senegal, there 
have been new types of migrations.  A new phenomenon called “Barca or Barsaakh” (“Barca” 
being a reference to Barcelona in Spain, and “Barsaakh” a reference to the Arabic word for 
death), meaning “Europe or Death” has preoccupied the Senegalese.  It consists of the deaths of 
many young Senegalese people who try to reach Europe by any means necessary, including 
using boats on the oceans or crossing the Sahara desert.  Dakar, Rufisque, Thies, Mbour, 
Diourbel, Saint-Louis, Louga, Matam, Ziguinchor, all these areas and cities of Senegal are 
affected by the phenomenon of “Barca or Barsaakh”.  A high number of young people have lost 
their lives.  Despite the deaths and sufferings, young people keep on migrating.  Consequently, 
many Senegalese families have lost their sons, who represented their only hope.  This has created 
                                                          




a trauma in many families in Senegal and has affected Senegalese society.  Whether it is on 
television news, newspapers, or local meeting places, all debates revolve around the 
phenomenon of “Barca or Barsaakh”.  Senegal is in a total shock.  This is a shock that the 
country cannot endure for a long time.  My research is an investigation of the problem, that is, of 
the phenomenon of “Barca or Barsaakh”. 
        Therefore, there is a need to deal with this problem: What is going on? What is the 
phenomenon of “Barca or Barsaakh”, and how does it affect the youth and families in Senegal? 
This is what I want to investigate. 
 
Research Questions 
            To understand Senegalese migrations and particularly the phenomenon of "Barca or 
Barsaakh", different questions can be raised.  For example: 
a)  How do Migrants get to Europe? 
b)  What will migrants bring back to Senegal? 
c)  Do they travel with other family members? 
All of these questions are important.  However, these are not the types of questions I am 
interested in.  My main research question is rather: 
                Why does a whole generation of young Senegalese resort to such desperate and 
dangerous Migrations to Europe, known as the “Barca or Barsaakh” phenomenon? What 





Throughout this research, I will deal with the phenomenon of Senegalese youth’s migrations 
called ‘‘Barca or Barsaakh’’.  “Barca” is an abbreviation for Barcelona, the administrative and 
economic capital of Catalonia in Spain and its surrounding and metropolitan area.  In my study, 
it refers to Europe.  “Barsaakh” is an Arabic word that means “death”.  “Barca or Barsaakh” is a 
formulation of plucky and valiant young Senegalese migrants seeking opportunities abroad by 
braving the Atlantic Ocean and the Sahara desert at their peril.       
        The works of many scholars and writers related to the issue of migrations are one of the 
greatest sources for a general understanding of the issue.  Many of the works reflect insights 
from three broad theoretical frameworks. 
Globalization and Neoliberalism can help answer the research question because they connote a 
rise of market reforms as a global creed, a phenomenon partly engendered by the global 
economic crisis, which prompted a search for alternative economic and policy paradigms.  It puts 
emphasis on market rules and their “infallibility”.  Economic mobility becomes the fundamental 
aspect of many countries because of the fluidity of free trade in goods and services, and free 
capital circulation.  This creates massive mobility because of economic opportunities in some 
countries in the North and the economic failure in other parts of the world such as the African 
continent, where the economy is a reproduction of colonial extraverted economy that relied only 
on raw materials.  Globalization relies on multinational corporations, which exploit the country’s 
resources and leave only crumbs for governments already tempted by unlawful practices. 
Therein lies the birth of certain de-structuring practices that affect both the state and society.  
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They lead to migrations in many African countries, such as Senegal’s new phenomenon of 
“Barca or Barsaakh” (Note taken from AAS 612, Dr. Carty). 
 Neoliberalism is the ideology of globalization.  It helps answer the research question because 
with it comes calamities that ravage the African countries.  Because neoliberalism is part of 
globalization, fluid movements of people also characterize it.  Take the case of Senegal, where 
rural areas provide most of the food for the nation.  The new government’s agricultural program 
of diversification should help farmers not only to feed themselves and their families year-round 
but also to retain seeds for the next season and commercialize a significant part for liquidity.  
However, neoliberalism has brought drastic changes.  More and more, rural people such as 
leather, iron, clay smiths and workers are forced to move to the cities for additional cash flow.  
These relocations of rural populations to the city for their survival cause an anarchical growth of 
the urban population and slums that lack basic services. This accentuates insecurity in the large 
slums of the major cities.  The miserable city-living causes slum dwellers to attempt an escape to 
Europe.  Another neoliberal policy is Structural Adjustment Policies by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund.  It gives indebted states access to further credit with which to 
service their debts but in return for a radical neoliberal restructuring that includes the 
deregulation of finance and trade as well as the privatization of public assets.  Structural 
adjustment policy also imposes cuts in State subsidies, public employment, wages, which affect 
severely families.  These two combined calamities set the stage for the movement Fakh 
(Extraction: leaving by any way possible), and its slogan “Barca or Barsaakh” by young 
Senegalese. 
       Colonialism and post-colonialism are the two other broad frameworks that help explain 
migrations.  Several authors have addressed the issue in general and in relation to Senegal.  With 
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the new economic configuration of the world in the new industrial era, dependency has become a 
colonial tie mechanism allowing former colonial powers to establish not merely outposts from 
which they could still execute their system of dominance, but also to get access to their former 
colonized countries’ raw materials in order to expand their industrial economies.  Such a 
mechanism renders pliant their former colonized countries for their own specific interests.  In 
Africa, many European powers mostly used this colonial dependency as their post-independent 
method in most of their former colonies.  In Senegal, for instance, its former colonizer, France, 
even after relinquishing direct rule over Senegalese territory after its independence, has created 
colonial dependency ties with the latter and ensured a steady supply of Senegal’s raw natural 
resources to further advance its own development.  This can be seen in the Senegalese 
monoculture economy, which is driven by agriculture.  Furthermore, the Senegalese economy is 
still a colonial extraverted economy based on the massive export of its agricultural and fishing 
products to France and other parts of Europe but with low-income revenue for Senegal.  This has 
created a stagnation in the Senegalese economy.  In addition, the colonial dependency makes it 
possible for France to be the main trade partner of Senegal.  It leads Senegal to operate in the 
global economy of France and Europe rather than in favor of its national economy. This 
condition deregulates its financial market and allows Senegal’s integration in the global market.  
Such conditions have led to shortfalls in foreign exchange for Senegal and its need to borrow 
money from I.M.F to recover (Note taken from Professor Mbow’s discussion).  The end result is 
generalized poverty and lack of opportunities in Senegal.   
        In post-colonial Africa, many believed that with the independence of many African 
countries, prosperity would follow automatically.  In the 1960s, many newly independent 
African states’ hopes lied with the new African rulers, who were expected to serve their citizens 
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and to relieve their long-suffering by practicing better governance and by committing themselves 
to the development of the African continent.  A continent returning to African control where the 
interests of their citizens would be put first.  Many believed that after independence, the 
continent would make more progress after a long time of colonial oppression.  However, these 
hopes were dashed.  Authoritarian rule better characterized the new African regimes.  They 
plundered national treasuries and appropriated the natural resources at the expense of the masses.  
Such a way of governing has betrayed the aspirations and hopes of their citizens and has violated 
the rights of their people with impunity.  It is one reason why African development is stalling 
comparing to other regions.  In Senegal for instance, post-colonial rulers have used authoritarian 
means of governance and appropriated the state resources as their personal property.  This has 
created a situation of generalized economic poverty and lack of opportunity for young people.   
        Colonialism’s dependency and post-colonialism are, thus, two other theoretical frameworks 
that help explain migrations.  The literature on migrations raises issues that are connected to 
these broad theoretical frameworks.  
        Migrations from Senegal to Europe are often viewed as outcomes of “irregularities”, which 
make Senegalese migrants desperate travelers who fall victim to human trafficking.  Their 
illegality makes migrants worthless in the eyes of the traffickers whose only goal is to make 
profits and to take advantage of the situation, as was the case under Slavery. Such conditions 
compel them to seek humanitarian protection.  Maher (2017) evokes this aspect of migrations, 
stating that, “Today what we see is an increasing victimization of the migrant subject. As such, 
the blame is often leveled against migration facilitators, who allegedly use and abuse their 
human ‘cargo’ for quick profits. It has become common in media and policy reports to suggest 
that irregular migrants the world over are manipulated into departure by greedy and 
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unscrupulous human smugglers who do not fully disclose the dangers of passage, and who take 
advantage of passive or gullible migrants. Consequently, Europe’s mission to police its borders 
becomes a humanitarian project to ‘protect’ the vulnerable migrants”. Playing on the ‘care and 
control duality of humanitarianism’, police interventions ‘control’ the national borders while 
‘caring’ for the vulnerable migrant who is presumably exploited by criminal thugs. 
       It is true that Senegalese do face increasing exploitation along their journey to Europe, such 
as being kidnapped, being held for ransom, or literally being sold by depraved people.  This 
development is due to the fact that border securitization has made entry an impossibility for 
most.  Migrants are forced to rely on traffickers.  However, I agree with Maher.  Traffickers do 
not cause migrations.  They only take advantage of the situation because many of these migrants 
feel vulnerable, desperate and naive and are always opened to rely on traffickers whom they 
consider as their conveyor who can help them navigate through their way to Europe.  But what or 
who created this situation that compels many of these migrants to live their countries? 
       Mondain, Diagne, and Randall (2013) explore also the dynamics of migrations among 
Senegalese men. The latter are motivated by the social reality and religious culture of Senegal, 
which places men as caretakers of the family.  The moral and religious values that characterize 
Senegalese Wolof society, the obligations and duty toward family and parents compel many men 
to migrate.  Failure to respect these values could lead to the marginalization and social exclusion 
of the individual.  According to the three authors, “Migrations to Europe have become a major 
source of financial and social resources for an increasing number of Senegalese men who are the 
main providers for their natal households”.  For the three authors, through migrations they hope 
to support their families, especially parents left behind, contributing to both their well-being and 
social standing in old age”.   
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       I completely agree with Mondain, Diagne, and Randall.  Senegal’s social reality and 
religious culture place men at the center of attention.  A man’s financial situation characterizes 
and determines him in the Wolof society, where duties and obligations toward the family are 
supposed to be sorted out by the man. It is impossible for the man to stay home without being 
able to meet all these expectations. Therefore, the need to provide for their families economically 
is what forces Senegalese men to migrate to Europe or elsewhere.  But this still does not explain 
why they cannot stay in Senegal to meet these obligations.  Why are resources lacking in 
Senegal? 
       Many Senegalese people choose to migrate illegally to Europe.  Mbaye (2014) explores this 
aspect of migrations by explaining the factors behind the choice to migrate illegally, knowing 
that death might occur during the trip. According to him, “the intentions to Migrate are 
determined by the economic conditions in the country of origin such as the level of income 
inequality” (Mbaye, 2014, p. 6).  Dalen, Groenwwold and Schoorl (Mbaye, 2014, p.6) assert that 
“the probability to migrate can be motivated by great expectations concerning the living 
standards at the destination”.   
       I agree with Mbaye because the economic system must be analyzed as a fundamental 
element of any country’s development.  The link between Migrations and income inequality is 
well evidenced by the fact that much of the global economy is controlled by the G20 countries 
and the remaining is divided among the other countries of the world, many of which remain 
below the poverty line.  Low economic growth and income inequality are among the main 
reasons that cause many people to migrate to other countries in order to flee hardship and to 
seize opportunities that these countries can offer them to improve their living conditions and to 
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succeed in their lives.  However, Mbaye does not explain who creates income inequality in a 
country like Senegal. 
        According to Baizian and Gonzales (2016), “Senegalese migrations to Europe have their 
roots in colonialism, and the first migrations resulted from recruitment efforts by the French 
army and administration during colonial times”.  It means that migrations have their roots during 
the time when the European system of dominance took individuals from their own land and 
transformed them into defenders of French colonies.  Furthermore, they highlight the role of the 
labor market and social capital in the migrations.  In agreement with Baizian and Gonzales, I 
stated earlier that Migrations in Senegal have their roots in the colonial period.  I take for proof 
the statue of “Demba and Dupont” in Senegal, representing an African and a French soldier, 
which is a symbol of colonial paternalism.  This view is consistent with exploring colonialism as 
a theoretical framework. 
       Migrations and the indefectible will of the young Senegalese who try at all costs to go to 
Europe are a major theme for Senegalese rappers known as “Y'en a marre” (“We are fed up”), 
considered since the 2000s as a success in Senegal with their ability to mobilize young people in 
order to be heard in the local public sphere to question and feel concerned about the issue of 
migrations. They convey messages of awareness in their texts.  Kouka (2014) in his 
anthropological study of Senegalese migrations chooses to focus on the discourse of these 
rappers as actors of social life, in relation to the phenomenon of migrations or life in exile.  As 
Kouka, states “Now taking part in mobility, a number of them, among the most emblematic of 
the current period, produce texts and express themselves in the media on the subject of 
migrations”.  According to Kouka (2014, p. 418) “This imagined geography is not comparable to 
the pure "fantasy" or phantasmagoria for the work of the imagination to have an effect; it 
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imposes itself on it to be connected with the real”. The rappers tie themselves to their lived 
experiences and those of their peers to produce a speech as anchored as possible in the daily 
reality of Senegal.   They mention and evoke in their texts the difficulties of the Senegalese life 
by blaming the Senegalese leaders perceived as being there only for their own interest and who 
are responsible for the Senegalese migrations to Europe. 
       I consider Kouka’s argument because rap represents Senegalese culture, and rappers have 
played an important role in raising the awareness of Senegalese youth who constitute the future 
and hope of the Senegalese Nation.  Taking into consideration the embezzlements and corruption 
of the Senegalese leaders, Senegalese rappers’ blame of the Senegalese leaders, perceived as the 
main causes of the Senegalese migrations to Europe, is apt. 
       In light of what these different authors have argued, I concur that the effects of globalization, 
neoliberalism, colonialism, and post-colonialism have destroyed hopes of Africans and 
particularly of Senegalese.  Not having great opportunities and better living conditions for 
themselves and their families are the socioeconomic consequences in Africa.  It is an effect of 
the negative economic growth and the development of the African Continent.  In Senegal, the 
generalized poverty and the attendant lack of economic opportunities for young people is a 
possible reason for migrations. 
Nevertheless, I do not focus on globalization and neoliberalism here because of time constraint 
imposed by my field research.  They require a collection of a different set of data.  For this 
research, I will use Colonialism and Post-Colonialism as theoretical frameworks to guide my 





H1:  If a dependency relationship develops between a colonial power and its former colony, then 
the former colony’s economy is likely to be weak and unproductive.  France’s relationship with 
Senegal is a dependent relationship in which Senegal’s monoculture economy and general 
development depend on France’s economic, financial and technical assistance.  By weakening 
the Senegalese economy, the colonial dependent situation has created conditions of generalized 
poverty and lack of economic opportunities for young people. This situation causes migrations to 
Europe and elsewhere. 
H2:  The more post-colonial holders of state power resort to authoritarian rule and the 
privatization of the state, the more likely they will loot national resources for their private 
interests.  In Senegal, post-colonial rulers have used authoritarian means of governance and 
appropriated the state resources as personal property.  This has created a situation of generalized 
poverty and lack of economic opportunities for young people.  The outcome has been massive 
migrations to Europe and elsewhere. 
 
Methods    
        In order to test these two hypotheses, in light of research topic, which depicts the social 
context of a particular population, I use a qualitative research approach.  The latter helps 
illuminate and understand complex psychosocial issues and better answers the humanistic 
question of why and how.  It brings flexibility and provides an effective way of collecting the 
type of information sought by my research question.  To collect the data, I resorted to sampling, 




        Sampling is as a systematic selecting process that helps identify the subjects or informants 
of the study.  In other words, it defines and selects a subset of population for any given or 
particular study.  It was an appropriate method for me to use as it targeted and selected 
individuals sharing the same culture and representing the society about which I was collecting 
data.  Each individual selected for the collection of data represented the sample frame.  
Therefore, I used the group of those Senegalese who left for Europe or who attempted to leave 
for Europe, their families and friends who still live in Senegal. 
 
Snowballing sampling 
        Snowball or chain sampling usually involves utilizing well-informed people to identify 
critical cases or informants who have a great deal of information about a phenomenon.  As a 
researcher, I followed this chain of contacts in order to identify informants I did not know and to 
accumulate more information.  Often a few key informants or cases were mentioned multiple 
times and took on additional importance.  It was represented as a chain referral sampling.  One 
research participant referred to another, that person referred to another and the latter referred me 
to another unsuspected informant.  Thus, a chain of potential participants was identified.  For me, 
it was also a useful strategy to use when my group of interest was likely to be difficult to find, 
not only because of some stigma associated with the group but also because the group appeared 
relatively rare.  By contacting some members of Senegalese communities living in Senegal, they 
referred me to other people who also were able to provide in-depth and detailed information 




        I used both male and female participants to convey different articulations and experiences 
germane to my research.  I had in mind those who constituted the first wave of migrations and 
their family members in Senegal and those who experienced the impact of migrations with the 




       Much of qualitative research entails oral interviews.  The latter constitute a fundamental way 
for a complete answer to a research question.  Oral Interviews may be designated as structured or 
rigid when data are collected by the same flow, same questions, and the same order.  The 
questions asked are generally limited, thus allowing short answers and only enough useful data 
in a particular research study.  In this study, semi-structured interviews, which allow more open-
ended answers without any formalized or strictly-followed list of questions, were used in order to 
add creativity and to help develop further avenues for data collection. 
 
Documents and Archives 
     I collected data through documents and archives.  For the documents, I consulted those 
provided by the Senegalese government, particularly those of the Senegalese ministries of youth 
and national education, of labor, of foreign affairs and international cooperation.  Newspapers 
such as “L’Observateur”, “Le Soleil” and “Le Quotidien” were also consulted via Senegal’s 
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national archive, where I purchased all documents related to Senegalese migrations.  I went to 
IFAN (Fundamental Institute of Black Africa) which is an academic and research institution that 
is located at Cheikh Anta Diop University of Dakar.  Its aim is to help students and researchers 
by facilitating access to necessary resources in their field of research.  I also went to CODESRIA 
(Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa). The latter’s main aims are 
to develop scientific capabilities and tools that promote the cohesion, well-being, and progress of 
African societies.  Unfortunately, I did not get access to their archives because by the time I was 
there, they were closed until further notice. 
 
 Interest of this Study 
        I am interested in this study for several reasons.  First, because it reflects the lives of many 
Senegalese young people and is part of my own experience as part of this generation.  In fact, in 
Senegal, we young people of my generation (18-29) used to find ourselves in a corner called the 
“corner of the lost” that was behind Cheikh Anta Diop University of Dakar, next to the beach, to 
meditate and to exchange ideas concerning our future.  Always present at this corner, I can 
testify about the feeling of disappointment and despair of these young people who were very 
worried about the future. These feelings and concerns caused many of them to make bad 
decisions to migrate and face the “Barca or Barsaakh” phenomenon as the only possible way to 
leave the chaotic situation in Senegal for a better tomorrow.  Thus, it is of major interest for me 
to contribute through this study to an understanding of the aches and pains of the young 
Senegalese people in the hope of seeing some change in the Senegalese society. 
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       Second, the study sheds light on the incapacity of the African State, and particularly the 
Senegalese State, to unleash the potential of its youth as manifested through the inadequacy of 
the education system.  As a result, to leave the country or to stay is now a matter of life and death 
both literally and metaphorically.  Thus, this study will help inform the state by hopefully 
awakening the awareness of these Senegalese leaders to consider and to open the door to these 
Senegalese young people who constitute the hope of the nation of tomorrow. 
      Third, as a student in the African American department, the study’s interests also lie in its 
Pan African implications because many of Senegal’s problems are shared by other African 
countries.  Senegalese, African American and Afro South Americans share the racial component 
of Migration.  Thus, this study will help to raise the debate of leadership and management in the 
Pan-African world. 
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       Imperialism is originated from the Latin word imperium, which means supreme power and 
has become a policy or ideology of extending a country's rule over foreign nations, often by 
military force or by gaining political and economic control of other areas.4 The theory of 
imperialism is dominated by Lenin’s contribution and Marxist scholars of imperialism.  
According to Lenin and Marxist scholars of imperialism, “Imperialism was not simply a policy, 
but an indispensable stage of capitalist growth and development, the higher stage of capitalism 
because of its power to extract a surplus-value, to expand production, and to increase privileged 
investment under competition.  Imperialist expansion displays five characteristics: (1) the 
concentration of a production and capital so that it creates monopolies; (2) the fusion between 
banking capital and industrial capital occurs as the result of concentration of production in 
monopolies.  This merger gives rise to the finance capital dominated by financial oligarchies and 
financial traders; (3) the exportation of capital, which is more important than the export of 
commodities into other countries, thanks to foreign investments; (4) the formation of 
international capitalist monopolies that share the world among themselves; (5) the territorial 
division of the whole world by great powers” (Yansane, 1980, p.10).  For Hobson who preceded 
Lenin’s contribution, “Imperialism was a policy adopted in capitalist societies because of 
inequalities in the distribution of wealth.  When consumption failed to keep pace with the growth 
of production power in developed capitalist economies which were haunted by 
underemployment and convinced that more goods can be produced than can be sold at a profit 
and that more capital exists than can be found a remunerative investment, the resulting state of 
                                                          




over saving made imperialism a necessity” (Yansané, 1980, p. 9).  Campbell (2015, pp. 99-100) 
defines it as “a worldwide expression of the search for profits and the ever-increasing 
accumulation of surplus value by monopoly-financial capital centered in two parts of the world; 
first in Europe, and then in North America.  Placing its fact within the general trajectory of the 
evolution of the transcendental factor, which has changed the face of the world, namely capital 
and the process of its accumulation, imperialism refers to piracy transplanted from the seas to dry 
land. It is piracy reorganized, consolidated, and adapted to the aim of exploiting the natural and 
human resources of our peoples”.  “It was the highest stage of capitalism”, said Lenin (Nkrumah, 
1965, p. 37). 
       The singularity of imperialism in Africa was marked by the period when Europeans and 
foreign powers invaded the continent, exercised supreme authority, and forced the African 
society to relinquish power entirely to Europeans.  As a system of domination and subordination 
organized with an imperial center and a periphery, it gained tremendous momentum in the 
history of Africa.  It became the product of specific historical conditions that marked the starting 
point, which made possible the emergence of byproducts such as colonialism and dependency, 
post-colonialism, globalization and its neoliberal ideology that occurred in the next decades of 
world history with particular consequences in the African continent.  The combination of these 
three episodes: colonialism, post-colonialism, and globalization and its neoliberal ideology as the 
byproducts of imperialism continue to contribute to the legacy of western hegemony and the 
notion of weak state attributed to Africa.  Hereafter I discuss these three episodes, although I rely 
on colonialism and dependency and post-colonialism as my conceptual and theoretical 




Colonialism and Dependency Relations 
       Colonialism was the policy of a nation seeking to extend or retain its authority over other 
people or territories (Webster, 1989, p. 291).  From Rodney’s perspective (1972), its general aim 
was for economic dominance.  The colonizing country sought to benefit from the colonized 
country or landmass.  In the process, colonizers imposed their religion, economics, and 
medicinal practices on the natives.  According to Yansané (1980, p. 9), “colonialism had a few 
characteristic features.  First, colonial domination made the colonists secure economic 
advantages by acquiring more land, properties, and material resources.  Second, the colonists 
ravaged and destroyed many independent and indigenous ways of life and cultures.  Third, the 
rise of racism as an ideology justified and rationalized the dehumanizing and depersonalizing 
aspect of colonialism.  Fourth, political economy and social institutions were established to 
continue European domination, to incorporate and subordinate the African people by 
colonialism, and to strengthen their attachment to the expanding European capitalist economic 
and trading activities from the fifteenth century to the present”. 
       Driven by imperialism, colonialism, as the practice of the idea of a system of dominance 
over the periphery, designed institution that would primarily benefit Europe.  With the Berlin 
conference (1884-1885), countries like Great Britain, Portugal, German, France, Italy, 
Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck and King Leopold II of Belgium, among others, partitioned and 
carved up the African continent into spheres of influence.  The European colonial powers were 
seeking to establish not merely outposts from which they could launch campaigns against each 
other to preserve their geopolitical dominance, but also new resources for the raw materials they 
needed to expand their industrial economies.  The territories established after the Berlin 
conference served the interests of the colonial powers well. The administrations they set up were 
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not interested in the genuine development of an empowered local populace; they were there 
either to ensure the flow of raw materials to the mother countries or to provide representation and 
organizational capacity for the white settlers who were encouraged to colonize the new 
territories, in the name of developing them and to “civilize” and Christianize third-world 
countries the native peoples (Maathai, 2009, p. 26). 
      The first five of the 25 articles issued from the “Charter” was developed and traded discretely 
at the “Berlin conference in 1885”.  They were secretly renegotiated two years after World War 
II at “Yalta” in February 1947, and had partitioned the world in two blocks: the colonial 
metropole and Africa.  According to CoupsFrancs Journal (2018), the Charter stated 
approximately the following:  (Article 1): From the motto of Imperialism: rule the world and 
control the riches of the planet; our policy is to divide to better rule, dominate, exploit and raid to 
fill our banks and make them the most powerful in the world.  (Article 2): No third-world 
country is a sovereign and independent state.  (Article 3): All power in the countries of the third 
world comes from us, who exercise it by pressure on the leaders who are just our puppets. 
Nobody in the third world can give itself the exercise.  (Article 4): All Third-world countries are 
divisible and their borders are accessible to our will. Respect for territorial integrity does not 
exist for the third world.  (Article 5): All dictators must put their fortune in our banks for the 
security of our interests. This fortune will serve as donations and credits granted by us as 
assistance and development assistance.5 
      Although these are a rough interpretation of the charter, because of the partition of and 
scramble for Africa at the Berlin Conference, currently Africa is subject to the same strategy by a 
                                                          





different costs of players.  There are no more underground and secretive movements or activities 
of the partition of Africa as it was at the Berlin conference.6  Nevertheless, looking at how those 
scrambling for Africa are partitioning, if not repartitioning it, Africa is facing a modern-time 
scramble or new scramble (Dzingirai, 2003; Lee, 2006; Frynas and Paulo, 2006; and 
Habiyaremye, 2011).  The current scramble is about the leverage and extraction of resources 
whereby those former colonial powers scrambling for Africa do not necessarily need to occupy it 
directly.  Instead, they want to use Africans themselves to do the show.  While Africa was not 
aware of the first scramble for itself during the precolonial, colonial and post-colonial time, it 
still is the subject of a scramble in the modern time, as the continent is still dependent on its 
former colonizers.  The latter continue to play their cards smartly based on their acquired 
experience from the history of colonialism and imperialism in Africa.   
       During the heyday of the world economic expansion era7, there was an economic 
reconfiguration incorporated into the world system.  As Wallerstein (Wallerstein, 2004) 
characterizes it, “the world system is as a set of mechanisms, which redistributes surplus value 
from the periphery to the core”.  In his terminology, the core is the developed, industrialized part 
of the world, and the periphery is the “underdeveloped”, typically raw materials-exporting from 
the poor part of the world.  In the new world marked by a global economic configuration, the 
market is the means by which the core exploits the periphery.  It has established imbalance and 
privilege upon nations such as the industrialized and the underdeveloped countries particularly 
                                                          
6 The Scramble for Africa was a late nineteenth century rush by major Western European powers to stake territorial claims in 
Africa. Partition of Africa formalized these claims, and imperial occupation was eventually accomplished through military 
conquest from the late 1880s to the early twentieth century. For a summary of these historical processes, see Robert O. Collins 
and James Burns, A History of Sub-Saharan Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007: 265-279. 
7 “Economic expansion era” is an economic growth period, a period where there is an increase in the level of economic activity, 




Africa.  According to the economist Goldstein (Mhango, 2017, p. 117): “Africa is endowed with 
attractive extractive resources such as oil, mining, and timber that are very capital-incentive”.  
Because of such wealth in terms of natural resources, many Europeans countries, due to their 
hegemony and the colonial relation they built, have participated in massive exploitation of 
African countries by raw materials exporting, international division of labor, free market, and 
free trade in order to accumulate wealth. 
        Therefore, the concept of colonialism and dependency automatically came into existence 
when parts of Africa were caught in the web of international commerce.  On the one hand, there 
were the European countries who decided on the role to be played by the African economy 
because they made their African colonies’ monoculture economies entirely dependent on the 
metropolitan buyers of their produce; and on the other hand, Africa formed an extension to the 
European capitalist market.  The latter double Western countries’ wealth by exploiting Africa’s 
cash-crops and buying raw materials from Africa at low prices and then processing and selling 
them back to Africa at hiked prices because “as far as foreign trade was concerned, Africa was 
dependent on what Europeans were prepared to buy and sell” (Rodney, 1972, p. 76).  In my 
understanding, the colonized (Africa) is like a person who is fallen into a hole.  Its former 
colonizers represent the person holding a rope and telling her, “I will throw you a rope so you 
can get out”.  While the rope provided is never quite long enough for her to grab on to it, it is 
long enough so she has the hope of reaching it.  At the same time, the person holding the rope 
throws spades and is encouraging the person in the hole to dig herself in deeper.  In other words, 
from the outset in the game, Africa’s former colonizers are not motivated by the love of Africa or 
the intention to help it out but to exploit it.  In the hope of seeing its economic development to 
proceed after the trade became truly international, Africa was integrated into the global market 
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by its former colonial powers, who at the same time undermined its stated objectives.  Africa 
achieved a completely opposite outcome, leaving the majority of the African states dependent 
rather than empowered because, as Rodney (1972, p. 75) asserted, “The relationship between 
Africa and Western Europe was just to ensure the transfer of wealth from Africa to Europe and 
the contention here is that Africa helped to develop Western Europe in the same proportion as 
Western Europe helped to underdevelop Africa”. 
       With the colonization of Africa, Europeans in their respective colonies applied two 
contrasting ideals.  They were the philosophy of indirect and direct rule.  The philosophy of 
indirect rule, which is associated closely with the name of Lord Lugard (a British officer, 
colonial administrator, explorer of Africa, governor of Hong Kong and then of Nigeria, and 
practitioner that came to be known as one of the best theorists of indirect rule matters), became 
dominant in British imperial thinking between the two World Wars.  It held that the most 
appropriate way to administer the newly acquired territories was to operate through the existing 
political authorities rather than to act directly upon the people.  In this way, the impact of 
imperial rule was less obvious to ordinary Africans and much of the day-to-day political activity 
of the rural areas was left apparently undisturbed.  This philosophy had a threefold origin: the 
parsimony of the British Treasury, which necessitated a cheap method of administration; a 
genuine belief in the sanctity of local institutions and a fear of the social and political ills which 
follow their decay; and, finally Lord Lugard’s own experience in Northern Nigeria where easily 
discernible political rulers had been the obvious tools for his administration (Hodder-Williams, 
1984, p. 33). 
       The philosophy of direct rule, by contrast, minimized the importance of existing political 
organizations.  The paradigm for this essential French conception was a bureaucratic state in 
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which officials were appointed at every level, each level being ultimately responsible to the 
imperial government itself.  There were domestic reasons for such a preference.  The French 
state was a centralized, bureaucratic state in which the preféts in départments were powerful 
agents of the central government.  The French motives for imperial expansion were more 
positive than the British and thus more easily attracted government funds.  There was not in 
France tradition, and approval, of local government autonomy.  Thus, the governors-general of 
French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa, for instance, who were themselves subject to 
control from Paris, were the heads of centralized hierarchies; their control extended over the 
governors of the individual territories, the appointed commendant de cercle and chef de 
subdivision (roughly the equivalent to the district commissioner and district officer in the British 
Empire), and the appointed chef de canton and chef de village, whose authority depended not 
upon his standing in the local political system but upon his efficiency as a tax collector.  Orders 
thus went down the line of command and there was little feedback, or room for the initiative, 
through political channels to which villagers had access (Hodder-Williams, 1984, p. 33-34). 
      The difference in this dichotomy between the French and British philosophies of imperial 
rule can be summed up by saying that the French policy was designed to create black 
Frenchmen, while British policy was designed to create Africans with British characteristics.  In 
the French colonies, there was the assimilationist policy that was incorporated into the colonies’ 
educational system, which from primary to university level was made free, secular, and carried 
out exclusively in the French language.  This assimilationist policy also allowed France to 
entrust their interests to the élites, professors, and their recruits to black officers (Symonds, 1966, 
p. 213).  The centralized political structures and those assimilated people moved the centre of 
political competition to the national level, where the political parties were responsive not to local 
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barons but to the need for influence in the French National Assembly (Hodder-Williams, 1984, 
p. 44).  But on the British side, there was never any thought of assimilation.  Although the ideas 
behind the policies may have been different, the practices of imperial rule on both sides had the 
same purposes that were to have the control of Africa and make the continent available to their 
disposal. 
      By 1900, a significant part of Africa had been colonized by European powers.  For instance, 
British dominated Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, The Anglo-Egyptian Susan, Uganda, 
Northern and Southern Rhodesia, and the Union of South Africa.  French dominated West Africa 
and Equatorial Africa. The colonial state was the machinery of administrative domination 







     
Map retrieved from Exploring African: http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/colonial-exploration-and-conquest-in-africa-
explore/ 
                                                          






       According to Mhango (2017, p. 124), “Africa has immense resources that many rich 
countries need.  But Africa has never benefited from its humungous resources.  Thanks to 
colonial and the archaic and exploitative nature of international trade, Africa’s resources have 
become a curse of its own”.  “This resources curse has turned Africa into a witness of its 
robbery” (Robinson and Verdier, 2006; Mideksa, 2013; and Haber, and Menaldo, 2011).   
      Mhango (2016) addresses colonial legacies as the major causes of Africa’s 
underdevelopment.  He argues that the division of Africa did not only weaken African countries 
but also created artificial identities, dependency, perpetual exploitation through neo-colonialism 
and enmity among African countries, and suggests that the only way to turn the resource curse 
into blessings is only through reunifying Africa so as to have a say in international affairs just 
like the US or Canada have whereby the money and resources that fund war and the war of 
economies will be channeled and invested in economically and socially beneficial uses. 
       According to Mhango (2017, p. 179), “ Many hyper iconized and eulogized European racist 
scholars such as G.W. F Hegel, Darwin, Ibn Khaldrun, Francois-Marie Arouet (Voltaire), Ibn 
Sina or Avicenna. David Hume, Emanuel Kant, Ibn Qutaybah and others, viewed Africa as an 
android that will never do anything meaningful for itself while at the same time it has for many 
years contributed immensely for the prosperity of the world”.  From this point of view, most 
Western countries tip the balance in international affairs and world economy with the means of 
dependency by continuing to perpetuate their routines and habits with Africa, their daily 
homework of exploiting Africa’s natural resources by practicing plundering, deceit, and 
manipulations as the same rules of the game that make them prosperous and respectable.  
Conversely, in the case of Africa, it credulously lives with the infamy of excruciating 
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dependency that leads to the suffering, desperate situation of its citizens, poverty, and beggary in 
the country because Africa has allowed itself to become the backyard of the world.  Essentially, 
Africa expects its development by depending on Western countries to export development to it 
instead of adopting some strategies to top up to what it naturally is endowed with (Note taken 
from AAS 612, Dr. Carty).  Furthermore, Africa’s development results from an external spur that 
does not emanate from and rest in the hearts, minds, and the shoulders of Africa itself, but it 
relies on whatever external forces can offer.  Countries keep on allowing foreigners to define 
them and decide for them, thus making Africa dig itself deeper in backwardness and remain in 
slumber.   
      According to Clapham (1996, p. 98), “Post-colonialism was the most exclusive manifestation 
of colonial dependency relation, between a single former metropole on the one hand, and its 
former colonized country on the other.  Even multilateral organizations such as the Francophone 
Community and the Commonwealth were in essence clusters of bilateral relationships, in which 
the connections of each of the individual members with France or Britain were on a different 
plane from those, which they had with one another.  The incorporation of all Africa’s former 
colonizers into the European Community,9 and their creation of a multilateral relationship among 
themselves, none the less brought with it a multilateralization of their relations with Africa, and 
in turn, broadened the linkages which African states could seek in Europe”.  “Postcoloniality was 
the condition of what we might ungenerously call a comprador intelligentsia: of a relatively 
small, Western-Style, Western-trained, group of writers and thinkers, who mediated the trade in 
cultural commodities of world capitalism at the periphery.  In the West they were known through 
                                                          
9 The Term “European Community” (or EC) is used throughout this section, for an institution that has successively been known 
as the European Common Market, the European Community, and Economic Community, and most recently the European Union. 
33 
 
the Africa they offered; their compatriots knew them both through the West they presented to 
Africa and through Africa, they had invented for the world, for each other and Africa” said 
Appiah (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, 1995, p. 119).  Put it differently, post-colonialism was 
the period when Africa’s continent transitioning through colonialism, was influenced by many 
Western thinkers to borrow and adapt the Western’s cultural forms of capitalism where 
everything was based on accumulation and commodification.  This period represented not only a 
period to create a normative type of society in Africa but also a dependency relation in the 
formerly colonized continent Africa. 
       For Clapham (1996, pp. 98-99), “Academic analysis of this relationship has almost 
exclusively been concerned with Lomé Conventions, which from 1975 linked the two groups of 
States within a common trading structure, and within that with the impact of the Conventions on 
African economic development.  This discussion will take a different emphasis.  The effects of 
the Lomé Conventions on African development were in any event negligible, and their 
provisions are of interest largely as indicating the balance of relative advantage, which existed at 
the time when each of them was negotiated.  The aid provisions of the Conventions, however, 
provided African states with a significant source of income, while at the same time subjecting 
them to the peculiar pressures and tensions, which any relationship creates.  More generally, this 
relationship provided European Community states with a mechanism through which to pursue 
their individual or collective interests in Africa, while giving false alternative points at the same 
time to African states of accessing to Western Europe financial support”. 
       In its origin, the initiative for establishing special links between the European Community 
and its former African colonies came very largely from France, which established sphere of 
influence and especial relation over its former colonies in Africa known under the expression of 
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“Françafrique”.10 The latter allowed France to continue to maintain dependency relations and to 
practice its foreign policy over its former colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa.  One of the salient 
examples that can be given to corroborate this idea of special relation within dependency is the 
“CFA Franc”.  Established during the Bretton wood agreement in December 1945, it became the 
current and common money of 14 African States members of the “Franc Zone” as a way of 
maintenance of a special relationship between France and the Francophone states of Africa.11 At 
its most cynical, indeed, it could be regarded as a mechanism through which other states in the 
Community (and especially Germany) could be induced to contribute to the French aid budget, 
and through which the special trading relationship between France and the Former colonies 
could be extended to the rest of the Community while remaining essentially under French 
control.  The founding members of the Community, France had overwhelmingly the most 
important interests in Africa, and though the arrangements made for former French colonies had 
to be extended to those of greatest gainers.  This largely French connection led first to the 
provision for the ‘association’ of the African colonies of Community members under the Treaty 
of Rome, and subsequently to the negotiation of the Yaoundé Conventions between the 
Community and 18 of their former African colonies (Clapham, 1996, p. 99).  According to 
Zartman (1971) “The first Yaoundé Convention came into effect in 1963, and the second 1969; 
but though they put the relationship between the 6 states of the EC and their African former 
colonies formally on the basis of an agreement between independent states, and maintained the 
European Development Fund for EC aid, they were too restricted in scope, and too uneven in the 
                                                          
10 “Françafrique”, derived from the expression of France-Africa, it is generally used in a pejorative way to designate the special 
relationship between France and its former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa during the post-colonial period. 
 




bargaining power of the two sides, to constitute more than a partial multilateralism of previously 
bilateral post-colonial economic relationships”.  
        Once again, Africa was at the Centre of the world, and promises were many.  However, the 
game has remained the same.  Britain joined to the EC membership.  By doing so, the United 
Kingdom adopted a strategy to make it necessary to extend the EC-African relationship to 
Commonwealth African states, and in the event led to the inclusion of all independent sub-
Saharan states, which wished to take part, except for South Africa, while France used 
Francophone linkages to rekindle their colonial ties.  In addition to that, there are now emerging 
blocs such as China, India, Japan, and Turkey, among others, as a counterweight to the West, but 
which are espousing the same Western strategies.  All these new countries promise heavens 
while blaming the former colonial powers.  Zhang Ming (Mhango, 2017, p. 119), China’s Vice-
Minister for Foreign Affairs recently said that, “There is never a shortage of conferences and 
promises for Africa, and yet action and implementation have not always followed”.  I believe 
that even when the actions were followed, Africa would not have any gains.  Zhang’s statement 
is still a strategy to jockey for a position to meet some African leaders of the countries that hold 
resources these courters need.  “Those who summon Africa prepare themselves based on their 
interests, strategies, and timing while Africa just fits in without any pre-prep arrangement” 
(Mhango, 2017, p. 122).  Those hegemonic powers seek to take advantage of Africa’s natural 
resources and cash crop producing in order to reinforce their economic and financial muscles not 
to mention their technological advancement while Africa is weakened, and relies on promises, 
hoping that there is goodwill or love in business. 
      Thus, these are the consequences of colonization and dependency ties through which former 
colonial powers imposed their power and reinforced a sense of superiority vis-à-vis their former 
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colonized countries in Africa.  The latter accepted an inferiority complex and weakness vis-à-vis 
their former colonial rulers.  As a matter of fact, even after independence, this ideology is still 
persistent in most African countries and makes Western rule effective.  Africa is still 
manipulated and persuaded to accept that it not only is inherently inferior but also should 
gratefully receive the wisdom of the so-called “superior” (former metropole) that renders 
Africa’s continent’s economy pliant, weak and unproductive.  Africa, naively and blindly 
believes that the only choice it has is to be reliant on outside guidance and direction.  This 
experience exposes Africa to a deep dependency relation.  Because of this dependency, relations 
that connected Africa with its former colonizers during the colonial era still prevail and make 
Africa play the subordinate role to the former colonial metropole.  Not able to alter the 
fundamental inequality that was built into that colonial relation which persists through the 
economic means, Africa’s economy is weakened and affects African countries’ development.  
Consequently, it leads to a condition of generalized poverty and lack of economic opportunities 
for many young African people.  This situation causes migrations to Europe and elsewhere. 
 
Post-Colonialism 
       “Post-colonialism begins from the very first moment of colonial contact.  It is the discourse 
of oppositionality which colonialism brings into being.  In this sense, post-colonialism writing 
has a very long history” (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, 1995, p. 117).  Nevertheless it true that 
the intensification of theoretical interest in the post-colonial era has coincided with the rise of 
African rulers to the leadership in the 1960s.  The rise of the new African rulers in the newly 
37 
 
independent countries has come with a new behavior in their way of governing that tends to be 
generally “authoritarian”.12 
      In this perspective, the notion of “post-colony” identifies itself specifically as a given 
historical trajectory, that of societies recently emerging from the experience of colonization and 
the new type of behavior that comes up within the newly independent states because of their 
leaders.  To be sure, as Achille Mbembe puts it, the post-colony is chaotically pluralistic in the 
sense that politics and decision-making are primarily within the framework of the new rulers.  It 
is a specific system, a particular way of fabricating simulacra or re-forming stereotypes.  In other 
words, a designed state apparatus appears neither to refer to any underlying reality nor to claim 
to be worthwhile for that reality itself.  But it appears just as an economic junction of signs in 
which power is possessively mirrored and imagined self-reflectively, and at the expense of the 
masses.  It is characterized by a style of political improvisation and modus operandi that 
accounts for their own sake rather than one of their citizens, by an excess tendency and desire to 
privatize the state power as their legitimate property, as well as by a new practice against the 
civil society’s will, interest, and expectation.  It is made of a series of corporate institutions 
whose aims are to accumulate wealth and a political machinery that, once in place, constitutes a 
distinctive regime of violence.  This set of behaviors the Cameroonian philosopher and post-
colonialism theorist, identifies it with “Power, violence and accumulation”.  Because of these 
three, in Black Africa the question of a reflection on the economy is marked by a renewed 
decadence.  Although multifaceted, this decadence is reduced to its economic aspect.  And the 
                                                          
12 Authoritarian is used through this section to refer to the way in which new African rulers’ behavior in the newly independent 
continent Africa that basically is associated with a principle of blind submission of authority as opposed to individual freedom of 
thought and action. 
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solutions envisaged by both the external actors and by the natives themselves hardly escape this 
reductionism, this fixation on the economic side of a multi-faceted impasse.13 
      Under these conditions, the linkage to the world economy could not be favorable to the local 
societies because the main source of the colonial mode of production was the manipulation by 
the post-colonial holders of state power.  Their new regulatory and coercive apparatus entangle 
with those formerly initiated by the colonial metropole.  The latter induces the new African 
rulers to perpetuate the same system in a sense to continue to promote and consolidate the steady 
supply of natural resources.14 
      This said, I am more concerned with the post-colonial holders of state power in Africa, and 
the way they privatize and monopolize the state resources as their personal property. 
      Since their accession to independence, many African rulers had operated under the shadow of 
the colonial system.  They dovetail with the former colonial metropole and have created a way of 
governing based on oppression on their newly independent States.  They promoted the same 
system of oppression initiated by the former colonial powers and shaped public and foreign 
policy designed principally for their own interests and for the benefit of the former colonial 
powers.  Post-colonial African leaders were supposed to make possible the creation of utilities, to 
produce value and wealth by putting an end to scarcity and poverty, to ensure the satisfaction of 
the needs of their citizens by protecting them and their natural resources from outside predators, 
and to create a continent, where the ideas of democracy and autonomy representation could come 
into being and “common” or “general” interest would prevail.  Instead of being motivated by the 
                                                          






sense of service to their people by putting an end to the power of customs, traditions, and 
authorities perceived as unjust and tyrannical, and by practicing a better governance that could 
create opportunities for their people to prosper, post-colonial African leaders and holders of state 
power tend to be coercive and authoritarian.  Postcolonial regimes of African rulers betrayed the 
aspirations and violated the rights of their people with impunity.  They plundered the national 
treasuries and resources often plunging their citizens into fruitless wars, both civil and regional.  
Though they were members of the community, such chiefs and their assistances were de facto 
agents and information gatherers for their former imperial powers.  These local autocrats did 
everything they could to promote the oppressive, exploitative and undemocratic authority of the 
colonial government and ruled their own people with even greater cruelty than the departing 
colonizers by privatizing the state, and by engaging blatantly themselves in a mass looting; they 
stall Africa’s development and impeded the sustainable growth and stability of the continent, and 
the welfare’s promotion of the continent’s citizens (Note taken from AAS 525, Prof. Diallo). 
      As such, the new African holders of state power deeply disappointed their citizens’ 
expectations to be served and to be relieved of their long suffering by a better governance and a 
commitment to the development of the new emerging African continent. A continent under the 
African control and where the interest of the citizens should be put forward first.  But the African 
rulers had adopted an authoritarian propensity, resembling the colonial systems of governance 
that was designed principally to facilitate the continued exploitation of human and natural 
resources of the colonies for the benefit of the colonial powers.  The latter, although they were 
relinquishing direct rule over their former colonies, they were eager to maintain economic ties 
with the so-called new independent states, by making sure that the new leaders or rulers, who 
eventually held power in the former colonies were as cooperative politically as they were pliant 
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economically to ensure a steady supply of the raw natural resources that had provided their 
countries with such wealth during the colonial period.  At the same time, those African leaders 
who conformed, were rewarded with political protection from would-be plotters of coups d’états.  
They were given economic assistance they did not have to account for, such as opportunities to 
open secret bank accounts or purchase expensive villas in foreign capitals.  Their armies were 
well supplied with weapons and equipment, which were used mostly to silence their own citizens 
(Maathai, 2009, pp. 29-30). 
       With regard to governing, two factors spring to mind. The first is that dealing with human 
behavior and how it is regulated in a state with state instruments means not simply to look at 
what constitutes the strength and reason of the state, but also to ask questions about the actual 
forms of power, its manifestations and the various techniques that it uses to enhance its value, 
distribute the labor product, and either ensure abundance or manage poverty and scarcity.  And 
since Africa both before and after colonization state power enhanced its value by establishing 
specific relations of subjection, something must be said about the relationships between 
subjection, the distribution of wealth and tribute and the moral general problem of the 
constitution of the postcolonial subject.  The second factor is that postcolonial African regimes 
have not invented what they know of government from scratch.  Their knowledge is the product 
of several cultural heritages and traditions of which the features have become entangled over 
time, to the point where something has emerged that has the look of “custom” without being 
reducible to it, and partakes of “modernity” without being wholly included in it.  One part of this 
knowledge or rationality is colonial rationality (Mbembe, 2001, pp. 24-25). 
      State sovereignty in the newly independent Africa had, in principle, two main features.  On 
the hand, it combined weakness of, and inflation of, the notion of right: weakness of right in that, 
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in the relations of power and authority, the model was, in both theory and practice, the exact 
opposite of the liberal model of debate and discussion; inflation of right of conquest, the very 
concept of right often stood revealed as void.  On the other hand, it rested on the form of 
violence that was designed to ensure the authority’s maintenance, spread, and permanence.  
Falling well short of what is properly called “dictatorship”, it recurred again and again in the 
most banal and ordinary situations crystallized through a gradual accumulation of numerous acts 
and rituals that in short, played so importantly a role in everyday life that it ended up constituting 
the central cultural imaginary that the state itself shared with society, and thus had an 
authenticating and reiterating function (Mbembe, 2001, p. 25). 
      The lack of justice of the means, and the lack of legitimacy of the ends, conspired to allow an 
arbitrariness and intrinsic unconditionality that may be said to have been the distinctive feature 
of the former colonial sovereignty and its credo of power in the colony, was the one post-
colonial holders of state power adopted.  They promoted this unconditionality and the regime of 
impunity and resorted to authoritarianism within Africa and its corollary in the African continent.  
These new African regimes which espoused the model of the colonial governance through 
authoritarian’s propensity made it possible for the former colonial metropoles to make equipment 
and goods available to them and was justified by the fact that they were to be enrolled into the 
structures of production that were administrated by their decentralized state apparatus, to be 
precise by their new agents called African rulers or elites through specialized institutions 
reshaped for this purpose.  They could at any moment, usurp the law and, in the same name as 
the state, and exercise the law purely for private ends.  Nobody in the African continent could lay 
claim to his or her right.  They conformed themselves with the prevailing rules because of the 
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type of oppression they underwent in their daily life in the African continent (Mbembe, 2001, pp. 
26-31). 
       In addition, there is a social policy of postcolonial African regimes that have been conceived 
based on an imaginary, which the state makes the organizer of public happiness.  As Such, the 
state arrogated the possibility of exercising an unlimited hold over every individual although in 
practice, whether in colonial times or since the outsize place of the state was never total.  Neither 
colonial commandment nor the postcolonial state was able to bring about the total dismantling, 
still less the disappearance, of every corporation and all lower-order legitimacies bringing people 
and communities together at the local level.  In a number of cases, state domination or the 
“etatisation” of society was achieved through the old hierarchies and old patronage networks, 
which led to two movements: The privatization of public prerogatives and socialization of 
arbitrariness, becoming in this process as the cement of postcolonial African authoritarian 
regimes.  Moreover, throughout the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, governing 
in the African continent means primarily having commandment over the African citizens.  
Exercising it thus meant to compel people to perform “obligations” like an army with orders and 
demands.  Power was reduced to the right to demand, to force, to ban, to compel, to authorize, to 
punish, to reward, to be obeyed in short, to join and to direct.  The key characteristic of the post-
colonial rule of these African leaders who had no loyalty to Africa was thus to issue orders and 
have them carried out and also involving in mass lootings or embezzlements of the state 
resources at the expense of the masses, to set out how to create foreign bank account in the 
western former colonial motherland where they could be able to ship this money embezzled and 
looted from Africa (Mbembe, 2001, pp. 31-33).  In this perspective, Campbell’s article (2018), 
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asserted that, “Thus, even at the moment when the Continental Free Trade Area Treaty15 was 
signed in to create the world’s largest single market, the African leaders continue to ship their 
money to foreign bank accounts and hinder the creation of a common currency in Africa.  
Leaders beg for aid while stealing billions and lodging the loot in foreign bank accounts”.16 
      However, it is important to highlight that these transfers of money’s lootings of African 
leaders into foreign bank accounts were in perfect concomitance with setting out how to dispose 
of Africa’s continent humongous natural resources and raw material to the benefit of their former 
colonial motherland.  These African ruling elites were integrated into international networks, and 
the revenues extracted from these transactions helped them structure local systems of inequality 
and domination, facilitate the formation of coalitions or inflame factional struggles, and 
determine the types of external support that these African elites enjoyed.  In short, the structuring 
of the relations among state, market, and society also depended on the modalities of this 
integration into Western world trade thus, creating a total economic imbalance and stagnation in 
the African continent. 
      These political and economic arrangements also made it possible to sustain a complex system 
of revenue transfers from the formal official circuits to the parallel informal ones, from urban 
households to rural households, from rich to poor (Russel, 1984, p. 595).  More importantly, 
patterns of both social stratification and internal power relation between groups and ethnicities 
                                                          
15 “Continental Free Trade Area Treaty” signed in March 2018 is a treaty outlined in the African Continental Free Trade 
Agreement (Trade agreement signed in Kigali, Rwanda in force between 27 African union member states and which 54 states 
adhered in July 2019) among 54 of the 55 African Union nations. The Free Trade Area is the largest in the world in terms of 
participating countries since the formation of the World Trade Organization. 
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were also part of the bases upon which the manner of these political and economic arrangements 
worked in practice and the state was the mechanical part that both regulated and created 
inequalities.  Put it differently, the political and economic arrangement followed up the range of 
structured social order within the society and the state was the main apparatus conditioning them. 
       The post-colonial potentates were thus themselves a form of domination that, while using 
universal techniques (a state and its apparatus), had its own internal coherence and rationality 
both in the political-economic realm and in the imaginary (Caswell, 1996-1980, p. 39).   With the 
foundation of the post-colonial states grounded in authoritarian regimes, there was a purely state 
type of allocation by transforming the native employees’ salary into a claim, and the state 
granted means of livelihood to all it had put under obligation.  This meant that any salaried 
worker was necessarily dependent.  The means of livelihood he or she received were not 
designed to reward a process of converting energy into wealth but were helping shape a 
particular figure of submission and domination.  For Médard (Mbembe, 2001, p. 46), “Other 
modalities of state allocation had developed as by-products of a form of regulating political 
affairs based largely on private appropriation of public resources to create allegiances”.  Two 
conditions had made possible the crystallization of such a political order and the viability of its 
functioning.  First, there was an economy of predation based on indebtedness, expenditure, and 
deficit.  Second, a general regime of privileges and impunity made possible this economy 
relatively extended reproduction.  The appropriation of public resources and the privatization of 
the state took various forms. There were, first, the advantages and privileges that holders of 
positions of authority granted themselves, with a cumulative value sometimes far greater than the 
salary, housing, furniture, water, electricity, cars, domestic help, entertainment and travel 
expenses, and bonuses reserve funds.  Then there was a system of double accounting 
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(misappropriation): double payment of rent, false administrative leases, secret commission, 
“backhanders” and under-invoicing in the granting of public contracts, allocation of property 
rights or bank loans, misappropriation under cover of performing customs and tax procedures.  
Then, finally, there were the parallel cuts on documents and visas that were required and issued; 
this was also the case with road checks or the granting of licenses and other permits (Morice, 
1987, p. 108).  In this optic, economic orders were converted into social and political ones thanks 
to these two forms of allocation.  It was through their mediation that many persons acquired an 
idea of the “good life”, managed to overcome material scarcity, or simply were released from the 
terror imposed by lack of security, by poverty and need.  To exercise authority is, above all, tire 
out the bodies of those under it, to disempower them not so much to increase their productivity 
as to ensure the maximum docility.  To exercise authority is, furthermore, for the African 
potentates, to appropriate the natural resources for their private interest.  Moreover, the 
experience of the post-colony makes it clear that illegal activities are not conformed to ordinary 
people.  Enforcing regulations, manipulating the system of bribery, collecting taxes and levies 
forcibly confiscating hoarded goods and then selling them, all are characteristics of a situation 
where there is the privation of national resources, looting, extortion whether for cash or product, 
violence, instability, and corruption.  For the latter, Maathai (2009, p. 154) asserted that “Most of 
the African communities end up dealing with governments that are mainly interested in taking 
advantage of this vacuum created by a culture of corruption to extract as many resources as 
possible.  By exposing their own greed and selfishness, the people are easily bought, exploited, 
and victimized, thereby working against their own interests”. 
      Thus, the period of the 1960s marked the transition from colonial despotism to independence 
in many African states.  In newly independent Africa, this epoch coincided with the rise of 
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Africans as rulers of the African states.  By virtue of their control of the “state” which serves as 
“An autonomous bureaucratic apparatus of domination endowed with its own material interests 
and political agenda” (Fatton, 1992, p. 19), African leaders put forward a new style of political 
modus operandi for their own interests rather than in the interest of their citizens.  They 
constitute the ruling classes or elites and holders of state power in Africa.  “These high circles 
exercise a virtue of monopoly over state offices and institutions through which they appropriate a 
disproportionate amount of a nation’s wealth and yearly income and dominate the policy-
forming and decision-making process that structure relations’ power and property” (Domhoff, 
1971, p. 109).  By dissociating themselves from the subordinate classes and by resorting to 
coercion, patronage, and communication through the monopoly of the state apparatus, African 
postcolonial rulers repress, co-opt, and manipulate citizens, rig elections, emasculate the courts, 
and cow the press.  They pack the civil service with their own supporters and employ the secret 
police to hunt down potential opponents, using imprisonment, torture, or murder if necessary 
(Meredith, 2013, p. 378). 
       In many ways, postcolonial Africa has been dominated by authoritarianism even when it 
proclaimed itself “democratic”.  Often African leaders monopolized power by putting forward a 
one-party rule to cling to power even in their old age.  As a result, postcolonial Africa  has been 
marked by relentless attacks and destructive confrontations between leaders vying for power 
domination that lead to many coup-d’états, bloody conflicts, high level of political instability, 
and brutal repression.  The tendency toward authoritarianism even in the democratic regimes, 
such as Senegal, is what Sangmpam has called overpoliticization (Sangmpam, 2007). 
      This behavior of the African potentates toward authoritarianism involves impulses of failed 
integration.  As Mbembe (2001, p. 54), writes: “Post-colonial African regimes had attempted to 
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integrate and discipline the bulk of the urban population through the mechanism of the salary, a 
gift when examined closely, allocated for the purposes of institutionalizing a form of domination 
having its own rationality.  These economic and political arrangements are today being shaken, 
in two ways.  On the one hand, there are the constraints that the financing and structure of the 
external exchange impose on African economies.  On the other, there are the prospects opened 
by three processes: the appearance of previously unknown forms of political mobilization, forms 
it would be wrong to confuse with a transition towards democracy; the disintegration of state 
power and then the recomposition of political power in a context of resurgence of the predatory 
economy characterizing Africa and the apparent instability”.   
      Thus, this situation has led to a condition of generalized economic poverty and lack of 
opportunity for many young African people.  Under such post-colonial conditions, it is 
impossible for most of the young African people to stay in Africa because their aspirations are 
diametrically opposed to the postcolonial state’s behaviors.  The postcolonial state in Africa 
should serve rather than repress, practice a better governance and treat all citizens fairly, and 
carefully watch over the state’s resources, which constitute the collective wealth rather than 
appropriating them for the benefit of the rulers and of the former colonial powers. 
       
Globalization and its neoliberal ideology 
      Globalization, as a concept, has become a worldwide phenomenon with different 
articulations.  It can be perceived as a new basic form of capitalism based on capital 
accumulation, privatization, and marketing, which creates extensive deregulation of industries 
and labor division enabling financial capital to play a much more dominant role within the global 
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economy based on labor mobility and production.  It is new model of global organization, a 
series of structural changes that entail not only an intensification of previous patterns from cross-
national lending to the hypermobility of finance capital but also a quantum transformation of a 
system lacking the staying power of effective means of regulation in the global political 
economy (Mittelman, 1997, p. 231).  Cox (1993) sees two main aspects of globalization: global 
organization of product and global finance.  The first entails the rise of complex transnational 
networks of production, which secure profitability through the most advantageous labor 
procurement, combining dimensions of political security and predictability.  Global finance is a 
very largely unregulated system of transactions in money, credit, and equities (Cox, 1993, p. 
260).  It encompasses contradictory trends.  On the one hand, the unaccountable forces of 
globalization such as cross-border flows of undocumented workers and modern communications 
with instantaneous speed are partially beyond the control of effective state regulation.  To adjust, 
the state responds to the globalization process by more fully integrating the domestic economy 
into world markets.  On the other hand, the state pulls in the opposite direction by using a variety 
of government interventions to create a competitive edge.  All countries industrializing late rely 
on large-scale interventions, most importantly, direct involvement in the production process, 
establishing social and economic infrastructure, generous terms of credit, and material support 
for shifting from imitative to indigenous technology capacity (Mittelman, 1997, p. 16). 
       Globalization also may be regarded as a phase in the history of capital, whose lineage has 
brought together many different societies into one system.  Long-distance trade and the 
emergence of nation-states are important conditions for the development of this single 
configuration.  It is a new set of movements of capital that involves a deepening of commodified 
forms of political and social integration.  With this new set of movements of capital, there is a 
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concentration of capital benefiting the wealthiest minority and making the masses poorer.  In this 
perspective, it is merely an expansion of social inequality, a particular constellation of economic 
concentrations, and the denationalization of economic activities at the expense of the masses.  “It 
is the spread of capitalism, its ideology, and culture; a worldwide integration and linkage of 
capitalists and social classes; a profusion of information technology; investments, new credits, 
financial institution, and privatization” (Note taken from AAS 365, Dr. Sangmpam). 
      Few are as widely discussed in historical, political topics as that ideology.  Yet, it is not 
always well defined.  Globalization is generally perceived as an “ideology”, that is a normative 
expression or set of ideas that rely on basic assumptions about reality that may or may not have 
any factual basis.  In other words, Globalization based on this interpretation is the duplication 
and manifestation, which appears to reflect a set of different perception assimilated to an 
“ideology”.  In this perception of globalization as an ideology, two parts can be highlighted.  On 
the one hand, the dialectical relationship between the international economy and world 
economy; on the other hand, multinational corporations and banks as principal agents of 
globalization in terms of economic development.   
        In the first part, it is essential to make the distinction between international economy and 
world economy first before stating the dialectical relationship between them.  As Madeuf and 
Michalet (1978, p. 253) argued, “The international economy was what classical economic theory 
had concerned itself with: movements in trade, investments, and payments crossing national 
frontiers that were regulated by states and by international organizations created by states.  The 
world economy, in contrast, was the sphere in which production and finance were being 
organized in cross-border networks that could very largely escape national and international 
regulatory power”.  This can be understandable because the late 1970s coincided with the global 
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recession crisis that affected both the developed countries and the developing countries and 
which prompted a search for alternative economic and policy paradigms based on the global 
credo of market reform.  This accentuated both the separation between those small, privileged 
groups integrated with the world economy and the larger part of the population that remained 
outside in the developing countries, while the developed capitalist society was feeling the 
financial and market discipline. 
        Despite this distinction, the relationship between international economy and world economy 
is dialectical.  “A Perspective on Globalization” of Robert W. Cox provides us with salient 
perspectives to corroborate this idea of the dialectical relationship.  Cox (Mittelman, 1997, pp. 
21-23) argued that, “The world economy grew by taking advantage of the territorial 
fragmentation of the international economy.  This allowed capital to choose the most propitious 
sites in which to locate diverse phases of a geographically disseminated production process, 
taking account of differences in labor costs, environmental regulations, fiscal incentives, political 
stability, and so on.  It also allowed capital to manage its accounts so that profits would accrue 
when the lowest taxes prevailed”. 
       In the second part, “the multinational corporations and banks, principal agents of 
globalization, henceforth represented themselves (and after a time were perceived by many 
governments and academic theorists) as primary agents of economic development.  They were 
also a growing force for national and international trade and finance.  Globalization began to be 
represented as a finality, as the logical and inevitable culmination of the powerful tendencies of 
the market at work.  The dominance of economic forces was regarded as both necessary and 
beneficial.  States and the interstate system would mainly to ensure the working of market logic,” 
said Cox (Mittelman, 1997, p. 23). 
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       Thus, these two parts show how globalization becomes an ideology.  Therefore, it is 
important to understand that economic globalization denotes the widening and intensification of 
international linkages and interactions in trade, investments and economic policy orientations in 
the world.  In this perspective, two major theoretical issues have arisen in the discourse on 
economic globalization.  The first centers on the role of the state in the economy and policy-
making.  The second focus on the effect or impact of economic globalization on economic 
progress and social welfare, especially in its spatial dimension.  In both contexts, two divergent 
positions are discernible.  The first concerns the impact of the growing transnationality and 
‘borderlessness’ of economic transactions and activities on the authority and economic powers of 
the nation-sate, especially as market reforms and economic liberalization policies foisted by the 
World Bank and the I.M.F on developing countries vitiate the capacity of domestic economic 
policy-making.  At one level, some argue that economic globalization erodes the national market.  
One of the foundations of the nation-state, and the nascent global economic space is replacing 
the national space as the most relevant and strategic space.  On the other hand, some scholars 
insist that despite the challenges posed by globalization, the state will remain the site of political 
authority, economic regulations and decisions, although there will be alternative in the nature of 
state power in this regard that will remain a major political actor in its configurations and 
activities (Aina, Chachage, and Yao, 2004, p. 26). 
       In addition, globalization’s ideology is to promote neoliberalism.  In this neoliberal ideology 
of globalization, there is a return to a basic form of capitalism.  Economic forces are represented 
as having potentially planetary reach and are akin to forces of nature; they are represented as 
beyond or above politics and form of basic structures of an interdependent world.  In this 
perception of globalization as a neoliberal discourse suggests a set of ideas that justify and 
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legitimate forms of class domination (of capital); it is abstract insofar as it reifies complex social 
processes and institutions such as the market.  With the latter, there is a new restructure based on 
capital accumulation and the massive mobility of people.  In this perspective, a variety of factors 
are central to this restructuring: a much greater engagement of corporations in the delivery of 
social services through policies of privatization and marketization; the extensive deregulation of 
industries, the most far-reaching of which was financial deregulation in all its forms, which 
enabled financial capital to play a much more dominant role within the global economy and 
indeed, people’s everyday lives” (Cahill and Konings, 2017, p. 19). 
       These different articulations of globalization and its neoliberal ideology provided above 
should inform an understanding of some of the negative global impact on the developing or 
peripheral countries, especially Africa, thus creating calamities in the whole African society 
particularly in Senegal.  Massive migrations are such calamities. 
      During the heyday of the world economic expansion era, there was an economic 
reconfiguration where Africa was incorporated into the world market in which a premium was 
put on the extraction and a steady supply of Africa’s raw material exporting and its monoculture 
economies.  It was the purpose of the world system, which was a set of mechanisms that allowed 
the redistribution of surplus value from the periphery (developing countries) to the core 
(developed countries).  As mention earlier, during the late 1970s, a global economic crisis 
affected both the developed and the developing countries.  This compounded with the effects of 
globalization and its neoliberal ideology, inflicted great pain on Africa as occurred elsewhere in 
the other developing or peripheral countries.  They had had to reduce domestic levels of 
economic activity and consumption, to reduce imports and to allow more resources to be 
channeled into production for exports.  In this perspective, Mittelman (1997, p. 22), argues that, 
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“Developing countries abandoned import substitution in favor of export promotion, which also 
meant sacrificing production for domestic consumption and satisfaction of basic needs in favor 
of earning foreign exchange”.  The adjustment also involved restructuring and reorientation of 
the industry into high technology sectors, diversifying services activities, mastering new skills, 
winning new markets, gaining access to new financial flows, and internationalization production. 
       The general configuration of the market, the industrial base, the structure of relations 
between the bureaucracy and local business circles, and the nature of respective alliances with 
multinational firms in Africa ruled out any possibility either of gaining access to new 
technologies and new distribution networks or of accumulating any substantial manufacturing 
know-how or developing an entrepreneurial dynamic that could have helped to respond 
creatively to the constraints of the world marker, as occurred elsewhere in the other developing 
countries.  These countries’ economies suffered even more from the fact that local incentive 
structures were not very effective and that it was hardly possible to find in them the productive 
combinations sought by international capital.  Thus, these economies could not profit from de-
localization whether by providing outlets for intermediate good industries, by allowing 
investment in high technology products for export or by specializing in international finance 
activities (Mbembe, 2001, p. 52). 
       In addition, the era of globalization and its neoliberal ideology was accompanied by a 
process of responsibility’s appropriation for economic and social development management by 
the International Financial Institutions (I.F.I), principally the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank, which imposed solutions to the world economic order by means of 
economic packages and Structural Adjustment program.  These institutions have always forced 
poor countries to swallow, hook, and sinker their programs while some researches showed how 
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their policies are negative to economic growth in countries that enter into an agreement with 
them (Mhango, 2017, pp. 204-205).  These policies, that are supposed to give indebted states 
access to further credit with which to service their debts, entail in return a radical neoliberal 
restructuring, including the deregulation of finance and trade as well as the privatization of 
public assets, which are detrimental for Africa.  They exacerbate social inequality and gaps 
between the super-rich and poor at the national level; increase inequalities between nations; 
decrease state autonomy and sovereignty; create corruption, bribery, violence, and prostitution; 
cause migrations (Note taken from AAS 365, Dr. Sangmpam).  These policies open up the 
African market, reduce its public sector, and devaluate its currency (AAS 612, Dr. Carty).  Going 
into that logic, Maathai (2009, p. 89) argued that, “Africa received over half a trillion dollars in 
loans from the World Bank, the I.M.F, and individual wealthy nations, and paid back roughly the 
same amount.  However, because of the interest on that debt, by 2002 $300 billion was still 
outstanding.  Throughout this period, the international community continued to provide more 
loans to African states so they could pay back the old ones.  More recently, some of these loans 
came with economic “conditionalities” requirements to curtail government spending, to open 
markets to foreign goods, and to restrict money supply. These restrictions forced governments to 
slash budgets for health, education, and other essential services for their citizens”.  Most African 
states were, in addition, able to borrow on favorable terms from Western governments and 
international institutions.  The easiest short-term expedient, for African (and other) states, was 
therefore to borrow money which they were no longer able to earn, which explains the rapid 
increase in levels of African indebtedness (Clapham, 1996, p. 166). These policies have sent 
many countries like Senegal to more poverty by pumping to them much money that ends up 
being misused thereby expanding national debts.  This explains why African economic 
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development is rendered impossible by the domination of the global economy and industrialized 
capitalist power.  These have created calamities in the African societies where migrations are 
seen as the only viable solution to escape from these calamities. 
       Thus, Globalization and its neoliberal ideology can help answer the research question 
because it connotes a rise of market reforms as a global creed, a phenomenon partly engendered 
by the global economic crisis in the late 1970s, which prompted a search for alternative 
economic and policy paradigms.  It puts emphasis on market rules and their infallibility.  
Economic mobility becomes the fundamental aspect of many countries because of the fluidity of 
free trade in goods and services, and free capital circulation.  This creates a massive mobility 
because of economic opportunities in some countries in the North and the economic failure in 
other parts of the world such the African continent where the economy is a reproduction of 
colonial extraverted economy with a premium put on the extraction, and a steady supply of 
Africa’s raw material exporting and its monoculture economies.  Globalization relies on 
multinational corporations, which exploit the country’s resources and leave only crumbs for 
governments already tempted by unlawful practices. Therein lies the birth of certain de-
structuring practices that affect both the state and society.  They lead to migrations in many 
African countries, such as Senegal’s new phenomenon of “Barca or Barsaakh” (Note taken from 
AAS 612, Dr. Carty). 
       In the case of Senegal, there are other negative consequences of globalization.  Rural areas 
provide most of the food for the nation.  The new government agricultural program of 
diversification should help farmers not only to feed themselves and their families year-round but 
also to retain seeds for the next season and commercialize a significant part for liquidity.  
However, neoliberalism has brought drastic changes.  More and more, rural people such as 
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leather, iron, clay smiths and workers are forced to move to the cities for additional cash flow.  
These relocations of rural populations to the city for their survival cause an anarchical growth of 
the urban population and slums that lack basic services. This accentuates insecurity in the large 
slums of the major cities.  The miserable city-living causes slum dwellers to attempt an escape to 
Europe.  Another neoliberal calamity is Structural Adjustment Policies (S.A.P) by the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund as described above.  These two combined calamities 
set the stage for the movement Fakh (Extraction: leaving by any way possible), and its slogan 
“Barca or Barsaakh” by young Senegalese. 
        As was stated in chapter 1, although globalization and its neoliberal ideology admittedly can 
help explain the research question, it is not used here because the externship time constraint did 
not allow me to collect the type of data that it requires.  Nevertheless, the discussion in chapters 
3, 4 and especially 5 refer to the policy impact of globalization and neoliberalism.  The 
discussion in those chapters help link migrations to the unbreakable relationship between 
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       As a byproduct of imperialism colonialism is the policy of a nation that seeks to extend or 
retain its authority over other people or territories generally with the aim of economic dominance 
(Webster, 1989, p. 291; Rodney, 1972).  It has given birth in the post-colonial era to a new type 
of indirect dominance exercised through dependency ties.  As part of the transitional stage of 
modernizing societies, dependency has become the new way through which former colonial 
powers reinforce their economic power and notion of superiority vis-a-vis the former colonized 
countries.  Therefore, this dependency tie helps to understand the outcome it has brought 
economically, politically, culturally, educationally, and socially in many former colonized 
countries that became independent.  Dependency has emerged in the post-colonial epoch as an 
important paradigm in the comprehension of the issue of underdevelopment in most independent 
countries, where the legacy of colonialism and its deep-seated history have made them remain 
completely in a dependent posture toward their former colonial powers.  I am arguing that this 
dependent posture vis-à-vis their former colonial powers has created a situation of harsh 
economic and developmental constraints in many of these countries.  This chapter aims at 
demonstrating France-Senegal colonial relations and the consequent dependency that represent 
serious roadblocks to Senegalese development since its independence.   
 
French colonialism and the roots of dependency 
       France’s relations with Senegal started in the 1600s with France’s conquest of Senegal and 
its settlement along the Senegalese coasts of Saint-Louis and Goree Island.  Due to the 
Restoration period in the 1700s, which came up with the freedom of trade, local commercial 
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capitalism developed in Senegal parallel to the settlement of the Bordelais (people from the 
French city of Bordeaux) coming from France to settle in the coastal enclaves of Saint-Louis and 
Goree in Senegal.  Between 1815 and 1860, the French of Saint-Louis and of Gorée increased in 
number due to the miscegenation that was created with the interactions of the Bordelais with 
Saint-Louis and Goree’s inhabitants whose ancestors were often military or commercial agents 
of the old companies.  “This period of 1800s was the mercantilist period dominated by the slave 
trade and later the gum trade in Senegal” (Vidrovitch, 1977).  This great era of the gum trade’s 
development was mostly dominated by the Bordeaux trading companies, which at that time had 
strong influences in the Senegalese economy and political influence.  This period was marked by 
the first French-Senegalese mulatto or metis generation of Saint-Louis traders, who settled in the 
stopovers of Dagana, Podor, Matam, Bakel, and Medina rivers where they operated on pirogues 
and worked as trading agents.  Travelers of that time, including René Caillé, a French explorer, 
gave a striking description of this trade which established a barter economy with European 
countries particularly France.  In addition to gum, Saint-Louis exported gold, which the 
Signares17 of the town during the Restoration and the July Monarchy brought from Bambouk18 
goldfields.  They regularly sent their servants to buy the precious metal, which they paid in cloth 
and junk (Amin, 1969, pp. 11-19).  With the trading post at Saint-Louis operated by the French 
West India Company, later known in French as “Compagnie du Senegal” (Senegalese 
Company), established in 1659, France in this period of gum’s trade also continued its export of 
cloth, iron, and muskets to Senegal and its import of textiles, ivory, spices and, slaves through its 
                                                          
17 “Signares” were the name given to those influential Mulatto French-Senegalese women of the city of Saint-Louis and Goree in 
the French part in Senegal during the 18th and 19th centuries. 
 
18 “Bambouk” was a traditional name for the territory in eastern Senegal and western Mali encompassing the Bambouk 
Mountains that borders Senegal and Mali. 
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four townships:  Saint-Louis, Goree, Dakar, and Rufisque that served with the establishment of 
the French railway from Dakar to Saint-Louis as ways to perform exports and imports within 
Senegal. 
       During the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815), Great Britain captured French possessions in 
Senegal and in 1807 Britain proclaimed the abolition of the slave trade known as the “Slave 
Trade Act 1807”.  In 1816, Britain returned to France its possessions in Senegal.  “1850s and 
1890s was the first phase of colonialism, marked by the introduction of cash crops for export and 
dominated by merchant capital, which extended trade from the coastal to rural areas” 
(Vidrovitch, 1977).  This meant that parallel to the establishment of French domination, there 
was an increasing commercial penetration of which the French houses controlled the prices and 
monopolized exports and imports.  They advance goods on credit to African traders, who 
circulated in the interior and, in turn, often advanced goods and either seeds or food to peasants, 
creating a debit-credit cycle that became a basic part of Senegalese peasant life (O’Brien, 1979, 
p. 70).  During the “Scramble for Africa”,19 France began to insert control of Senegal’s river and 
its hinterland.  By 1895, Senegal became part of the French West Africa colony with its capital 
in Saint-Louis before being relocated to Dakar in 1902.  The first major industries in Senegal 
established between the wars were French companies set up locally to process groundnut oil.  
These refineries represented the first monopoly export sector, which was to be reserved for the 
foreign industry and was followed by import substitution industries later (O’Brien, 1979, p. 27).  
Because of the colonial affiliations, there were immense migrations of Senegalese to France for 
labor’s need.  Furthermore, Senegalese soldiers fought for France during the Two World Wars.  
                                                          
19  “The scramble for Africa”, more accurately called the “Partition of Africa” or the “Conquest of Africa”. It refers to a period 
between the years 1881 and 1914.  During this time, European countries occupied Africa and attempted to colonize it. By the 
year 1914, around 90% of Africa was under European rule.   
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They were given the name of Tirailleurs in order to reflect the policing needs generated by the 
European colonization phase.  A piece of evidence for this period is the statue of “Demba and 
Dupont” in Senegal, representing an African and a French soldier as a symbol of colonial 
paternalism. These colonial relations also made Senegal part of the France Union20 in 1946. 
       For almost a century and half of European penetration in Africa and particularly France’s 
penetration in Senegal, substantial colonial relations were built with Senegal through which 
France exercised direct colonial rule within the Senegalese territories.  This penetration of France 
in Senegal and the colonial relations it built with Senegal led to the establishment of a strong 
reliance on France by Senegal in the aftermath of the colonization era.  In the heyday of the 
1960s, many African countries achieved their independence from France.  It was during this 
period that Senegal got its independence from France.  However, France’s legacy of colonialism 
and its deep-seated history still made Senegal remain completely in a dependent posture toward 
France.  Though direct rule ended with independence, through dependency France continued to 
indirectly maintain its sphere of influence over Senegal and kept political, economic, military, 
educational, developmental assistance, cultural, scientific and technical cooperation ties.  It 
continues to impose its hegemony over Senegal to serve its interests and to maintain “imperial” 
prestige associated with its colonial past. 
       When Charles de Gaulle returned to power as French President in 1958, France had already 
been severely weakened by World War II and by the conflicts in Indochina and Algeria.  He 
proceeded to grant independence to France’s remaining colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 
1960s period to maintain close cultural and economic ties with them to avoid more close costly 
                                                          
20 “The French Union”, commonly known in French as “Union Française” (1946–1958) was a political entity created by the 
French Fourth Republic to replace the old French colonial system, colloquially known as the "French Empire". It was the formal 
end of the "indigenous" status of French subjects in colonial areas. 
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colonial wars (Chafer, 2005, pp. 7-23).  De Gaulle was keen on preserving France’s status as a 
global power and as a bulwark to British and American influence in this post-colonial era.  Thus, 
he saw close links with France’s image on the world stage, both as a major power and as a 
counterbalancing force between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war.  The 
United States supported France’s continuing presence in Africa to prevent the continent from 
falling under the Soviet’s influence.  Similarly, in that period, the United Kingdom had little 
interest in West Africa, which left France as the only major power in that region.  One of the first 
features of France-Senegal dependency is “Françafrique”.  The term “Françafrique” derived from 
the expression “France-Afrique”, symbolized the inherent colonial ties and dependency relations 
that France built with its former colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Felix Houphouet-Boigny, 
former president of Cote-d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), defined it as “the secret criminality in the upper 
echelons of French politics and economy, where a kind of underground Republic is hidden from 
view”.  He said that it also means “France à fric” (which implies cash money to France), and that 
“Over the course of four decades, hundreds of thousands of euros misappropriated from debt, 
aid, oil, cocoa…or drained through French importing monopolies, have financed French 
political-business networks (all of them offshoots of the main neo-Gaullist network), 
shareholders’ dividends, the secret services’ major operations and mercenary expeditions” 
(Verschave, 2006). 
      To implement his vision of France’s hegemony.  “Françafrique” marked France’s sphere of 
influence and dominance over Sub-Saharan African states mainly Francophone.  Jacques 
Foccart, a close adviser and former intelligence member of the French Resistance during World 
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War II and Secretary-General for African and Malagasy Affairs of OCAM21 appointed by De 
Gaulle, played a pivotal role in it.  Through Françafrique, Foccart put in place a series of 
cooperation accords that covered political, economic, military and cultural sectors with an 
ensemble of African countries, which included France’s former colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa 
of which Senegal was part, and built also a dense web of personal networks that underpinned the 
informal and family-like relationship between France and African leaders (Whiteman, 1997; 
Bovcon, 2011); Chafer, 2005).   
       Françafrique characterized several features of Sub-Saharan African countries that emerged 
during the cold war: African cell, Franc zone, cooperation accords, military interventions, 
personal networks.  Africa cell was those policy decisions made on Africa by President De 
Gaulle and his close advisors without engaging in broader discussions with the French 
parliament and civil society actors such as non-governmental organizations (Bovcon, 2011, p. 5).  
The African cell worked closely with powerful business networks and the French secrets service.  
Its founding father was Jacques Foccart who became a specialist on African matters at the Elysee 
Palace, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, son of President Mitterrand and a former AFP journalist in 
Africa, who between 1986 and 1992 held the position of chief advisor on African policy at the 
African cell, in addition to Claude Gueant general secretary and close aide to President Chirac.  
       The Franc zone was a currency union in Sub-Saharan Africa that was established when the 
CFA franc or “franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine” (franc of the African Financial 
Community) was created in 1945 as a colonial currency for over a dozen of France’s African 
colonies.  The zone continues to exist after the colonies had achieved their independence in the 
                                                          
21 “OCAM” (Organisation Commune African et Malgache) referring to “African and Malagasy Common Organization” in 
English, was an intergovernmental Organization that gathered African States mainly Francophone and which goal was to 
maintain an economic, cultural, and social cooperation between its members. 
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early 1960s, with only three African countries ever leaving the zone, mostly for reasons of 
national prestige.  One of the three countries, Mali rejoined the zone in 1984.  The CFA franc 
was pegged to the French franc (now the euro) and its convertibility was guaranteed by the 
French treasury.  Despite sharing the same exchange rate, the CFA franc is actually two 
currencies, the Central African franc, and the West African CFA franc, which are run by their 
respective central banks in Central and West Africa.  The foreign exchange reserves of member 
countries are pooled and each of the two African central banks keeps 65% of its foreign reserves 
with the French treasury.22  The franc zone was intended to provide African countries with 
monetary stability, with member countries such as Ivory Coast experiencing relatively low 
inflation at an average of 6% over the past five years compared to 29% in neighboring Ghana, a 
non-member country.  Moreover, the fixed exchange rate between the CFA Franc and the French 
franc has changed only once in 1994 when the CFA franc was considered overvalued.  However, 
this monetary arrangement has enabled France to control the money supply of the CFA franc and 
to influence the decision-making process of the central banks through their boards (Renou, 2002, 
pp. 5-27).   
       Cooperation accords or post-independence relationship was a concept around which French 
governments in the early 1960s developed a discourse.  This concept was related to the effort of 
expanding French influence across the world such as promoting French language and culture, 
securing markets for French goods and projecting French power (Chafer, 2005, pp. 7-23).  It was 
to be achieved outside of the traditional colonial context whereby sovereign states such as France 
and the newly independent African countries would work together for mutual benefit.  To that 
                                                          




end, France signed cooperation accords with its former colonies, which provided them with 
cultural, technical and military assistance such as sending French teachers and military advisors 
to work for the newly formed African government.  The accords also allowed France to maintain 
troops in Senegal, Chad, Djibouti, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and to establish a framework that would 
allow France to intervene military in the region.  During 1970-1981, the French military 
cooperation budget constituted 11 to 19% of the entire cooperation budget.  Under President De 
Gaulle, French aid and assistance were made contingent on the signing of these accords.  For 
example, when Guinea refused to sign the accords, France immediately withdrew its personnel 
from Guinea and terminated all assistance to that country.  The implementation of these accords 
was the responsibility of Jacques Foccart under President De Gaulle and Georges Pompidou.  In 
1987 alone, France was the largest source of development aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, providing 
up to 18% of total aid to the region, followed by the World Bank (13%). Italy (8.5%), United 
States (6.8%), Germany (6.8%), and the European Community (6.4%) (McKesson, 1990, pp. 34-
47).  All French aid was provided through the Ministry of Cooperation.  France has benefited 
from its aid, trade, and investment in Africa particularly in Senegal, which has consistently 
generated a positive balance of payment in France’s favor (McKesson, 1990, pp. 34-47).   
       For military interventions, a significant piece of the post-colonial jigsaw was France’s 
substantial military presence.  After decolonization, France established formal defense agreement 
with many francophone countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  These arrangements allowed France to 
establish itself as a guarantor of stability and hegemony in the region, playing the gendarme role 
of Africa.  France adopted an interventionist policy in all its former colonies in Africa, resulting 
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in 122military interventions that averaged once a year from 1960 to the mid-1990s,23 particularly 
in Senegal with a coup d’état prevented in 1962.  France often intervened to protect French 
nationals, to put down rebellions or prevent coups, to restore order or to support a particular 
African leader (Vallin, 2015, pp. 79-101).  Between 1997 and 2002, thirty-three operations were 
launched in Africa by France, though ten of those had mandates or fell under United Nations 
command, suggesting that broader humanitarian concerns have become increasingly important to 
France, with acceptance of multi involvement, and moves towards using interventionism to 
promote security and development rather than prioritizing often morally dubious order and 
stability (Charbonneau, 2008, p. 283).   
      And finally, for personal networks, they were the central feature of Françafrique with state-
to-state- relations between French and African leaders that were informal and family-like and 
were bolstered by a dense web or personal networks, whose activities were funded from the 
cooperation budget.  In this logic, Senghor with his “Union Progressiste Senegalaise (UPS-
Senegalese Progressive Union), which became the Senegalese Socialist Party in 1977, saw these 
state-to-state relations as positive contributions to Africa’s development, and Senegal should be 
opened to the World and particularly France and its European partners of the European 
Economic Community for mutual benefit “Eurafrique”, must be pursued (Yansane, 1980, p. 32).  
These networks served as one of the main vehicles for the clientelist relations that France had 
maintained with its former African colonies.  France has endeavored to preserve the centralized, 
socialized, free market-suspicious model of government institutionalized in its former colonies, 
with much of its development funding going to central governments instead of sub-state or non-
                                                          




state actors.  In continuity with the double standards exhibited during colonialism, in 1990 
Mitterrand announced renewed enthusiasm for encouraging democratic transition via French aid, 
but statistics actually demonstrated increases of aid to authoritarian regimes, generally countries 
in which France had economic and security concerns (Martin, 1995, p. 15). 
     Thus, Françafrique as the first feature of dependency was really incorporated in France’s 
former colonial colonies in the heyday of the 1960s period and particularly in the cold war era.  
This made Senegal and other former Sub-Saharan African colonies of France totally dependent 
in all aspects.  The colonial ties built in the aftermath of the colonial period allowed France to 
still maintain its influence and expand its hegemony over its former colonies. 
 
Senegal’s dependent particularities 
     One particular feature of France-Senegal dependency is through the maintenance of political 
order.  Since 1960, it has been attributed to French presence as well as French investment and 
aid.  This political order maintenance is close and multi-faceted, and political leaders from the 
two countries often meet.  Senegal is the only Sub-Saharan African country with which France 
holds an intergovernmental seminar every year (alternative between Dakar and Paris) due to the 
fact Senegal is the first sub-Saharan Africa colonized by French, and Senegal also is home to the 
largest French community in Sub-Saharan Africa.  It is one of France’s closest partners in Africa 
on a human, political and economic level.  It is the principal partner of local authorities and 
regions in terms of the number of cooperation projects.24 This can be seen with the list of 
bilateral visits. For examples: The Senegalese president’s visit from December 18 to December 
                                                          
24 Retrieved from Gouvernment: https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/franco-senegalese-intergovernmental-seminar 
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22, 2016, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of the Economy, Finance and Planning’s 
visit in Paris to attend the Open Government Partnership Summit in Paris on December 7 and 9, 
2016, Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs’ participation in the intergovernmental seminar 
held in Dakar on September 22 and 23, 2016 attended by France’s Prime Minister Manuel Valls 
(from March 31, 2014, to December 6, 2016,25 and the Prime Minister of the Republic of 
Senegal’s holding of the third Franco-Senegalese intergovernmental seminar at Matignon’s hotel 
(Paris) that followed the seminar up with a joint press conference to spell out their priorities for 
cooperation: mobility, economic emergence, schooling, and higher education, health, innovation, 
and security.26 
In addition to these lists of bilateral visits can be added the resident diplomatic missions such as 
France’s embassy in Senegal and Senegal’s embassy in Paris and consulates in Bordeaux, Lyon, 
and Marseille, and also a consular agency in Le Havre,27 symbolizing all the France-Senegal’s 
political order maintenance and Diplomatie. 
        The second particular feature of France-Senegal dependency is through military 
maintenance performed by France’s means of security and defense cooperation with Senegal.  It 
means that Senegal is the leading beneficiary of French structural defense and security 
cooperation, which allows France to monitor interventionist policy and programs in Senegal and 
its region for national armed forces, and for stability and dominion maintenance within the 
Senegalese territory.  This can be seen with France’s army corps strong presence in the whole 
                                                          
25 “France and Senegal” (2016-2017).  Retrieved from France Diplomatie: 
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/senegal/ 
26 Franco-Senegalese intergovernmental seminar (2017).  Retrieved from Gouvernment: 
https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/franco-senegalese-intergovernmental-seminar 
 




Senegalese territory.  France often intervenes in Senegal’s affairs to restore order or to support 
particular Senegalese leader. 
      The third peculiar feature of France-Senegal dependency is through the assimilation of 
French language carries out not only in the educational system but also as the official language in 
Senegal.  Inherited since colonialism as France’s civilization mission and assimilation process, 
French remains the first language spoken in Senegal that springs well in Senegalese enterprises 
and businesses as well as the Senegalese educational system in which it is used.  Currently, the 
L.M.D (License, Masters, et Doctorat) “Bachelor, Masters, and Ph.D” which is the three-cycles 
organization of higher education, common in France and in most Europeans Union as the a way 
to standardize the high educational system cycles and to organize the recognition of diplomas 
between countries in Europe and in the world28, is now implemented in the Senegalese 
educational system.  All these just symbolize the strong assimilation of French language and 
educational system within the Senegalese territory that serve as salient examples affirming and 
corroborating the notion of France-Senegal dependency. 
      The fourth particular feature of France-Senegal dependency is through development 
assistance.  Senegal is one of the 16 priorities of poor countries for France’s official development 
assistance.  The bilateral partnership framework paper for the period 2013-2017 sets three 
priorities sectors: sustainable development, democratic governance, and human development.  
Since 2000, the Agence Francaise de Development (A.F.D) “French Development System” has 
committed more than 1.5billion Euros in funding in Senegal, combining all financial products 
and sectors.  Flagship projects include the Train Express Regional (T.E.R) “Regional Express 
                                                          




Train” in Dakar (Euro 100million), the KMS III project which is expected to secure the supply of 
safe drinking water in Dakar (93million Euros, granted in July 2016), and several projects aiming 
to diversify the country’s energy mix.  In accordance with Senegal’s development strategy, the 
11th EDF (European Development Fund) is focused on three sectors for the period 2014-2020: 
Strengthening democratic development; sustainable agricultural development and food security; 
water and sanitation.  Civil society’s support is also covered, in addition to these keys sectors.  
The overall envelope of this 11th EDF for Senegal stands at 347million Euros, split between two 
phases.  The first is for 2018-2020 and will be subject to joint programming with the Member 
States of the European Union and the European Investment Bank (E.I.B), even though its 
Regional Indicative Program (R.I.P) for the West African Union also supports the strengthening 
of regional integration, infrastructure, trade, good governance, and sub-regional peace and 
security.  Senegal is eligible for the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, aimed at tackling the 
root causes of irregular migration and displacement, which was created during the Valetta 
Summit in November 2015.  This fund has 1.8billiom Euro of European funding, of which a 
billion is dedicated to the Sahel and the Lake Chad regions.29 
       The fifth peculiar feature of France-Senegal dependency is through cultural, scientific and 
technical cooperation systems.  The French network in Senegal consists of Senegal’s French 
Institute, which includes the sites of Dakar and Saint-Louis; two branches of French alliance in 
Ziguinchor (687students) and Kaolack (362 students), and a third in Banjul (Gambia) managed 
from Dakar; a network of 11 French schools teaching curriculum, and the one of Banjul managed 
from Dakar.  These French institutes mainly work for the support of Francophonie and cultural 
                                                          




promotion, and for academic and scientific sectors.  They use in the procedure France Campus 
offices and CEF (Centre D’Études en France) “Study Center in France”.  On average, 135 higher 
education scholarships are awarded each year to local students.  Nearly 9,500 Senegalese 
students are enrolled in France’s higher education institutions.  Dakar is home to a Pasteur 
Institute and Regional Offices of France with Institut de Recherche pour le Development (I.R.D) 
“Research Institute for Sustainable Development” and Centre International de Recherche 
Agronomique pour le Development (C.I.R.A.D) “International Centre of Agronomic Research 
for Development”.  Since 2016, France has deployed 49 international technical experts to 
Senegal.  Thirteen of them have been posted in multilateral institutions.  They help to implement 
projects to tackle terrorism and organized crime, modernized the justice system, support 
democratic governance and create start-ups in Senegal.  France works in coordination with 
international European donors through which most of the French multilateral assistance passes 
347million Euros in the 11th European Development Fund for the period 2014-2020, thus making 
Senegal among the main African states receiving many partnerships cooperation with France’s 
local government (114 ongoing partnerships between France’s local government and Senegal),30 
and also among the main African states receiving French volunteers for any France’s programs. 
 
Senegal’s economy 
      Like many African countries, Senegal is a low-income African state.  Its economy is mainly 
driven by agriculture and fisheries, which employ almost 75% of its population and are the 
                                                          





primary sources of employment in many of Senegal’s rural areas.  In addition, there is mining, 
manufacturing construction, and tourism.  Senegal’s macroeconomic performance has been 
strong in recent years.  Real GDP more than doubled (an increase of 108%) between 2000 and 
2006, driven mainly by the telecommunication and financial services sectors, which together 
accounted for 70% of growth.  It has boasted a low inflation rate, with an average rate of 1.6% 
between 2000 and 2016.  However, it reached an all-time high of 5.85% in 2018.  The main 
reason behind this price inflation was the sharp rise in product prices, in particular food and 
energy products.  Senegal is a member of the WAEMU (Western African Economic and 
Monetary Union), and eight country (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, and Togo) customs and currency union in which all members use the CFA franc (CFAF) 
and are working toward greater regional integration with unified external tariffs.31  Senegal’s 
monetary policy is defined by the regional central bank, the BCEAO (Central Bank of Western 
African States), with the aim of reducing inflation and preserving a fixed-exchange-rate between 
the CFA franc and the euro.  Since 2004, the official fixed exchange rate has remained stable 
with a fixed exchange rate of 655.96 CFA franc per US dollar.32 
       During the last ten years, Senegal’s exports of goods and commercial services have 
increased at an annual average rate of 6.4%, and 5.5% respectively.  Exports of goods have 
increased from US$1.5bn in 2005 to US$ 2.61bn in 2006, while exports of commercial services 
have increased from US$ 0.8 in 2004 to US$ 1.3bn in 2006.  Despite the growth in exports, 
Senegal’s trade balance continues to record a deficit, which reached US$ 3bn in 2015 (22% of 
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GDP).  Senegal’s main export products in 2015 were gold (US$240m), fresh fish (US$230m), oil 
products (US$212m), cement (US$167m), phosphates (US$150m), and groundnut products 
(US$123m).  Senegal’s main export markets for goods in 2015 were Mali (US$443m), 
Switzerland (US$225m), India (US$140m), Cote d’Ivoire (US$ 122m), and China (US$120m); 
and 2018 (US$84.45) to France (United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade, 
2006-2018).33 In the last five years, Senegal’s export growth mainly has been driven by 
phosphates and groundnut products.  Phosphate’s exports have increased from 4.7bn CFAF in 
2011 to 34bn CFAF in 2015, while groundnut’s products export have increased from 47bn CFAF 
to 77bn CFAF over the same period.34 
       In terms of Senegal’s imports, it is mainly originated from its main trade partner France 
(US$917m), and operates with the rest of the world like China (US$544$), Nigeria (US$ 453m), 
India (US$355m), Spain (US$289m), and the Netherlands (US$230m).35  This means that 
Senegal is dependent on external partners to provide local companies with equipment and 
machinery, necessary for industrial processes.  Also, the national refining company and the 
oldest one in West Africa imports crude oil and petroleum products, as its refining capacity is 
lower than the national demand.  The main import products were thus machines and apparatus 
(US$7.6bn), refined petroleum products (US$5.2bn), crude petroleum (US$4.2bn), transport 
equipment (US$3.9bn), rice (US$3.1bn), and wheat (US$1.4bn).36 
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       Senegal is actively involved in several international investment-related organizations and is 
a member of the African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI), the International Centre for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA). Senegal has also created an investment arbitration center in 1998, which is 
administered by the Dakar Chamber of Commerce.  In addition, Senegal has bilateral investment 
treaties with France, Australia, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, Romania, South Korea, Spain, 
Switzerland, Netherland, and the US.  It has concluded tax treaties with France, Mali, and the 
French-speaking African states of the “Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache” (Joint 
Afro-Malagasy Organization).  Furthermore, Senegal’s investment Code includes guarantees for 
access to foreign exchange and repatriation of capital and earnings, through transactions that are 
subject to procedural requirements of financial regulators.  These are today no barriers to 100% 
ownership of businesses by foreign investors except in Sectors that government and state-owned 
enterprises are active such as physical infrastructure including water, electricity distribution, and 
port services.  According to the World Bank (2017), “FDI inflows to Senegal more than doubled 
from US$168m in 2005 to US$345m in 2015”.  This is largely due to the country’s privatization 
program launched in the 1990s.  The government of Senegal partially or totally withdrew its 
shares in national companies in the 1990s, most of which provided public services (water supply, 
telecommunication, and refinery).  The effect of the 2008 international crisis has provoked a 
reduction of about 20% of FDI in 2009.37 
       In the period of 2000s particularly (2005-2015), the average GDP growth rate was estimated 
at 4% while the population grew at a pace of 3%.  They did not allow for a significant reduction 
                                                          
 





in poverty rates, especially in rural areas. Therefore, Senegal’s President Macky Sall adopted the 
“Emerging Senegal Plan” (commonly known in French as PSE “Plan Senegal Emergent”) in 
2014 as a new policy framework and development model to accelerate Senegal progress toward 
becoming an emerging economy. The PSE is carried out through a five-year Priority Action Plan 
(PAP) with strategic pillars, sectorial objectives, and the Strategy's lines of action. The PAP 
comes in various development projects and programs that are part of a budgetary framework for 
2014–2018.  The PAP is building on the optimistic scenario of the PES, which is evaluated at 
9,685.7bn of CFA francs.  Its financing has been secured up to 5,737.6bn of CFA francs, or 
59.2%, making the funding gap to fill for the 2014–2018 period 2,964bn of CFA francs (30.6%), 
and the one to be covered by additional revenues and cost-savings reaches 984bn of CFA francs 
(10.2%).38 
        For the transport sector, Senegal has built 1 520km and rehabilitated 4 015km of roads over 
the past four years.  It has expanded its highway system with the construction of the Diamnadio 
highway and a new 115km highway (The ILA Touba highway).  Senegal is also counting the 
modernization of transport services through the development of a more modern transport system.  
It can be perceived with the TER (Regional Express Train) project which aims at revolutionizing 
the Senegalese transport system connecting Dakar(the capital ) and the new airport in Dias via 
14stations with a speed of 160km/h, for a load capacity of 115 000 people per day. 
       In addition, with the new discoveries of gold, oil, gas, petroleum, and zircon in its soil, 
Senegal is currently working on projects to explore these precious resources that can generate 
immense fortunes and could be a way to enhance its economy to the top. 
                                                          




      Senegal’s dependency on France is perpetuated through its economic relations.  There has 
been a reservoir of cheap labor and raw material for the former metropole, a captive market for 
various high-priced manufactured imports, minimum metropolitan public investment, mostly in 
infrastructure projects and financial autonomy, and in addition to export-oriented of Senegal’s 
market, making it a significant target for France’s investment.  This helps understand that 
Senegal accepts France’s contribution and support, and in turn has to undergo most of the cost of 
administration and development from its own limited resources.  Senegal is France’s 57th largest 
trading partner globally and third largest from Africa.  France represents the leading foreign 
investor in Senegal with more than 78% of FDI stock (2.2billion in 2015), and over 1.7billion 
Euros worth of investments with the country.39 Several French multinational companies such as 
BNP Paribas, Eramet, Orange S.A, Necotrans, and Societe Generale operate in Senegal, thus 
playing a significant role in Senegal’s economic vitality, accounting for 25% of GDP and tax 
revenues.40  
       Thus, all things considered, since imperialism and colonialism, when France conquered 
Senegal and settled in its four townships of Saint-Louis, Goree, Rufisque, and Dakar, until today, 
France has been playing a great role in Senegal.  France is involved in all Senegal’s affairs.   
        Although independent since the 1960s, Senegal is still not autonomous due to France’s 
colonial legacy and its deep-seated history that has been so firmly established in Senegal, and has 
made it very reliant on France.  Because of this reliance on France, the economy of Senegal 
follows very closely the colonial extraverted pattern in favor of the former colonial metropole 
France.  This can be seen in foreign trade where Senegal is dependent on what external partners 
                                                          




particularly France are prepared to buy and sell.  High-priced manufactured imports, minimum 
metropolitan public investments, mostly in infrastructure projects and lack of financial autonomy 
characterize Senegal’s relations with its former colonial power, France.  The latter is its main 
trading partner and its leading foreign investor with more than 78% of FDI stock (2.2billion in 
2015) and over 1.7 billion Euro worth of investment.  Senegal also exports many of its crucial 
products to France: Gold (US$ 240m), fresh fish (US$230m), oil products (US$212m), cement 
(US$ 167m), phosphates (US$ 150m) and groundnut products (Us$ 123m).  These statistics 
issued in 2015 are salient examples that show that Senegal is very dependent on global economy 
particularly France, which is its largest trading partner.  The outcome for Senegal is deregulation 
of Senegal’s financial market to allow integration in the global market, thus creating trade deficit 
as well as balance of payment’s problems over years forcing it to borrow from IMF to cover 
shortfalls in foreign exchange.  Another outcome is stagnation seen through the harsh economic 
development constraints and the immiseration that many Senegalese people face in their daily 
lives.  By weakening the Senegalese economy, the colonial dependent situation has created 
conditions of generalized economic poverty and lack of opportunity for young people. This 
situation causes migrations to Europe and elsewhere. 
       Take the traditional monocrop of groundnuts (groundnut and peanut) in Senegal, for 
example.  After independence in the 1960s, Senegal produced 1,1 million tons of groundnuts41.  
Senegal’s groundnuts, particularly peanut, alone accounted for more than 80% of the country's 
exports.  Groundnuts cultivation employed 87% of the labor force and covered half of the 
cultivated land.  It provided the greater part of the monetary income of the peasantry of the 
                                                          





central basin, which produces the bigger share of groundnuts.  Groundnuts processing accounted 
for 42% of the turnover of Senegalese industry, and a substantial part of the former colony's 
fiscal revenues came from taxes on the export of this product (Caswell, 1983, pp. 39-40).   
        At the peak of 1965, Senegal exported about 300,000 tons of its peanuts, which represented 
roughly 20% of the total global peanut exports.42  However, with the France-Senegal relations of 
dependency, it meant that almost all the crop was exported to Senegal’s former colonial power 
France, where it provided 60% of the total consumption of vegetable oil (Caswell, 1983, p. 40).  
This situation was established during the colonial period when the monocrop of groundnuts 
economy which made Senegal a rich country, at least in West Africa, caused the colonial 
administration (France) to provide technical and material assistance for the production to satisfy 
France’s needs.  France’s interventions during this period allowed it to maintain the main policy 
of setting paid prices to peasant producers at a certain threshold, as it did during the World Wars 
and during the crisis of the Thirties.  Measures were taken, for example for the provision of seeds 
on credit, and, after the war, the first attempts were made to increase yields through the 
modernization of agricultural techniques in the marketing circuits through controlled prices and 
by legislation promoting commercialization cooperatives (Caswell, 1983, p. 40). Later, France 
lifted the price support it had been offering under the Lomé Convention,43 and ensured a steady 
supply of Senegal’s groundnuts by establishing an increasingly interventionist system in this 
sector during the period when the market was in a state of unpredictable changes or tribulations. 
                                                          
42 “The Senegalese Groundnuts story” (February 20, 2015).  Retrieved from Gro-Intelligence: 
https://gro-intelligence.com/insights/articles/polishing-peanuts-the-senegalese-groundnut-story 
 
43 “Lomé Convention” is a trade and aid agreement between the European Economic Community (EEC) and 71 African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, first signed in February 1975 in Lomé (Togo).  
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      Overall, the organization of the groundnuts trade tended to undermine the long-term interests 
of Senegal and its peasant producers.  It was dominated by a handful of French companies 
operating mainly through African and Lebanese intermediaries, and which monopolized not only 
the purchase and export of groundnuts but also the import and distribution of consumer goods.  
Senegal was obliged to mortgage very often its future crops in exchange for loans that allowed 
the Senegalese peasant producers to spend the interim period preceding the harvest.  This 
resulted in a vicious circle of indebtedness, which, combined with fluctuating terms of trade, 
long-term adverse effects, and land reclamation did not favor the modernization of agriculture in 
Senegal.  All this reinforced the stagnation of Senegal's real incomes (Vanhaeverbeke, 1970, p. 
217). 
       As a result, following the independence of Senegal, the percentage of indebted families in 
the groundnuts basin was estimated at 60% (CINAM-SERESA, 1963, p. 253).  In addition, there 
was a new policy agency, OCAS,44 inaugurated by the Senegalese new elites who studied in 
France.  Senghor (leader of the UPS party (Union Progressive Senegalese) who served as the 
first Senegalese president for almost two decades (from 1960-1980) was a salient example to 
perfectly support this idea.  Senghor, in the name of African Socialism, was, on the one hand, at 
the forefront of the Senegalese nation willing to liberate Senegal and the peasantry from the 
straitjacket of the colonial treaty economy while, on the other hand, was attributing to France a 
great importance in the Senegalese economy as means of colonial paternalism, particularly in the 
traditional agricultural sector.  This made Senegal’s agriculture more oriented to the world 
economy, and particularly to France, rather than operating in favor of national interests.  This 
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newly created policy granted the monopoly of purchase of Senegal’s groundnuts production to 
agricultural cooperatives and a small number of approved private traders who sold the harvest to 
the French processing industries operating in Senegal or French companies that organized the 
groundnuts export for treatment and commercialization in France (Caswell, 1983, p. 41). 
         From the 1975-1976 marketing season, France extended its influence even more with the 
complicity of the Senegalese leaders who always embody the colonial paternalism and fraternity 
toward the former colonial motherland France, and who are always eager to receive external or 
outside assistance from France.  They were organizing the export of groundnuts products with a 
new parastatal society, SONACOS (Societe Nationale de Commercialisation des Oleagineux du 
Senegal or “National Company of Marketing of the Oleaginous of Senegal”) created in 1975.  
SONACOS delivered the new harvest to the factories of transformation and organized the 
commercialization of the exports.  This was facilitated by the creation of the ONCAD (Office 
National de Coopération et d’Assistance au Développement or the “National Office for 
Cooperation and Assistance in Development”), which was the exploitation mechanism that 
ensured the monopoly of the Senegalese marketing of peanuts and represented also the largest 
customer carriers during this marketing season by linking it to rural credit, and providing 
instruments to control the price and quality of the means of agricultural production used 
(Caswell, 1983, p. 44) 
       Currently, because of France’s influence, the Senegalese government still maintains the 
price set at which the peasant producers sold their groundnuts for export and commercialization 
in France through the new committee on groundnuts commonly known as CNIA (Comité 
National Inter-professionnel de l’Arachide or “National Inter-Professional Committee on 
Peanut”).  The CNIA reviews the purchase price every year and implements any changes to 
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prices at the beginning of the season.  It offers the same price to peasant producers regardless of 
their location in the country and absorbs any transportation-related costs.  Peasant producers sell 
their products to the CNIA, which has set the price at the national level.  French processors 
impose to the Senegalese state a reduction and subsequent withdrawal of subsidies for its 
groundnuts and for crushing its groundnuts into oil that is sold to France in a pattern of unequal 
exchange, characteristic of primary commodity economies, and in a situation of deteriorating 
terms of trade (O’Brien, 1979, pp. 19-20).  In 2010, the last year in which the described domestic 
processor subsidy was in place, the nationally set price for peanuts is CFA165 ($ 0.34) per kilo.  
The Senegalese government offers a subsidy to these French processors of CFA15 ($0.03) per 
kilo, which means that the effective processor has cost CFA150 ($0.31) per kilo.45  
         These policies show that France’s colonial legacy and relations with Senegal make 
Senegal’s groundnuts monoculture heavily dependent on France’s financial and technical 
assistance.  This can be seen during the two drought seasons that occurred in Senegal from the 
period 1970s and 2000s.  During this period, Senegal, like other countries in the Sahelian zone, 
suffered from a persistent drought while it had few non-agricultural resources to depend on.  
Senegal’s peanut basin soil tends to be poor and sandy, and are currently undergoing these 
effects with the rapid depletion noticed in these areas particularly in the increasingly 
overpopulated areas of the basin which were and are being exploited first (Caswell, 1983, p. 46).  
These have led to the even faster exhaustion of Senegalese cultivation soils because of this 
irrational exploitation.  Therefore, it is no surprise that France provided financial and technical 
                                                          




assistance for modernization programs aimed at counteracting these trends and encouraging the 
use of fertilizers and seeds to ensure the steady supply of Senegalese groundnuts to France.   
       Thus, Senegal’s dependency on France makes France exercise its influence over Senegal’s 
main source of revenues and the largest portion of Senegal’s GDP that employs 70% of the labor 
force.  Because of the colonial ties Senegal’s cash-cropping that begun during the colonial period 
draws today the peasant producers away from subsistence economy and ties them to the supply 
mechanism of France’s foreign industries operating as groundnuts’ processors in Senegal.  The 
liberalization of the export market provides a steady supply of these precious sources of income 
to France’s trading companies (O’Brien, 1979, p. 20) that make France richer.  Conversely, these 
economic relations constrain Senegal’s economic development due to a situation of deteriorating 
terms of trade that they have created.  The end result has been the inflation of groundnuts export 
with a low-income revenue, many financial problems largely compensated by additional aid and 
loans that plunge Senegal in an indebtedness and economic stagnation that creates frustrations 
for the peasants and families, and the majority of people living below the poverty line.  
Therefore, migrations are seen as the only viable solution to escape from this endemic situation 
in Senegal. 
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      The period of the 1960s marked the transition from colonial despotism to independence in 
many African states.  In the newly independent Africa, this epoch coincided with the rise of 
Africans as rulers of the African states.  Focused on Senegal, reputed to be one of the most 
democratic country compared to many other African countries, this chapter seeks first to describe 
Senegal as a democracy.  After showing the pattern underlying Senegal as a democratic state, in 
the second part, I attempt to support my hypothesis that the more post-colonial holders of state 
power resort to authoritarian rule and the privatization of the state, the more likely they will loot 
national resources for their private interests.  I argue that in Senegal, post-colonial rulers have 
used authoritarian means of governance and appropriated the state resources as personal 
property.  Therefore, they have created a situation of generalized poverty and lack of economic 
opportunities for many young people in Senegal.  Because of that, the outcome has been massive 
migrations to Europe and elsewhere. 
 
Senegal: A Democratic State 
        I define democracy as a government established for the people and by the people.  
Etymologically, the term is derived from the Greek dēmokratiā, which came from dēmos 
(“people”) and kratos (“rule”) in the middle of the 5th century BCE to denote the political 
systems that existed in some Greek city-states, notably in Athens.  It means the rule of a majority 
and a government, in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them 
directly or indirectly through a system of representation that involves usually a periodical free 
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elections holding.46  Democracy as a process entails the elaboration of a structured and regulated 
uncertainty.  While it grants winners the power to govern and advance their interests 
immediately, democracy frees losers from the dangers of a sudden obliteration, and guarantees 
them the capacity to hope for a future victory via regularized, free, and fair multiparty elections.  
Therefore, it constitutes the institutional equalization of a structured and regulated uncertainty of 
political outcomes among antagonistic and competing actors, and is greatly assisted by the 
emergence of civil society, which according to Fatton (1992, p. 103), “Embodies the private 
sphere of material, cultural and political activities”. 
       To be sure, Senegal is a West African state, where democracy overtly appears to prevail.  
This has been supported by successive events in the development of the country’s politics, which 
has always taken place within the framework of a presidential democratic republic with each 
successive political regime in Senegal.  In post-independence Africa, Senegal emerged as a 
country that moved to democracy without any military coups.  In the early 1960s, the country 
pulled out of Mali Federation,47 and saw its first national president, Léopold Sédar Senghor 
(leader of the UPS “Senegalese Progressive Union”), elected on September 5, 1960.48 Senghor 
was a lofty intellectual and a highly skilled grass-roots politician who embodied black 
consciousness and cultural value and identity of Africa through his philosophical formulation of 
Negritude (Note taken from AAS 312, Dr. Sangmpam).  Senghor started to shape in this post-
independence period the political life of Senegal by embarking on the process of liberalization in 
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1974.  This process aimed at expanding political pluralism and democracy in Senegal.  Its 
realization made it possible for the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) of his opponent 
Abdoulaye Wade to be legally recognized in that same year.  This first step in Senegal’s politics 
reflected an aspect of democracy, with the existence of opposition considered as part of a 
participatory democracy; such opposition seemed inevitably and safely displayed in public rather 
than through the formations of clandestine underground organizations (Wiseman, 1990, p. 168), 
and enjoyed the respect and liberty granted to Senegal’s civil society. 
       A move toward Senegal’s democracy was made in the provision for opposition parties.  It 
was extended through a new constitutional amendment in April 1976 and allowed new 
opponents and their respective parties to adopt one of these three designated ideological 
positions such as liberal, socialist, or Marxist-Leninist.  In this logic, Senghor’s UPS party 
became the Senegalese Socialist Party (commonly known in French as Parti Socialiste du 
Senegal), Abdoulaye Wade, leader of the PDS, went for the liberal position, and the PAI (Parti 
Africain de l’indépendance or “African Independence Party”) of the leader Majhemout Diop, 
became the third party recognized as Marxist-Leninist.  The November 1976 municipal elections 
went under these arrangements, so did the February 1978 presidential election as well.  The latter 
was considered as the first presidential election under these three-pronged party system and took 
place in a democratic atmosphere that resulted in a landslide victory for the Senegalese Socialist 
Party of Senghor.  He won 82.20% of the votes, against 17.80% for his opponent, Abdoulaye 
Wade.49 Moreover, during the national assembly election that took place that same day, PS won 
                                                          







83% of the seats, against 17% for the PDS, while the PAI won none (Wiseman, 1990, pp. 168-
169). 
        From this first step of democracy emerged in December 1978 a further concession to a more 
open and freely competitive party system in Senegal.  The constitution was amended to allow for 
the legalization of a fourth party that represented a right-wing ideological stance.  MRS 
(Mouvement Republicain Senegalais or “Senegalese Republican Movement”) was created in 
1977 and led by Boubacar Gueye, the nephew of the late great nationalist leader Lamine Gueye.  
In addition to this, came the RND (Rassemblement National Democratic or “National 
Democratic Rally”) that was led by the eminent Senegalese academic, Cheikh Anta Diop.  It was 
a left-wing party and was thus associated with PAI, which symbolized the same ideal spectrum 
the RND stood for (Wiseman, 1990, p. 170). 
       On December 31, 1980, Senghor, even though his health was good for an African leader of 
his age to continue to serve his country, surprisingly announced his retirement from politics.  His 
decision was totally unforced, and he, according to Wiseman (1990, p. 170) commented that, “In 
politics, you should know when to go”.  Comparatively, the decision he took, distinguished him 
from many African leaders of the post-independence period, who even at their old age, were 
eager to cling to power.  Such a decision placed Senghor as the first of 150 heads of state in the 
political stage of Africa to relinquish power on his own accord in the post-independence era.  
Since then, a number of others followed his example:  Ahidjo in Cameroon, Nyerere in Tanzania, 
and Siaka Stevens in Sierra Leone (Wiseman, 1990, p. 170).   
       All of this describes a series of events under Senghor’s regime in Senegal, where the 
political system appeared stable.  They embodied a perfect promotion and advancement of 
democracy as a process and ideology in the country.  It was exercised through the constitutional 
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amendments in Senegal, allowing antagonists’ parties at that time to be legalized, and to 
participate freely in fair competitive elections against the incumbent Senghor in a democratic 
sphere, where freedom and civil society’s choices were respected. 
       After Senghor’s voluntary retirement, Abdou Diouf, who had been the head of his private 
office and then his prime minister after the reestablishment of this post in 1970, replaced 
Senghor according to Senegal’s constitutional law under which the prime minister succeeds a 
retiring head of state.  On January 1, 1981, he was sworn in as Republic of Senegal’s second 
president for the remaining five years of Senghor’s tenure.  Additionally, he replaced two weeks 
later Senghor as general secretary of the ruling party PS (Wiseman, 1990, p. 171), and held the 
presidency’s position from 1981 to 2000. 
       Diouf was known as a reformist that epitomized the ideal of Senegal’s democracy.  He 
expanded Senegalese citizens’ rights to create parties.  He mandated the constitutional 
transformation by initiating legislative change to allow for an unlimited number of parties in 
1981 (Kelly, 2019, p. 3).  In other words, this integral pluripartism opened up the possibility for 
opposition parties to run for the presidency against any ruling party or political opponents, as 
they desired.  By the end of 1981, there were 14 registered political parties; and several other 
leaders of that time created their own organizations.  It was the case for ex-Prime Minister, 
Mamadou Dia, who founded the MSU (Mouvement pour le Socialisme et l’Unité or “Movement 
for Socialism and Unity”), for a former anti-colonial activist who created the BDS (Bloc 
Démocratique Senegalais “Senegalese Democratic Bloc”), and Oumar Wone who created the 
PPS (Parti Populaire Senegalais “Senegalese Popular Party”), asserted Kelly (2019, p. 63).  All 
of this symbolized Senegal as a democratic country, where there was an ascendency of parties 
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that became more institutionalized.  This proliferation of parties allowed any party leader to 
express desire and wish to run for president in transparent elections. 
      Through the reforms, Diouf was continuing the political liberalization that Senghor started 
earlier by allowing more opposition parties to run against him.  Under Diouf’s regime, Senegal 
held two presidential elections in 1983 and 1988, where many emerging parties participated.  He 
respectively won both of these two elections with 83.45% and 73.20% of the votes,50 in a 
country, where the president is to be elected by an absolute majority on a national basis, and in a 
democratic climate where people’s voices speak freely for themselves in the polls. 
      Another indication of Senegal’s democracy under Diouf’s regime was the constitutional 
reform he brought in 1991, by approving several constitutional amendments that allowed the 
opposition parties to participate in the government in 1991.51  The following year, in 1992, he 
made a significant reform in terms of free and fair elections by establishing the democratic 
“electoral code”.  It was a consensual elaboration by the government of Diouf and the opposition 
leaders.  The electoral code put forward a secret ballot and expanded the voting rights to the 
diaspora and young people.  It required the use of the ballot boxes and indelible ink for the vote, 
allowed party representatives to be present at the polls, guaranteed equal media access to all 
candidates, and established a national ballot-counting commission, among other reforms (Kanté, 
1994, p. 96). 
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      After the establishment of these new reforms, there were events that affected Senegal 
negatively.  As we know, the 1990s period was marked by a severe economic depression that 
affected both the developed and developing countries.  In addition, there was the drought season 
the country experienced during that period; and the expansion of globalization and its neoliberal 
process came up with the rise of market reform as a global creed that involved a series of policies 
in the peripheral part of world.  All of these scourges inflicted great pain on Senegal during this 
period.  The country was in a disastrous economic situation that resulted in the closing of several 
important labor sectors and businesses, thus, creating high rates of unemployment.  It led to a 
total frustration and outbreak in whole Senegal’s fourteen regions. 
       All these problems affected the country’s politics in that period because the disastrous 
economic situation and the high rate of employment mixed to create a crisis of authority.  
Although in February 1988, Senegal held presidential and legislative elections and elected Diouf 
with 73.20% of the votes52.  In the aftermath of these negative events, Diouf and the PS were 
losing legitimacy in the eyes of significant portions of the country.  This was particularly so with 
the urban and rural youth due to the deepening of the socioeconomic deprivation.  Moreover, the 
opposition parties were really disorganized and did not fully acquire the necessary means and 
support to conquer power and govern (Fatton, 1992, p. 105).  Thus, Senegal was facing a disaster 
that ended up pervading the whole country economically, socially, and politically. 
      The events in the post-1988 presidential and legislative elections and the economic crisis 
need to be highlighted because it was in such a climate of generalized crisis in Senegal that 
Diouf’s regime made a democratic move to set up the “Enlarged Presidential Majority”.  The 
                                                          




latter’s main purpose was to form a new government cooperation by incorporating the main 
opposition leaders into the governance itself.  Among them, he chose Abdoulaye Wade (leader of 
the PDS party) and nominated him to the position of minister d’état without a portfolio.  
Furthermore, he incorporated three other members of the PDS, as well as the leader of the 
Communist party, Amath Dansako.  In addition, Diouf re-established the prime ministership and 
gave it to his intimate friend, Habib Thiam, the last to have occupied the position prior to its 
dissolution in 1983 (Fatton, 1992, p. 105). 
      From this standpoint, Diouf’s unification with Wade and the other opposition leaders 
reinvigorated Senegal’s “model” democracy.  Both of them embarked on an attempt to contain 
civil society’s frustrations and outbreaks during such a critical situation, when violence could 
have characterized Senegal’s politics, and might have led to serious disruptions and tremendous 
consequences that could tarnish the country’s image as a model of democracy.  Thus, in 
containing the risk of explosive social disturbances, and in promoting stability, the coming 
together of party leaders displayed, reaffirmed, and consolidated the claim about Senegal’s 
model democracy in Africa. 
       In 2000, Senegal held presidential elections.  During the elections, Diouf and his PS party, 
respectively after 19years and 40 years in power, were defeated by Abdoulaye Wade (leader of 
the PDS, and main opposition leader in the country since 1974) in the runoff.  Diouf received 
only 41.51% of the votes against 58.49% for Wade.53 Although defeated by Wade, Diouf 
conceded his defeat and made the courteous move by calling the incoming president Abdoulaye 
Wade to congratulate him on his victory while leaving office.  Wade in his turn, paid a brief visit 
                                                          





to Diouf’s mother, who received her son’s replacement with the utmost of graciousness.  He also 
asked Diouf to represent Senegal at the first European-African Summit in Cairo (Kuenzi, 2011, 
pp. 40-41). 
      The gestures of the two leaders were a major accomplishment in Senegal’s political history 
and supported the idea of Senegal as a model democracy.  They revealed the vitality and 
flexibility of its political system, which peacefully went through a power transfer.  This 
achievement represented a watershed in the country’s political system.  It not only demonstrated 
and reaffirmed the perception of Senegal as a democratic country but also placed the country as 
one of the most democratic countries in West Africa, and was inscribed forever in the political 
history’s book of the continent.   
       Coming into power through the democratic ballot box that showcased Senegal as a 
democracy, Wade’s regime (from 2000 to 2012) represented Senegal’s heyday of democratic 
power change.  He was widely admired and embodied the PDS historical legacy in his role as 
leader of the country’s most prominent post-independence opposition party.  His government 
initially appeared energetic and communicative, and the civil society seemed appreciative of this 
executive power’s transition.  President Wade benefited from the two-round voting system54 in 
Senegal.  This system allows opponents from different parties to forge a sense of shared purpose 
through “unity or coalition” against a candidate during a second-round election.  Therefore, those 
opposition leaders, who supported Wade and his “Sopi coalition”55 (Coalition for change) by 
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coalescing with him to form the Front pour l’Alternance56 (Front for a change in power “FAL”) 
during the second round of that 2000 presidential election, seemed also reinvigorated and had 
hope for the millennium era (Kuenzi, 2011, p. 41).  
       Some of the initial steps taken by Wade’s regime and government reinforced in the eyes of 
many the perception of Senegal’s model democracy.  Although governing is not an easy task in a 
country that is known as democratic, Senegalese expected full achievements from the Wade 
government.  Wade’s government was forthcoming about its promise to hold new elections.  By 
then Senegal had 174 registered parties, a number that had tripled from 58 parties by the end of 
the year 2000 (Kelly, 2019, p. 62).  Three elections were held the year after Wade came to 
power: (1) the referendum on the new draft of the Constitution in January 2001, (2) the 
legislative elections in April 2001, and (3) the municipal and local elections in 2001 (Kuenzi, 
2011, p. 41).  These elections displayed Senegal’s model of democracy by the way they unfolded 
in the country.  They were relatively free and fair, where the PDS and its allied parties forming 
the “Coalition Sopi” won the elections with nearly 50% of the votes and 74% of the seats.57 
        In addition to that, the “strength” of Senegal’s democracy was also demonstrated under 
Wade’s regime when the influential Freedom House organization rated Senegal as “free”, based 
on its democratic performance during this era (Kuenzi, 2011, p. 41).  Indeed, in the early years of 
Wade’s regime, elections were relatively free, fair, and peaceful.  They reinforced Senegal’s 
image as a democratic achievements.  But this was not to last. 
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        On February 26, 2012, Senegal held its 10th presidential election and the incumbent 
Abdoulaye Wade attempted, against the constitution, to run for a third term.  He faced his former 
protégé Macky Sall.  Trained as geological engineer at the Institute of Earth Sciences (IST) of 
the University of Dakar and then at the French Institute of Petroleum (IFP)’s National College of 
Petrol and Engines (ENSPM) in Paris, Macky Sall was a member of the Senegalese Democratic 
Party (PDS).  He served as Prime Minister (from April 2004 to June 2007); and was then 
appointed as President of the National Assembly (from June 2007 to November 2008) under 
Wade’s regime.  Due to its political disagreement and conflict within the PDS that led to his 
removal from his appointed post as President of the National assembly, Macky Sall on December 
1, 2008, formed his own political party, APR (Alliance pour la Republique or “Alliance for the 
Republic”).  He toured all fourteen regions of Senegal to lay the foundations for his campaign, 
and became the key rival of Abdoulaye Wade during that 2012 presidential race. 
        The initial results of the February elections were 26.58% for Macky Sall, and 34.81% for 
Wade.58  It compelled both of them to resort to a second round or runoff to get an absolute 
majority on a national basis for the victory.  During this second round elections which took place 
on March 25, 2012, Sall allied with the other disqualified candidates such as Tanor Dieng (leader 
of the Socialist Party), Moustapha Niass (leader of the AFP party (Alliance des Forces du 
Progrés “Alliances of the Forces of Progress”); Idrissa Seck (leader of the party Rewmi (Wolof 
appellation for “country”); Youssou Ndour (Senegalese famous singer) whose candidacy was 
rejected by the Constitutional council due the fact he didn’t meet the sufficient valid 
requirements and signatures to run for the presidency.  He also allied with the M23 (Opposition 
                                                          





movement generally composed of rappers, who identify themselves under the slogan of “Y’en a 
Marre”, Wolof translation for “We are fed up”).  All of these opposition leaders and their 
respective parties joined forces with Macky Sall and formed with him a coalition named in 
Wolof “Benno Bokk Yakkar” (United for the Same Hope).  They supported and endorsed Macky 
Sall’s candidacy to the presidency during this second round election.  Again, Senegal’s 
democracy was put to test for transparency in the electoral system, national consensus, and 
accountability.  In the end, Macky Sall won with 65.80% of the votes,59 and Abdoulaye Wade 
called his opponent Macky Sall at 21:30 GMT to concede the race. 
       Inaugurated as the Republic of Senegal’s fourth President on April 2 at the King Fahd Palace 
hotel in Senegal, Macky Sall put in place his government by appointing Abdoul Mbaye, a 
technocrat and banker as his Prime Minister.  Some of the initiatives taken by Sall’s regime 
reinforced Senegal’s democratic claims made under all the three previous regimes.  He took the 
initiative to publicly publish his net worth, which was estimated at CFA Francs 1.3 billion, 
largely acquired during his tenure as Wade’s Prime Minister.60  Three month later, precisely on 
July 1, 2012, when he won the legislative election with the same coalition “United for the Same 
Hope” by obtaining 119 of the 150 seats in the National Assembly,61 Macky Sall re-established 
the Court for the Repression of Illegal Enrichment and announced the creation of OFNAC 
(Office National de la Lutte Contre la Fraude et la Corruption or “National Anti-corruption 
                                                          
59 Database of election results in Senegal. Retrieved from: 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/sn.html#1988_Presidential_Election 
 
60 Carayole Remi. “Senegal: Macky Sall, a regulating president”. JeuneAfrique. June 4, 2012. Retrieved from: 
https://www.jeuneafrique.com/141316/politique/s-n-gal-macky-sall-pr-sident-quilibriste/ 
 





Office”), and a National Commission for the restitution of property and recovery of wrongly 
acquired possessions.62  He did so in order to promote Senegal’s image of model democracy 
where good governance and transparency coexist on a basis of constitutional values.  He also 
took the initiative to put forward a democratizing reform by declaring publicly his wish to revise 
the constitution in order to reduce the president’s tenure from seven to five years. 
        Senegal’s democracy under Sall’s regime was also characterized by the creation and 
registration of many political parties.  According to (Kelly, 2019, p. 88), “The number of 
registered parties has risen from over 200 when he became president to over 300 now”.  All these 
parties serve as vehicles for voicing policy alternatives and freely express themselves as a 
counterweight to the president’s policies on the basis of free electoral competition and 
accountability.   
        Sall’s regime illustrated the potential of Senegal’s democracy.  As the prerequisite for 
democracy involves socioeconomic transformation, he set up in February 2013 the famous “Plan 
Senegal Emergent” (PSE “Senegal’s Emergent Plan”).  It was a plan designed to transform 
Senegal into an emergent economy by 2035, with a cohesive society under the rule of law.63  It 
was a plan designed to raise potential growth and satisfy Senegalese’s aspiration for a better life 
through investments in sectors like agriculture, infrastructure, and tourism.  Portraying himself as 
modernizer eager to promote and consolidate Senegal’s democracy through the solidary and 
inclusive appeal for the march towards a “Senegal for all” within the PSE, he invited all the 
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opposition leaders and the entire Senegalese community to participate in the boosting of 
Senegal’s economic growth and development.  More importantly, on March 20, 2016, he 
reduced the president’s tenure from Seven to Five years, after the constitutional referendum 
elections.  These elections took place in a democratic sphere.  The opposition and civil society 
expressed themselves freely in a fair vote that went for 63% of approval against 37.44% of 
turnout.64 
       On February 24, 2019, Senegal held presidential election.  Among the six potential 
candidates and leaders of parties, two of them (Karim Wade, the designated leader of PDS, the 
Party of his father Abdoulaye Wade) and Khalifa Sall (leader of the Socialist Party) were 
excluded from participating due to their previous condemnations for misuse of public funds.  The 
remaining four party leaders, Madicke Niang (leader of the Independent Party), Issa Sall (leader 
of the Unity and Rally Party), Idrissa Seck (leader of the Rewmi Party), and Ousmane Sonko 
(leader of the Patriots of for Work, Ethics and Fraternity Party), ran as candidates against the 
incumbent Macky Sall.  The 2019 presidential election, was peaceful, fair, accountable, and civil 
society-based.  More than 6.6 million people registered to vote, including some living abroad.  
Macky Sall was re-elected in the first round election with 58.27% of the votes against 1.48% for 
Madicke Niang, 4.07% for Issa Sall, 20.50% for Idrissa Seck, and 15.67% for Ousmane Sonko.65  
       Macky Sall, who is currently in his second term in office, continues to project the image of 
Senegal as a” model” democracy.  In this speech of December 31, 2019, President Sall said that, 
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“As a democratic country, Senegal has crossed these 2019 elections peacefully, and in total 
equanimity”.66 He reiterated his commitment to continue to maintain Senegal as a model 
democracy by serving with accountability to the Senegalese nation.  Preparing the future of 
Senegal, he argued, “Is to achieve the widest possible convergence around the major national 
issues that are at the heart of public policies, especially the sense of the call for a national 
dialogue”.67 Sall has launched a national dialogue, which serves as an opportunity to deal with 
the great questions related to the national interests.  Currently, it has installed the dialogue 
steering committee, which serves as a framework for facilitating exchanges on various topics 
related to the country’s agenda.  This dialogue, in his words, “Is a consensus to consolidate the 
democratic experience, and the economic and social progress that are coming along in this 
country”.68 He has also inaugurated a series of big projects within the PSE, such as the turnpike 
that links Dakar and Diamnadio (where the actual airport is located); the one that links Dakar and 
Touba,69 the new national arena for traditional wrestling in the suburb of Dakar; the basketball 
arena in Diamniadio; the new agriculture machines for the development of the country’s 
monocrops (peanuts and groundnuts); the development of the local rice cultivation and its 
consumption in the country; and the development of the fishing sector, in addition to the 
expansion of other sectors such as tourism.   
       All in all, since independence with President Senghor until today with President Macky Sall, 
there are enough facts that support the claim that Senegal is one of the better democracies in 
                                                          
66-67-68  Macky Sall’s Speech of December 31, 2019. Retrieved from YouTube: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XmZq2FywJqw 
 






Africa.  This is supported by the proliferation of parties in the country.  It is also demonstrated by 
the country’s stability, the vitality and flexibility of its political system that can transition 
peacefully from one regime to another, the transparency of its electoral system or its formal 
electoral rules, where the opposition parties and their respective leaders can freely participate and 
express their will against a particular incumbent, and with the freedom and respect of civil 
society’s choices, the relative accountability of some of its political regimes.  Yet Senegal is 
hardly a “model” democracy as often claimed. After discussing Senegal as a democratic state, I 
now turn to show how the county’s democracy is accompanied by authoritarian behaviors. 
 
Senegal’s democracy and authoritarianism 
        Placed in the general political framework of post-independence Africa, authoritarian 
behavior is the way in which new African elites exercise power by virtue of their control of the 
state to oppress, repress, and manipulate to enhance their power.  Unlike many African countries, 
Senegal has been hailed as a stable democracy model in the continent.  However, a close analysis 
of the country’s political reality shows that despite its claim to democracy and stability, Senegal 
displays features related to authoritarianism.  
      As mentioned earlier, since its accession to independence in 1960, the republic of Senegal 
saw for the first time of its history its first president named Léopold Sédar Senghor.  His UPS 
party occupied the center of Senegalese politics.  When he was elected as Senegal’s head of state 
in the early period of the 1960s generally seen as the “Period of Electoral competition” (Sheldon, 
1995, p. 21), Senghor started to set up his political authority as “a presidential monarch” by 
imposing a one-party regime or one dominant-party system which, accordingly, “Was presented 
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as part of the African tradition that aimed at the elimination of oppositional or adversarial 
institutions of participation” (Sangmpam, 2007, p. 125).  The establishment of a one-party 
system represented the organ through which Senghor sought to maintain his monolithic political 
position as the supreme officeholder in Senegal by controlling the military corps, the electoral 
process, the civil service, and by fending off political challenges by excluding rival contenders.   
        In 1962, a constitutional crisis arose in Senegal due to the falling out between President 
Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia.  As Senghor’s colleague, Dia was appointed as 
prime minister and was in charge of the government administration and policymaking.  He 
wanted to implement an agricultural reform that would place the peasants’ groundnuts 
production more directly under the control of the government while restraining the rural 
dignitaries’ influence over rural commercial trade.  Senghor perceived Dia’s reform as 
threatening his rural clientelist base from which he derived the strength and the growing 
hegemony of his UPS.  These were peasants and rural dignitaries (Muslim leaders from the 
Muridiyya brotherhood) who were landowners who managed the majority of the groundnuts 
production.  The disagreement created a conflict between the two leaders.  It resulted in a 
constitutional crisis that divided the UPS party into two camps during this period: Dia’s radical 
camp that wanted the commercial interest of the state by reducing the planning autonomy and 
resource of individual ministries against the Senghor’s liberal camp that had personal patronage 
networks to defend.  The crisis culminated in a standoff when a motion of censure against the 
prime minister was introduced in the National Assembly.  Senghor and his UPS parliamentary 
deputies, who mostly belonged to the Muridiyya brotherhood and their Khalif-General,70 
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provided critical support for Senghor, mobilizing themselves in a show of force for the 
presidents (Beck, 2008, p. 54). 
        From this standpoint, it was not a surprise when Senghor ordered the army to arrest Dia, his 
key political rival, after falsely accusing him of a subversion’s conspiracy.  Dia was sentenced to 
lifelong imprisonment in a remote jail in Kedougou in Eastern Senegal (Bianchini, 2019, p. 187).  
Four other promising leaders, Valdiodio Ndiaye, Ibrahima Sarr, Joseph Mbaye and Alioune Tall, 
who supported Dia, were arrested as well.  In the wake of the crisis, Senghor abolished other 
opposition parties in so many ways.  Firstly, he dissolved the FNS (Front National Senegalais 
“Senegalese National Front”) in October 1964, apparently for harboring supporters of Senghor’s 
ex-colleague and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia (O’Brien, 1967, p. 559).  Secondly, he banned 
the PAI (Parti Africain de L’indépendance “African Independent Party”) whose leaders were 
respectively Majhemout Diop and Amadou Ly.  Thirdly, he refused the recognition of the RND’s 
Party (Parti du Rassemblement National Démocratique “National Democratic Assembly’s 
Party”) led by the eminent Senegalese academic, Cheikh Anta Diop (Wiseman, 1990, p. 170).  
Fourth, he proclaimed the dissolution of the BMS (Bloc des Masses Senegalaises “Senegalese’s 
Masses Coalition”), a relatively conservative party organized also by Cheikh Anta Diop, on the 
pretext that a majority of the leaders of that party had joined the UPS (O’Brien, 1967, p. 559).  
Finally, he absorbed the PSAS (Parti Senegalais de l’Action Socialiste “Senegalese Party of 
Socialist Action”) of Lamine Gueye into UPS and appointed him as President of the National 
Assembly as a way to pay him off.   
       After the absorption of opposition parties, Senghor also established a presidential regime 
with executive strengthened powers; he wrote a new constitution in 1963, whose main points 
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were the abolition of the Prime Minister’s post and the parliamentary system.71 Under the new 
constitution, the decision-making was highly centralized.  Ministers served as high-level 
functionaries, deferring to President Senghor on everything except routine matters.  The National 
assembly, became a rubber stamp for the laws and budgets proposed by President Senghor, who 
frequently legislated by decree.  Even the judiciary was not immune to Senghor’s influence 
(Beck, 2008, p. 55).  Senghor was not only the head of state and government but also the 
secretary-general of the ruling party, setting a precedent that established the rise of the party-
state.  All the government and party officials, whether elected or appointed, were ultimately 
dependent on Senghor’s patronage, blurring the distinction between legislative, judicial, and 
administrative functions (Beck, 2008, p. 55).  This meant that the new constitution was designed, 
not only to allow him to centralize power through a de facto institutionalized one-party state, but 
also to have the single party as the strategic instrument of policy and governability.  As a matter 
of fact, it allowed Senghor’s UPS ruling party to be declared in 1966 as the sole political party in 
Senegal.72 
       That, Senghor embarked, by 1976, on the process of liberalization by allowing political 
pluralism with the formation of opposition parties as mentioned earlier, was made possible by his 
hold on the constitution, his party’s dominance, and his control over the main services and the 
military corps.  In addition, he controlled the internal clientelist networks and relied externally, 
as seen in chapter three, on the former colonial power, France, with which Senghor had a deep 
personal attachment.  All this, allowed Senghor to exercise power in his favor through different 
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means, whether through manipulation or intimidation.  One can cite the use of certain unlawful 
acts of electoral fraud.  The latter as Sangmpam (2007, p. 44) argued, “May involve the 
annulment of the results of an election won by the opposition or open bribery aimed at altering 
the process and outcome of the elections”.  In this optic, the landslide victory of Senghor’s party, 
the PS during the first presidential and legislative elections under the three-party system that 
were held in February 1978, was not a surprise.  It was the outcome of electoral manipulation by 
the dominant party. 
       “While it does appear that there was some element of electoral malpractice, the enormous 
superiority of the PS electoral machine was largely responsible for the size of its victory” 
(Wiseman, 1990, p. 169).  PS’s enormous superiority derived from Senghor hegemonic position 
to carry out repression and cooptation for his party’s need and his ability to violate the electoral 
process and substance, if necessary, with the help and coordination of some groups of people 
such as the rural dignitaries (the Muslim brotherhoods) and local communal leaders who were 
indispensable intermediaries due to inadequate formal institutions at the local level (O’Brien, 
1975, p. 175).  They were designated as “odd ones out” to demonstrate a ruling party well 
equipped and prepared.  It came to what Fatton (1992, pp. 46-47) characterized as 
“Bonapartism”.  The latter, is the way in which a personal ruler is able to centralize power by 
incorporating certain influential specific groups of people into a cartel that defends his 
hegemony, supports and reinforces his material and self-interest, and makes him the only sun of 
the political system. 
        Thus, this means that after independence, authoritarian behavior was manifest in Senegal 
under Senghor’s regime.  During his time in office, the opposition parties were harassed.  Some 
prominent opposition leaders were imprisoned, and some other significant opposition parties 
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were absorbed and had not consistently participated in elections since their creation.  Others 
were coopted by Senghor to become part of his own party that held power and controlled power 
through a de facto single-party state system.  The liberalization process, which he embarked on, 
was only possible because his party was extremely dominant and he could use his supremacy to 
control and manipulate the strategic instrument of the state apparatus to maintain his hegemonic 
position. 
       After his personal decision to resign from power, Diouf who had been Senghor’s prime 
minister since the reestablishment of the post in 1970, replaced Senghor on January 1, 1981.  
Diouf was Senghor’s protégé, and Senghor had maneuvered the PS party in a way that would 
ensure the political survival of his party and the acceptance of his assigned successor long before 
he retired.  Diouf became also the general secretary of the ruling party PS.  During his time in 
office, he similarly duplicated and reproduced the same political logic that Senghor had already 
started.  As stated earlier, in Senegal, the president is to be elected by an absolute majority on a 
national basis.  Aware that the opposition coalitions might have posed a great threat to the 
legitimacy and stability of the PS party’s strength and dominion, Diouf secretly tailored the 
constitution by banning the electoral coalitions under the pretext that such alliances are 
“artificial” since they do not last beyond the electoral period (O’Brien, 1983, p. 9).  This clearly 
would handicap and hamper the progress of the opposition in their run for the presidency.  
Blocking this gate for the opposition, Diouf was smartly initiating the “divide and better rule” as 
a strategical game in the political sphere of the country by adopting in Senegal’s national 
assembly a law restoring the integral pluripartism, as mentioned earlier in the chapter. 
       From this perspective, it was quite probable that a certain amount of astute political move 
laid behind Diouf’s continuation in the political liberalization process that Senghor had started 
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earlier.  As politics entails tremendous competitions, he was conscious that in implementing his 
strategical game by providing more freedom to the opposition parties to participate in an open 
competition, it would certainly lead to many internal and external conflicts between them.  These 
conflicts would, therefore, result in reducing the ability of the opposition to mount an effective 
political party that would be able to run against him.  These conflicts would also result in much 
splitting and the creation of more and weaker opposition parties that, in return, would favor him.  
According to Wiseman (1990, p. 172), “It could well be argued that paradoxically, the decision 
to give more freedom to the opposition was designed to weaken them rather than strengthen 
them”.  Thus, in tailoring the constitutional authority, and putting into effect his strategical game 
in Senegal’s political sphere by allowing more opposition parties to run against him, Diouf was 
aware that he would be able to divide and bring them into fragments in order for him to better 
maintain his hegemonic power.  This was illustrated by the presidential and legislative elections 
that took place on February 27, 1983.  Diouf’s resounding victory in both of these elections with 
respectively 83.45% and 79.94% of the votes,73 was so predictable because he had trapped the 
opposition in his game by giving them a green light to run against him while he had in advance 
seized the state apparatus.  In addition to that, he had almost the total support of the rural 
dignitaries in the rural areas where most of the voters are located; and where his party (PS) had 
always benefited enormously from their continuing support, notably the Muslim brotherhood as 
part of Senghor’s clientelist base legacy that Diouf had inherited at that time.  “The marabouts of 
all the major brotherhoods supported Diouf in the 1983 elections” commented Creevey 
                                                          





(Wiseman, 1990, p. 175).  In this sense, the anti-democratic behaviors uncovered under Senghor 
were present under Abdou Diouf’s rule. 
       Throughout the 1980s, when Senegal faced scourges that impacted the country economically 
and socially, Abdoulaye Wade’s PDS and the other opposition parties were growing 
discontented due the fact that their call for the renegotiation of the electoral code to ensure fair 
and more transparent electoral competitions was ignored.  Fraud or possible rigging was 
suspected during the precedent elections that took place in1983.  Therefore, the next elections 
that Senegal held on February 28, 1988, were violently disputed.  Prior to Senegal’s Supreme 
Court’s official declaration, partial results rumored by Diouf’s government who had the electoral 
monopoly were predicting a victory of their PS party.  The opposition for its part saw this as a 
ploy to prepare them and the Senegalese nation for another fraudulent PS victory.  Once Diouf’s 
victory was officially confirmed by the Supreme Court with respectively 73.20% and 71.34% of 
the votes for the presidential and legislative elections,74 a wave of violence and vandalism 
erupted from all sides in Senegal.  Particularly in Senegal’s capital (Dakar), wrathful opposition 
leaders and their young followers burnt public buses.  This series of violence, triggered by 
Diouf’s electoral fraud and electoral monopoly, resulted in multiple injuries.  The state 
responded decisively by declaring a state of emergency and by arresting leaders of the opposition 
parties (Beck, 2008, p. 62). 
      This was a turning point in Senegal’s politics.  After twenty years, it was the most prominent 
post-independence opposition leader, Abdoulaye Wade, who orchestrated the rebellion in the 
capital city of Senegal.  He was enraged due to his persistent inability to assume power through 
                                                          




the electoral process in Senegal, where the two successive political regimes had put forward a 
new style of political and modus operandi operating for their control of power.  Therefore, he 
focused on his wrath of inequity by treating Diouf’s victories as “ridiculous” and triggered 
violence in the street with his followers.  Such acts led to his arrest when Diouf declared a state 
of emergency in Dakar.  As news from Reuters, New York Times reported at that time, “President 
Abdou Diouf declared a state of emergency in Dakar today as supporters of a defeated rival who 
denounced Sunday’s presidential election as fraud battled the police.  The police descended on 
Dakar University and the headquarters of the rival, Abdoulaye Wade, presidential candidate of 
the Democratic Party, breaking up rioting crowds with tear gas and clubs.  Young supporters of 
Mr. Wade ran through surrounding streets setting fire to cars and buses.  The emergency decree, 
broadcast over the state radio, banned unauthorized gatherings and increased police arrest 
powers.  By late afternoon, the crackdown appeared to have brought calm to the streets of the 
capital, a city of about a million.  The capital was put under curfew from 9 P.M to 6 A.M”.75 
       The instability, which Diouf’s regime brought, was intensified during the years that followed 
during which Senegal displayed a total lack of compromise.  As Sangmpam (2007, p. 204) 
argued, “In the absence of compromise, society-rooted conflict is accompanied by a bitter 
competition for the control of state power, the sine qua non for access to material and other 
resources”.  This was well illustrated by the internal conflicts in Senegal’s southern region, 
particularly in Casamance.  In this area, the MFDC (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la 
Casamance “Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance”) which was composed mostly of 
                                                          





Diola76 formed a separatist military wing named “Atika”.77  They were fighting for their 
autonomy within Senegal.  This was compounded by a border skirmish with Mauritania that led 
to rioting and violence with massive human rights violations, and by the collapse of the 
Senegambia Federation (Beck, 2008, p. 62).  The crisis was intensified during the 1993 
presidential and legislative elections that were fraudulently won again by Diouf with 58.40% and 
56.52% respectively.78 The 1998 legislative elections Diouf’s party won again with 50.19% of 
the votes.79  The main opposition leader Wade, who was arrested and suspended a while due to 
incitements to riots during the previous 1988 elections, had defeated Diouf in these 1998 
elections but once again, the official figures misrepresented the true results by declaring Diouf as 
a winner.  These elections results again sparked tensions in the country.  Riots broke out again in 
Dakar that involved Wade and his supporters, including many young people and students.  They 
made vociferous accusations of electoral fraud and abuse against Diouf again, and cried foul in 
the 1998 legislative elections (Kuenzi, 2011, p. 36).   
       Thus, in Senegal, despite the recognition of the role of the opposition in the constitution, 
Diouf’s regime used his control of the electoral laws to practice its “divide and better rule” game, 
which brought the opposition into fragments.  He ensured again a victory monopoly of his PS 
party in elections with illicit practices, electoral monopoly, clientelist networks with the rural 
dignitaries, and through his control over the military corps.  By doing so, he violated the basic 
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tenets of democracy, which requires transparency in the elections, fairness, and evenness in the 
playing field, and rejects any practices that will compromise or constrain the opposition from a 
possible win in elections, and which requires consistent respect of civil liberties and freedom. 
       Prior to the 2000 presidential election, Diouf had been in power for Nineteen years and 
embodied the hegemony of the PS that had been the sole political regime in power for forty 
years. On the other hand, Wade who had been the main opposition leader since Senghor’s regime 
was strengthening his PDS party with his new Sopi Coalition (Coalition for a change), which had 
increased his level of penetration in the society.  Diouf was out of touch with the majority of the 
population that faced instability and the deterioration of the living standards.  There was growing 
dissatisfaction with his regime that oppressed the Senegalese nation, particularly the opposition 
leaders and their followers.  His government lacked the resources to face the economic problems 
and to maintain effectively the clientelist networks, and to fulfill the demands or needs of his 
clients (Kuenzi, 2011, p. 39).  Because of these problems, PS’s enfeebled grip on power was 
becoming more apparent. 
       The 2000 presidential election that was held in February 2000 led to Diouf’s defeat in the 
second round election; he received 41.51% of the votes against 58.49% for Wade.80  This 
electoral result reflected the strong desire for change the Senegalese population wanted because, 
despite his expressed anti-corruption stance, Diouf came to symbolize a political system driven 
by graft, corruption, inefficiency, and incompetence (Kuenzi, 2011, p. 40).  Thus, Wade’s 
victory constituted a historic event in Senegal because it marked the end of several years of a 
                                                          






one-party regime by the PS.  As Senegal’s new incumbent president, Wade embodied PDS’s 
historical legacy in his role as the prominent party leader and organizer of the political platform 
“Sopi” (Wolof translation for “Change”).  Because of that, he represented to the eyes of many 
Senegalese people a common hope for an alternative solution and set of changes on the national 
scale after the practically one-party rule since independence.  In this regard, this Millennium era 
was though to augur what Wolof society called “Atoume Ndantague” (Prosperous year). 
        But this was not to be.  Depressingly and unexpectedly during the twelve years he was in 
power, President Wade relied on authoritarian even as he claimed to be a proponent of 
democracy in Senegal.  Many Senegalese people, particularly the youth who constitute the hope 
of the nation of tomorrow, felt betrayed because they saw in Wade the hope of a true 
embodiment of “Sopi”, the development of an orderly, viable and stable nation-state through the 
practice of good governance and accountability.  They grew discontented and marginalized by 
Wade’s regime, which was incapable of unleashing the potential of the Senegalese youth, 
increasingly wasted through the inadequacies of Senegal’s educational system.  The university 
dumped half a million untrained undergrad students on the streets each year.  Those who 
obtained the bachelor degree found themselves in total uncertainty about the fate of their studies 
and future in a system in which it was no longer your efforts, your notes, or grades that 
guaranteed you access to a Master’s program.  In a system that was no longer predicated on 
students’ merit, but on whom in the administration the students/or their families knew.   
        As the result of this system, thousands of students with a bachelor’s degree were denied 
access to Master programs.  They found themselves also unable to find work. One can find them 
easily in Senegal’s slums gathered around a pot of tea or at the corner of lost areas located 
behind Cheikh Anta Diop University next to the beach, where they spend their time to 
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commiserate with their cohorts about their situation.  As one of them, I frequently spent most of 
my time over there as well.  As a regular of these gatherings, I can testify about the feeling of 
disappointment and despair of these young people who were very worried about the future.  
Wade’s regime violated the rights to education for many young Senegalese students.  It was a 
total let down. 
       Such neglect of basic needs dismayed some donors.  Sweden shut down its main aid 
program, while the Netherlands dropped Senegal from its list of priority recipients.  Other 
development partners even complained that Senegal failed to give adequate attention to the 
drafting of a detailed third-generation Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Melly, 2012, p. 8) 
       Because of Wade’s propensity to privatize the state, the country was in a total impasse under 
his regime.  A patchy development and economic record aggravated long-standing problems 
such as high cost of living, poor social welfare, unemployment, and persistent power shortages in 
Dakar and the sub-region.  There occurred a fragmentation of demographic social trends, the 
spread of corruption, the allocation of state resources in favor of Wade’s ruling party and its 
clientelist networks constituted around the Murid brotherhood with whom he was openly 
affiliated.  All this, gave rise to tensions around the issues of the Sufi religious orders, state 
neutrality, and secularism, which were disconcerting to many Senegalese people who were not in 
the Murid brotherhood or who supported the secular state (Kuenzi, 2011, pp. 46-47).  There was 
also the reduction of the budget’s share allocated to health and education, at a time when 
teachers’ salaries had been up to seven months in arrears.  Even when government initiatives are 
announced, shortcomings are widespread.  Flooding, for instance, remained a persistent problem 
in some suburbs of Dakar, despite the president’s public promotion of new housing projects 
(Melly, 2012, pp. 4-8).   
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      The opposition, on the other side, was enraged due to Wade’s refusal to revise the voters’ 
registration lists following the February 25, 2007 presidential election that his PDS party and 
allies Sopi 2007 Coalition resoundingly won in the first round of voting with 55.90% of the 
votes.81  Because of such a result in this presidential election, all the major opposition parties 
made a major pact to boycott the legislative election that was going to be held on June 3, 2007.  
“During this election, all seventeen opposition parties boycotted this legislative election”, argued 
Galvin and Murison (Kuenzi, 2011, p. 42).  Despite their boycott, Wade won the legislative 
election with 69.21% of the votes, thus occupying 131 of the official 150seats82 in the National 
Assembly.  Once again, his resounding victory clearly showed that he had practiced electoral 
manipulation in favor of his PDS party.  “Rigorous statistical tests also suggest that manipulation 
was likely”, argued Bebber and Sacco (Kelly, 2019, p. 15), and it was as a way to neutralize and 
diminish the credibility of the opposition leaders and their parties.  This fraudulent number of 
seats he brought in the National Assembly allowed Wade to hold the hegemonic power over the 
rule of law and decision-making process in the Senegalese Institutions.  For that reason, he put 
forward reforms that suited his personal and party interests.  For example, he took measures to 
promote a party formation system that favored the distribution of rewards to party leaders that 
joined his ruling party.  The rewards included material and financial support and linkages to the 
state (Kelly, 2019, p. 72).  Wade cut the presidential term from seven years to five, and then 
restored it to seven (Melly, 2012, p. 5) in order to meet his authoritarian needs of the 
privatization of the state.  
                                                          







       All of this portrayed the institutional instability and Wade’s personal rule in Senegal, where 
he used uneven playing field to shape elections to his advantage.  Such behavior in office made it 
clear that the claim of democracy and fair governance that he militated for when he was in the 
opposition had been reversed.  His advocacy of fair play, transparency, and good governance 
appeared to have been abandoned when it was no longer his ox being gored (Kuenzi, 2011, p. 
43). 
       As a result, a climate of general instability invaded the Senegalese society that became very 
exasperated by Wade’s regime.  The opposition leaders started marching and rallying on the 
streets of Dakar and other major cities demanding Wade to give up power.  And if they were 
among the thousands of university students or young unemployed who twelve earlier fought for 
and with Wade to bring about political change in Senegal, they were most likely among those 
who marched and rallied along with the opposition.  The crisis was compounded by the failure of 
the government to end the 30-year insurgency by the separatist military wing of MFDC.  Little 
progress had been made.  It resulted in factionalism and the intensification of criminal activities 
by the MFDC in the South region of Casamance (Melly, 2012, p. 4). 
       This climate of general instability intensified by June 23, 2011, due to the absence of 
national consensus about Wade’s regime attempt to introduce a bill establishing the ticket for the 
simultaneous election by universal suffrage of the President and Vice-President of the Republic, 
prior to the February 2012 presidential election.  This was a plot for him to lower the threshold 
required for outright victory in the first round of a presidential election to just 25% of the votes 
and to create a position of vice president for his son Karim.  The latter had already massive 
responsibilities and prominent roles in the government, including state minister for a sprawling 
new portfolio encompassing international cooperation, infrastructure, regional development, and 
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aviation.  Even the energy department was added to his ministerial empire when Dakar was 
struggling with power cuts in October 2010 (Melly, 2012, p. 6).   
        Consequently, a backlash against Wade’s bill erupted in Senegal.  The opposition leaders, 
students, workers, musicians, and the M23 (Opposition movement generally composed of 
rappers, who identify themselves under the slogan of “Y’en a Marre” gathered in Senegal’s main 
public places such as Soweto and General-de-Gaulle’s Boulevard to fight against Wade’s bill 
and to pressure him into giving up power.  “Touhez-pas encore à Notre Constitution” (Do not 
touch again Our Constitution), and “Y’en a Marre” were two of the slogans of thousands of 
protesters surrounding the entire 14regions of Senegal.  As I witnessed, riots erupted everywhere 
and thousands of protesters demonstrated their anger by setting tires on fire on every street, by 
blocking the Senegalese highway, and by setting public transports on fire.  Deputies’ hotel was 
set on fire, and even the Residence of Wade’s special adviser of that time, Farba Senghor, was 
attacked and all of his cars set on fire.  He and his family were urgently extricated from their 
residence by the Senegalese army.   
      Fearing that he could be victim of a possible coup, Wade gave an order to the army to 
surround the palace.  He also gave orders to the army’s corps to react.  The police descended on 
the fields armed with tear gas canisters and helmets.  Confrontations broke out everywhere in 
Dakar and the sub-region between the police and civil society carrying clubs, and stones.  The 
country plunged into a total disorder, where the police sought to ban rallies and curtailed any 
civil society’s protest activities.  Because of that, many protesters including several opposition 
leaders were arrested.  Furthermore, Wade’s government even violated the civil liberties of 
journalists.  He censored controversial political writing, intermittently shut down private 
newspapers and radio stations, and harassed journalists.  Overall, He targeted troublemaking 
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politicians, public figures, and journalists with a range of legal measures such as the temporary 
closure of newspapers and the suing for libel or for threatening the security of the state (Dahou 
and Foucher, 2009, p. 28).  Members of all of the sectors that might check the abuses of the 
president, such as civil society, the press, and opposition parties, have been subject to police and 
judicial action (Mbow, 2008, p. 163) 
       Thus, Senegal’s political reality under Wade’s regime overtly showed that traits related to 
authoritarianism were apparent.  During the twelve years he spent as Senegal’s head of state, he 
violated the rights and basic needs of many young Senegalese people.  By virtue of his control of 
the Senegalese state, he held the decision-making power in the presidency, manipulated the 
country’s institutions by setting up reforms that shaped elections to his advantage, neutralized the 
opposition on several occasions, monopolized the state resources, expanded corruption within 
the Senegalese society, and violated the freedom of the press.  Moreover, during that millennium 
era considered as “Atoume Ndantague”, he caused growing discontent and disappointments to 
many Senegalese people who were very exasperated by his authoritarian rule.  The outcome was 
the extreme or relentless violence that was manifest in the whole country.  This portrayed not 
only the failure of the Wade regime but painted the current picture of general instability in 
Senegal where people saw revolutionary violence as a means to their salvation. 
       On February 26, 2012, in such an atmosphere of a disorder and despair, Senegal held its 10th 
presidential election.  Surprisingly, the incumbent Abdoulaye Wade who most the Senegalese 
people expected to retire from politics was among those running for the presidency.  He was 
around 85-years old and was attempting to run for a third term.  As such Wade’s decision rubbed 
salt into the Senegalese peoples’ wounds and had yet again raised growing concerns because a 
Wade’s victory meant that he would be in power for 19 years, which seemed like a sufficiently 
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long period for any political leader to hold the office of the presidency (Kuenzi, 2011, p. 45).  A 
Wade victory would prompt unrest in Dakar, especially if the elections were perceived to be 
fraudulent again, and more importantly if he placed his son to the presidency as a way to groom 
him to carry the torch of political leadership in Senegal.  This would confirm the prominence of 
Wade’s vision of dynasty or transfer of power from father to son.  Therefore, an Anti-Wade-re-
election bid protest broke out in Senegal.  The Police and thousands of opposition supporters 
clashed in the center of the city.  Tear gas was fired, two people were shot to death and another 
one died after being run over by the police’s water cannon truck.  Several other people were also 
wounded after they were run over by police vehicles, some people suffered several asthma 
attacks because of the tear gas and one man had been visibly beaten (Ajjan, 2012). 
       In this 2012 presidential election that took place in a harsh and unstable environment, Wade 
was facing his former prime minister and protégé Macky Sall (leader of the APR party) who was 
a familiar leader to all Senegalese due to his brilliant tour across the whole 14 regions of Senegal 
to lay the foundations for his campaign.  The election outcome was the victory of Sall on 
Sunday, March 25, 2012 with 65.80% of the votes of the runoff election.83  Sall’s victory derived 
from the endorsement he had received from the opposition leaders with whom he allied and 
formed the “Benno Bokk Yakkar” (United for the Same Hope) coalition prior to the runoff.  It 
also derived from the Senegalese youth, workers, and musicians; overall, the electorate who after 
crediting him effectively as a true alternative to the incumbent Wade joined forces with him and 
supported his candidacy in order for him to ascend to the presidency.  Thus, this showed the 
                                                          





revolutionary potential and determination that civil society has in challenging the most repressive 
aspects of an authoritarian regime that, once activated, are impervious to the public will. 
      Inaugurated on April 2, 2012 as the Republic of Senegal’s fourth president, Macky Sall was 
elected to restore order in the country after the violent outbursts and social unrest the country 
went through under the outgoing regime of Wade.  Many Senegalese people expected him to 
bring changes in the country after several promises he made prior to the moments he became 
president.  However, during the time he has been in office, authoritarianism once again 
characterized his regime.  As president, Sall set up his political authority by applying his power 
retention strategy through the creation of patronage-oriented parties, especially those major party 
allies that collaborated with him and joined his ruling coalition.  That was the case of his APR 
partisans and members of other parliamentary parties, like the AFP (Alliance des Forces du 
Progrés “Alliances of the Forces of Progress”) and the PS (Parti Socialiste “Socialist Party”) that 
formed the “Benno Bokk Yakkar” coalition, to which he provided the most visible rewards 
(Kelly, 2019, p. 89).  He institutionalized the distribution of rewards to those that joined him as a 
way to provide them with material support and linkages to the state and to ensure future 
majorities mobilization during elections.  That was the reason why after the July 1, 2012 
legislative election, Sall’s Benno Bokk Yakkar coalition held 119 seats in the National 
Assembly.84 
       In the post-election period, Sall sought to maintain his monolithic political position as the 
supreme officeholder in Senegal.  Therefore, he started conducting a “witch hunt” against his 
opponents and appeared keen to lock them up on corruption charges.  He was Wade’s protégé 
                                                          





and spent eight years on his side.  This, allowed him to know more about those opposition 
leaders who became his key rivals and to track them down with any evidence possible.  As a 
matter of fact, several of them were arrested.  The most popular among them were Karim Wade 
and Khalifa Sall.  The former was accused of misuse of public funds during his father’s rule and 
was issued a six-year sentence in March 2015, two days after the Senegalese Democratic Party 
(PDS) designated him as its candidate for the next presidential election (Ba, 2015). After serving 
three years, Sall released him.  However, after his release, he left Senegal immediately for Qatar.  
Such abrupt departure of Karim raised the suspicion that Sall had likely coerced him into leaving 
the country.  The other one was Khalifa Sall, Mayor of Dakar.  He was sentenced to five years in 
prison after being charged with fraud and misuse of public funds prior to the 2019 presidential 
election where he was expected to present a strong challenge to Macky Sall.  “I feel shame for 
my country.  This decision is meant to prevent Khalifa Sall from putting his name forward as a 
presidential candidate”, said the Senegalese Deputy Cheikh Gaye to Reuters.85 Such Sall’s 
decision to prosecute the popular opposition leaders clearly showed his unequivocal will to 
exclude any rival contenders as a way to fend off political challenges and to settle political scores 
in his favor. 
      As a result, popular discontent has been brewing in Senegal under Sall’s regime.  As most of 
his main political opponents are sentenced, he exhibits the practice and attitude that do not 
respond to the prerequisites for democracy.  It was illustrated by several political graffiti seen in 
every public place around Dakar and other townships in Senegal.  As the Economist journal 
reported, “To the casual observer, all seems well in Senegal.  Visitors to Dakar, the capital, fly 
                                                          





into a new excellent airport.  The economy grew by 6.8% last year and the discovery of natural 
gas heralds an even brighter economic future.  To boot, the national team has performed well at 
the football World Cup.  But the political graffiti scrawled across Dakar’s wall tell a different 
story.  The messages demand freedom for the political opponents of President Macky Sall, 
several of whom have been imprisoned.  With a presidential election just eight months away, 
fears are growing that democracy in Senegal, long an example for West Africa, is being 
subverted”.86  Furthermore, the press expressed anger due to ongoing harassment of journalists 
who denounced Sall’s violation of civil liberties and press organs. 
       Prior to the 2019 presidential election, Senegal had 300 political parties.  Sall introduced a 
law commonly known as “Loi de Parrainage” (Sponsorship law).  Its purpose was to increase 
barriers to entry in future races.  Among other elements, the law required all presidential 
candidates to obtain the signatures of 0.8% of registered voters spread across Seven of Fourteen 
geographical regions in order to appear on the ballot.  Aware of that, the opposition denounced 
the law as it was thinly veiled to bureaucratically handicap them in the 2019 presidential 
election.  The civil society argued that the law erected undue barriers to the freedom of 
expression and association, regulating political party members to the same onerous requirements 
to collect elector signatures that independent candidates had to follow to be on the ballot (Kelly, 
2019, pp. 59-60).  Galvanized by these contentious debated laws, protesters took to the Dakar 
streets when the National Assembly, in which Sall’s party occupied the majority with 119 seats 
of 150, voted the law.  Inside the National Assembly, the opposition grew angry and boycotted 
the vote due to the rejection of their request for debate by Sall’s majority parliamentary group.  
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Across the city, the police frequently greeted protesters with tear gas and other aggressive 
actions.  This portrayed Sall’s hegemonic power, his hold on the constitution, through which he 
organized political representation and participation, and his hold of military corps through which 
he practiced coercion and oppression. 
       Due to this Sponsorship law, only five candidates were approved to run on February 25, 
2019, presidential election.  On top of this, Sall’s main political opponents such Karim Wade and 
Khalifa Sall, were excluded from participating due to their previous condemnations.  For that 
reason, it was not a surprise when the Constitutional Council confirmed Sall’s victory in this 
election with 58.26%.87  He had already planned and calculated his political game by applying 
his power retention strategy. 
       Overall, in Senegal where “model” democracy has been hailed, features associated with 
authoritarianism were and are obviously present.  After decades of its independence, the 
country’s political reality in one state where all successive presidential regimes had resorted to 
authoritarian rule.  By virtue of their control of the Senegalese state, they apply their political 
authority by holding the decision-making power in the presidency and manipulate the country’s 
institutions by setting up reforms that shaped elections to their advantage.  They coerce and 
neutralize the opposition on several occasions, expand corruption within the Senegalese society, 
and violate the freedom of the press.  Moreover, all of them have violated the rights and basic 
needs of many Senegalese people, thus, causing popular discontent and disappointment, and 
making the country less hospitable.  The outcome was the waves of violence that rocked 
Senegal, where people saw revolutionary violence as a means to their salvation, thus, plunging 
                                                          




the country into total instability.  All of these successive rulers in Senegal monopolized power 
and enhanced themselves as the supreme power holders by building patronage with some 
opposition parties and their clientelist bases from which they derived their strength.  By doing all 
of this, they all have violated the basic tenets of democracy that require transparency in the 
elections, fairness, and evenness in the playing field, consistent respect of the civil liberties and 
their freedom, and that reject any practices that will compromise or constrain the opposition from 
a possible win in elections. 
      Moreover, by using authoritarian means of governance, Senegalese rulers have dissipated the 
state resources.  First, they use the selective mechanisms of administrative patronage and 
clientelism to establish a framework for the government in rural areas of Senegal, where they 
deplete the state resources in order to bargain for influence and advantages from the electorate 
majority that mostly resides in these areas.  This has been the case since independence with each 
political regime in Senegal.  Second, they take advantage of their increasing firm monopoly of 
peanut production management to absorb the peanuts profits, and then make Senegal’s 
traditional agriculture more oriented toward the world economy and particularly toward the 
former colonial power, France, rather than toward operating in favor of Senegal.  Senghor and 
Diouf were salient examples who put in place OCAS policy (Office de Commercialisation 
Agricole du Senegal) “Agricultural Marketing Board of Senegal”, ONCAD's organization 
(Office National de Cooperation et d’Assistance au Développement), the “National Office for 
Cooperation and Assistance in Development”, CNIA (Comité National Inter-professionnel de 
l’Arachide) “National Inter-Professional Committee on Peanut) as stated in chapter 3.   
       The regimes that followed Senghor and Diouf (Wade and Sall) set forward big projects 
through which they pretended to modernize and boost Senegal’s economy.  Beyond their dubious 
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economic impact, these big projects have been proposed through opaque deals with particular 
business interests.  Therefore, they have sparked off transparency concerns due to the widespread 
evidence of unprecedented looting.  This was the case of Wade with the building of the African 
Renaissance’s Monument towers above Dakar, an astronomical expense of $27 million,88 when 
the country was facing extreme socio-economic problems, culminating in electricity shortages.  
During such harsh conditions that the country was going through, many Senegalese people were 
exposed to multiple evidences that strongly revealed that Wade’s son (Karim), had accumulated 
a fortune of at least $200m that he had hidden away in offshore companies in the British Virgin 
Island and Panama.89 They also saw a dramatic increase in unexplained wealth among those 
influential Senegalese closely linked to the government (Melly, 2012, p. 7).  This is also the case 
with the actual Senegal incumbent president Sall with the building of the turnpike that links the 
actual airport of Senegal AIBD (Aéroport International Blaise Diagne) to Thies (the third-largest 
city of Senegal located in the East region), commonly named “Aibd-Thies”.  Based on the Le 
Quotidien Journal (2017), “On the occasion of the 2018 Ministry of infrastructure, land, transport 
and opening up, Senegalese members of Parliament noted a gap of 5billion francs CFA on the 
cost of the Aibd-Thies turnpike construction’s project.  Such a gap compelled many of them to 
ask Sall’s government to shed light on the real costs of this project and also the inadequacy of the 
financing model and financial clauses”.90  These questions, which were well noted in the report, 
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were not answered either in this document or during the plenary sessions of the Minister of 
infrastructure, land transport and opening up that was held at the semicircular auditorium in 
Dakar.  “Similar questions were asked to Sall about the real costs of Regional express Train 
Regarding the railway, where commissioners have noted the discrepancy between the cost of 
568billion francs CFA appearing in the official documents and the cumulative amount of the 
various contracts which amounts to 801billion francs CFA without taking into account the 
conditional works, possible endorsement, of the second section Diamniadio-Dias (both located in 
the South-East region of Senegal and is part of Sall’s development plan) and expenses estimated 
at more than 42 billion francs CFA” (Le Quotidien, 2017).  Furthermore, similar issues have 
been raised recently by L’Exclusif (Seneweb, 2020)91, which talks about the looting of the 
treasury coffers by Sall’s regime through the management of their big projects.   
       Thus, the overall picture is one of a Senegal where, since independence, each political 
regime (from Senghor to Macky Sall) has dissipated and plundered the state resources as their 
personal property.  Therefore, in a country where rulers have used authoritarian means of 
governance and appropriated the state resources, it is impossible for the young Senegalese people 
to stay because their aspirations are diametrically opposed to the holders of state power’s 
behaviors as they have destroyed the socio-economic base of the country.  This creates a 
situation of generalized poverty and lack of economic opportunities for many young people in 
Senegal.  This results in the wave of migrations that have been seen in the country. 
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       The effects of imperialism and colonialism’s dependency and postcolonial authoritarian 
means of governance that led to the appropriation and dissipation of the state resources by the 
Senegalese rulers have wreaked havoc on the country’s socio-economic landscape and affected 
negatively many young Senegalese.  Most of them do not have great opportunities and good 
living conditions for themselves and their families.  Overall, they lack basic services and live 
daily below the poverty line.  Therefore, in such a harsh economic development environment and 
misery in Senegal, the youth consider migrations as the only way out.  This chapter discusses the 
migrations from Senegal and explores issues of poverty and economic deprivation in Senegal as 
well as their impact on the migrations based on recent statistical databases, empirical evidence, 
and empirical analysis of data that I have collected from the intensive field research I conducted 
in Senegal during the 2019 summer externship.   
 
Migrations 
       Human Migrations can be defined as the movement or displacement of peoples from one 
place to another, in particular from one country (emigration) to another (immigration) for 
political, social, economic, or personal reasons.  They have been the fact of an entire population 
or individual, integrating into a wider societal phenomenon (Note taken from PSC 758).   
       In Senegal, the first waves of migrations started under colonialism.  During colonial times, 
French colonizers settled in Senegal.  Once installed, the European colonial administration 
created the four townships of Dakar, Rufisque, Goree and Saint Louis.  The creation of these 
four European townships served as a way to integrate the Senegalese community, to spread their 
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hegemony and to have control over the Senegalese territory for their own sake.  To operate its 
plan and business, the European colonial administration started collaborating with the Senegalese 
local chiefs who had at that time the power over the Senegalese people.  The collaboration was 
based on bribery.  The European colonial administration procured them with diamonds, guns, 
coppers, and ivories, and the chiefs served as indispensable channels through which to get access 
to the Senegalese people.  Once the collaboration was effective, the European colonial 
administration started their recruiting process.  They took many Senegalese individuals from 
their land, embarking them on boats and sent them to Europe.  Many of those Senegalese sent to 
Europe were transformed into soldiers and defenders of French colonies.  They were given the 
name of “Tirailleurs” to reflect the policing needs generated by the European colonization phase 
and to fight for France during the Two World Wars.  This practice of European colonial 
administration within the Senegalese territory made the first wave of Senegalese migrations 
directed towards Europe during that time to conform to French colonial needs and expectations.     
       In the post-colonial period, these migrations to Europe continued.  In fact, during that 
period, there was an international mobility that was partly the result of France facing a 
demographic challenge: a declining birth rate, an aging population, and the loss of many French 
young soldiers during the two successive world wars. Setting its sight on industrial recovery, 
which would require significant labor power, France turned to its former colonies.  As part of 
post-war reconstruction, migrants from across francophone Africa, particularly Senegal, were 
courted to work in French industries and on infrastructure projects. Known as the “Thirty 
Glories”, the three decades after the war saw the dirigiste revitalization of France’s economy, 
which was made possible in part by the importation of cheap labor from North and West Africa.  
France established official recruitment centers in eight foreign countries, one of which was 
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Senegal.  The economic logic of immigration legislation between 1945 and 1973 enabled France 
to remedy its domestic labor shortage by extracting labor from its former colonies (Maher, 2017, 
pp. 77-91).  This led to massive migrations of Senegalese people to Europe (particularly in 
France) for the latter’s labor needs.  Thus, the historical context of the problem and its 
explanation made the first Senegalese migratory movements directed towards France from the 
colonial period to the post-colonial period in the 1970s. 
      From the 1970s to the 1990s, Senegalese migrants chose different trajectories or destinations 
in Europe due to the decreasing opportunities and increasing migrations’ restrictions during the 
oil and economic crisis in France.  Italy and Spain became two major destinations for these 
Senegalese migrants.  In an interview held with Papa Demba Fall, a senior researcher at the 
Fundamental Institute of Black Africa, he argued that: 
       “From the period of 1973, there was the oil and economic crisis in France.  Because of that, the 
French government of that time under Jacque Chirac no longer wanted those Senegalese migrants whom 
most of them were laborers and worked in automotive industries in France.  They put into place new 
legislation accompanied by drastic measures, making the entry conditions to France very difficult.  
Therefore, during the next period that followed, Italy became a new destination for Senegalese migrants.  
Many of them reluctantly chose to go there temporarily just to wait for the situation in France to improve 
so that they can go back.  Fortunately, Italy, as an immigration country marked by its diversity, behaved 
much more comprehensively, and many Senegalese migrants finally settled permanently in Italy. 
However, a few years later, Italy experienced a crisis related to the growing number of migrants they 
yearly received and the rise of the extreme right wing in Europe.  At this point, many migrants left Italy.  
The flows spread to Spain, but years later Spain integrated the “Schengen Space” and applied the drastic 
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      In the 2000s, migrations to Europe reached a high peak.  It is important therefore to highlight 
that these migrations’ trends to Europe are irregular and seem mostly connected to visas and 
other immigration restrictions put in place by many European countries over the years.  The 
following statistic is a salient example to understand the scope of these migrations.  According to 
the Country Profile report published in 2007, approximately 32,000 migrants reached the Canary 
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Islands, compared to only 4,800 the year before.92 Recently, in the specific case of Senegal, there 
have been new types of migrations.  A new dramatic phenomenon called “Barca or Barsaakh” 
(“Barca” being a reference to Barcelona in Spain, and “Barsaakh” a reference to the Arabic word 
for death), meaning “Europe or Death”, has preoccupied the Senegalese.  It consists of the deaths 
of many young Senegalese people who try to reach Europe by any means necessary, including 
using boats on the oceans or crossing the Sahara desert. Whether it is on television news, 
newspapers, or local meeting places, all debates revolve around the phenomenon of “Barca or 
Barsaakh”.  It has completely affected the Senegalese society and has created a trauma in many 
Senegalese families who have lost their sons, who represented their only hope.  As 
(Hebdomadaire, 2006) witnessed: 
       The Barca or Barsaakh phenomenon has traumatized in families.  In several regions of Senegal, as in 
the capital, Dakar, parents are worried.  They remain without news of their sons left on an adventure in 
boats of fortune that are little more than canoes.  Anxiety has taken over.  In many families’ homes, when 
the telephone rang, everybody runs.  They hope to hear their son's voice from afar.  A voice that could 
soothe their worries. Nevertheless, the reality is often cruel.  In other families, tears are shed.  Many learn 
that their children for whom they dreamed of a bright future have perished at sea. They are shot down.  
The shock is too brutal. 
       Based on the research findings, Barca or Barsaakh did not come in a vacuum.  It started with 
the Senegalese anglers. They are located along Senegal’s small coasts of Thiaroye Sur Mer, 
Rufisque, Kayar, Mbour, and Saint-Louis, where artisanal fishing is mostly the main activity, 
and where these anglers used to do daily what we call in French “navette en mer”.  This is a long 
period spent on the sea by commuting between territories with the use of GPS and compass.  
                                                          




Most of them were former employees of big fishing boats.  This means that they are redoubtable 
captains in terms of navigation and are very familiar with the sea adventure.  Because of the 
enormous problems related to climate change and the state’s mismanagement that the fishing 
sector encounters, many of them get involved in irregular migrations in the twenty-first century.  
This was at a period when the visa fees for Europe were very expensive and the application 
processes so discouraging because of the implementation of appointment systems through voice 
services in many of the European consulates in Senegal (Le Soleil, 2007).  The increasing 
immigration restrictions in most of these European countries made it harder for most applicants 
to obtain a European visa.   
       Therefore, during this period, the anglers put into place the project, involving different 
people with specific roles.  “Some in charge of the logistics; others playing the role of 
coordinators and main intermediaries between the promoters and candidates.  Also, there are 
those called secondary intermediaries, who advertise the project and recruit people”, said 
Alioune Ndiaye, a 64 year-old angler.  Thus, as experienced anglers turned into promoters, they 
carried out the large number of boats that embarked onto ocean-crossings.  After their 
tremendous successes went viral on the Senegalese national level and immediately created 
agitations along those Senegalese small coasts, the small coasts now became the main points of 
departure.  “La pirogue” (The pirogue) for instance, released in 2012 by Moussa Toure (a 
Senegalese well-known producer and cinematograph), is a movie that shows how the business of 
these migrations are organized by the local fishermen and their allies, and how they are well 
established to target those young Senegalese people whose only option and ambition are to 
migrate to Europe no matter the cost or how dangerous the situation is.  The movie highlights 
that apart from the Wolof community, many of those who adhere to this dangerous adventure 
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come from different ethnic groups in Senegal, such as Toucouleur, Peulh, Al Poular, and 
Guineans, making the communication between them very difficult because they do not speak the 
same language. They are not very familiar with the sea and cannot even swim. Those who can 
are the captains and staff members, who usually are “Lebous” or “sea adventurers”, and those 
Wolof people who are familiar with the sea because they share many activities with the Lebous.  
Before boarding a pirogue, each of them pays 500.000F Cfa ($852).  They all gather at a specific 
place appointed by the boat’s manager and wait until the right time assigned by the captains and 
the staff members to depart. 
       The main destination of the majority of anglers’ boats that depart from Senegal’s small 
coasts is the Canary Islands (Spain). “This is mostly because this island is 1549km (962.504 
miles away), and usually by pirogue, one can make it approximately in six days”, said the Mayor 
of Ngaparou (an adjacent town located on the west side of Mbour in Senegal), Mamadou Ndiaye 
in an interview I held with him.  “In a global perspective, Canary Islands are often temporary 
destinations or gateways for many young Senegalese people swept by the “Barca or Barsaakh” 
phenomenon to enter Spain (which is one of the weak links in the Schengen space and an easy 
crossing point for all those who want to come, without having a visa), or to join France and other 
European countries like Italy, Portugal, and Belgium”, argued Papa Demba Fall.  That is the 
reason why when Senegalese migrants started taking these sea-crossing journeys, the migratory 
flows at the Canary Islands increased dramatically.  To understand the scope of the phenomenon, 
“January 2006, around 6,000 migrants were intercepted in the Canary Islands by boats, compared 
to 4,715 counted throughout the year 2005”, reported Le Soleil (2006).  Overall, half of the 
30,000 migrants who arrived in the Canary Islands in 2006 were Senegalese (Gebrewold and 
Bloom, 2016).  Furthermore, between 2005 and 2008, tens of thousands of Senegalese migrants 
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attempted to cross the Atlantic in wooden pirogues heading for the Canary Islands (Maher, 2017, 
p. 86). 
      The sea boat journeys of these Senegalese migrants to the Canary Islands are risky 
undertakings and many of them face wide ranges of potentially life-threatening dangers.  The 
movie “La Pirogue” as mentioned above relates the treacherous journey on the sea with many 
difficulties these adventurers encounter.  For example, the sea’s pressure with its multiple waves 
cause the death of many of them.  The depression of many of the passengers who scream with 
fear and feel constantly dizzy because they have never been on a boat, and have never 
experienced worse situations than those they faced. Carretero, Hernández. M and Carling, J. 
(2012) have also examined these dangers.  According to them, “En route to the Canary Islands, 
migrants face a wide range of potentially life-threatening dangers.  Storms and ferocious waves 
can make pirogues capsize, even though they are relatively sturdy vessels.  There is also the risk 
of fire related to onboard cooking with gas, and health hazards that include seasickness, 
dehydration, and hypothermia.  The overcrowded and unhygienic conditions on board, 
sometimes with the presence of dead bodies, can aggravate sickness.  The fuel for the engines 
can emit toxic fumes that endanger the passengers.  Health risks become particularly severe 
when equipment failure or weather conditions prolong the journey.  In numerous cases, boats 
have drifted at sea for several weeks, with passengers eventually dying from thirst and starvation.  
There is allegedly a risk of being taken for dead and shoved overboard while sleeping.  
Passengers who accidentally fall into the water might not be rescued because the delay would 
provoke the loss of precious time and fuel”.   
       Moreover, they argued that, “Beyond the somatic risks, passengers are exposed to dangerous 
psychological stress.  The combination of overcrowding and isolation over a long period is a 
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strain in itself, sometimes exacerbated by dramatic episodes with the loss of life.  Technical 
failure, accidents, illness, getting lost at sea, and other adversities are at times attributed to the 
mystical powers of “sorcerers”, “demons” who are said to board pirogues with the deliberate aim 
of causing suffering and death.  This culminates in the risk of involuntary return, which is the 
most serious adverse possibility. It occurs in three ways.  First when there are technical 
problems, bad weather, or other adverse events.  Second when the boats are at the risk of being 
intercepted by patrols, or when they are intercepted by patrols and escorted back to shore.  Third, 
when passengers are at risk of being repatriated after arrival on the Canary Islands”. 
       In 2006, the bodies of 1,167 drowned migrants were taken from the sea, forty-one and 
several thousand others were deemed missing in the Mediterranean Sea.93 Many of those who 
make it safely to Canary Islands suffered from dysentery exposure, and dehydration (Maher, 
2007, p. 87).  The press and international channels witnessed, at that time, the tragic events of 
these Senegalese migrants. Faced with this alarming situation, the authorities of the Spanish 
Canary Islands launched an SOS appeal.  They launched a series of diplomatic and security 
measures aimed at relieving the constantly increasing migratory pressure on the Canaries (Le 
Soleil, 2006).  Among the series of diplomatic measures, I can cite for example the signature of 
deportation agreements between the Spanish government of that time under Jose Luis Zapatero 
and several other African countries, including Senegal.  These measures affected those migrants 
who survived the treacherous journeys and who temporarily resided in the Spanish Red Cross 
camps.  Most of them were exposed to very thorough verification tests analyzed by specialists in 
the Spanish region.  These verification tests make it possible to reveal with high probabilities 
                                                          




these migrants’ identities and countries of origin before being deported.  For security measures, I 
can cite SIVIE (Système Intégré de Surveillance Extérieure “Integrated System of foreign 
control), which is an extension of the electronic monitoring system of the Southern Coast of 
Spanish country and the Canary Island.  It is constituted of radars’ network, camera, and sensor; 
and FRONTEX (Frontières Extérieure “External borders”), which is a maritime and air control 
system set up by the European Union in collaboration with sub-Saharan African countries.   
      While the implementation of these effective measures crippled and curbed the sea boat 
journeys of Senegalese migrants, the Sahara desert crossing became the new route of these 
waves of Senegalese migrants swept by the Barca or Barsaakh movement to enter European 
countries.  “This Sahara desert crossing has been a historical trajectory chosen by many African 
countries since, in the general context, the continent’s migratory flows were predominantly inter-
African and cross-border.  Most Sub-Saharan migrants settled in the North Arabian countries 
such as Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia to name a few.  The main reasons for their 
displacement in these countries were the quest for settlements and well-being because of the 
tremendous consequences engendered by the 1970s drought seasons.  It was during these periods 
that the Tuareg pastoral communities coming across Senegal through Mali and Mauritania, the 
Tubu people from Chad, and others coming from Niger went to work in the farms and oil 
exploitation areas of Algeria and Libya.  In the space of thirty years, fifty-three cities had been 
built in most of these geographical spaces of Northern Arabian countries.  This exponential 
development encouraged the massive arrivals of people coming from other parts of Africa, 
therefore, creating additional flows in those areas where indigenous people lived.  Though there 
had been tremendous incidents between them, there were emergences of associations that 
supported newcomers.  For example, a country like Algeria at that time controlled migrants’ 
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movements while integrating them into the development of cities in Algeria where there were 
shortages of labor applicants.  Many religious and associative support structures were even set up 
through these migratory trajectories.  Migrants who were around there, found support and 
necessary resources in those areas to be able to continue their journey” (Le Soleil, 2006, based 
on the research and survey carried out by socio-anthropologist Sylvie Bredeloup of the Research 
Institute for Development (RIF) and Olivier Pliez, Geographer at the National Center for 
Scientific Research (NCSR) ). 
       Therefore, in recent years, with the implementation of effective measures of European 
borders’ control, the Barca or Barsaakh movement has been redirected to the crossing of the 
Sahara desert.  Thousands of Senegalese migrants have been making their way into the Sahara to 
join Europe.  This new circular route is the most dangerous one.  “Those who attempt the desert 
crossing travel along the Sahara desert through Senegal, Mali, and Mauritania, Niger, and (either 
Algeria, Morocco or Libya) to Europe”, said the Mayor of Ngaparou, Mamadou Mbengue in the 
interview I held with him.  Many Senegalese migrants who undertake these longer and remote 
routes are more vulnerable to exploitation, particularly because their transit across Northern 
Arabian or Maghreb regions like Agadez (on the North of Niger), Derna and Misrata (in Libya), 
El- Khalil (on the border of Mali and Algeria), and Salé, Tangier, Tetouan, and Bouarfa (in 
Morocco).  Because of their geographical proximity to Europe, these Maghreb regions are 
perceived by many migrants as gateways to reach Europe via Malta, or the Spanish enclaves of 
Ceuta and Melilla.  But most of these regions are controlled by the Tuareg rebels, who work with 
the smuggling and trafficking networks connected to departure points across West Africa.  
Having no other alternatives, those migrants are obliged to rely on these unknown people.  For 
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the latter, the desert adventure is all about moneymaking.  They profitably take advantage of the 
situation.   
       Along their journeys to the desert, migrants undergo increasing exploitation and unhuman 
conditions such as being stripped of their possessions, being kidnapped or held for ransoms, or 
being killed.  Secret spectacles: “The story of a migrant spy” by Joel Gunter (a journalist at BBC 
Africa), is a salient example to understand the vulnerability and exploitation those Sub-Saharan 
African migrants face along the terrific desert journey.  In The story of a migrant spy published 
in May 23, 2019, at BBC Africa Eye Journal, Gunter described the story of a 25-year-old valiant 
and plucky Ghanaian young man named Azeteng, who after being inspired by film and 
documentaries about being a spy or secret agent, faced the desert’s adventure in order to 
understand the way smugglers operate their business and the risks Sub-Saharan African migrants 
confront during the horrendous desert journey.  For him, to fight for human dignity, something 
needed to be done.  Talking about the exploitation Azeteng and other African migrants faced, 
Gunter (2019) writes: 
      “It was night when the trucks came to an abrupt stop, jolting Azeteng from a half-sleep.  Voices 
called out from the dark, ordering the migrants to get out, and they were surrounded by men in military 
fatigues carrying AK-47s.  We had hit the first Tuareg rebel checkpoint.  They fired shots into the air and 
ordered the migrants to line up to pay.  Those who did not have enough money were told to form separate 
lines and had their pockets searched and possessions were taken.  Then, they were beaten.  Azeteng was 
hit hard in the side of the head, knocking his glasses off his face.  A Gambian man, who Azeteng had 
befriended on the journey, held up his Koran and begged in vain for them to stop”.   
       “Azeteng put his glasses back out on, and overcoming a swell of fear, he pressed the tiny button 
under the arm.  The grainy footage captured the migrants shuffling past a militant holding out a large 
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plastic bowl, depositing cash.  When the bowl was full, another militant tipped it into a larger bowl.  
Those who had paid were ordered to sit on the sand and wait.  The wind whipped up and the cold started 
to bite”. 
       Two Senegalese migrants, Babacar Ndiaye and Omar Baldé, provided their own testimony: 
“Smugglers asked us to pay 400.000f Cfa ($659, 88) in order to be taken.  Once this sum was 
paid, they took us to Tangier, and from there we were on the way to the desert in indescribable 
conditions.  We were forty people in a small truck.  Some were stacked unceremoniously in the 
back of the truck and others were perched on luggage doors.  We looked like sheep ready to be 
sent to the slaughterhouse” (Le Quotidien, 2000).  
      Beyond increasing exploitation, vulnerability, and unhuman conditions, are the high death 
toll of thousands of Senegalese migrants resulting from thirst, starvation, and illnesses during the 
desert journey.  “There were a lot of people who died in the desert, Senegalese and other 
nationalities who undertook this journey through the desert. They died of thirst and hunger, 
combined with the ill-treatment that they suffered during the adventure,” witnessed the deported 
young Senegalese Koutcubo Dramé who undertook the desert journey (Le Soleil, 2005).  
Moreover, many of them who have survived, are left stranded along their transit across those 
Northern Arabian regions like Derna and Misrata (in Libya), and Tangier, Tetouan, Rabat, Salé 
and Bouarfa (in Morocco), where they experience uniquely challenging situations and 
horrendous conditions that affect their overall well-being.  “We are more than 5,000 Senegalese 
in this country in such difficult conditions.  Many of us live the ordeal in dormitory cities of 
Rabat, Salé, Casablanca, Tangier, and Tetouan,” revealed the young Senegalese Babacar Ndiaye 
(Le Quotidien, 2000).  His words are confirmed by his companion of misfortune Omar Baldé, 
who with twenty of his misfortune companions paid the monthly rent of 15,000 Dirhams (99.000 
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Cfa Franc or $197) for a small room in which all of them crammed each night for six months in 
Morocco. “We do not even have anything left in our pockets,” he added (Le Quotidien, 2000).  
      Similarly, handcuffed bodies of thousands of Senegalese migrants, some with swollen eyes 
and broken teeth, others with broken jaws, disfigured faces, are dragged along the corridors of 
European police stations and detention centers where they are locked up for days before being 
deported back to Senegal in truly horrendous conditions.  They add more desolation and 
affliction to their families, where all hopes have been shattered and only pain and grief are left.  
Those who manage to make it to Europe are scattered over the European peninsula of Spain, 
Italy, where they face discrimination, oppression, marginalization, stereotypes, and xenophobia. 
      Despite the death and suffering, these young people keep on migrating.  Every day, news on 
the television and newspapers’ headlines herald thousands of Senegalese who try to reach 
Europe. Why does a whole generation of young Senegalese resort to such desperate and 
dangerous Migrations to Europe, known as the “Barca or Barsaakh” phenomenon? Chapter 3 
and 4 answers this question. 
 
H1:  Colonial Relations and Dependency ties between Senegal and France as explanatory 
variable of migrations 
        In chapter 3, I explained that with France-Senegal colonial relations and dependency, 
Senegal, even independent since the 1960s, is still not autonomous.  This is due to France’s 
colonial legacy and its deep-seated history in Senegal that makes Senegal making very reliant on 
France.  Because of its reliance on France, the economic growth witnessed by Senegal follows 
very closely the path of colonial extraverted economy in favor of the former colonial power 
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France.  Put differently, the trend of Senegal’s economic growth reflects the colonial economic 
development model.  This can be seen in terms of foreign trade, which makes Senegal dependent 
on which external partners are prepared to buy and sell to Senegal.  The relation with France 
allowed high-priced manufactured imports, minimum metropolitan public investments, mostly in 
infrastructure projects and financial deals beneficial to France.  France is Senegal’s main trading 
partner and its leading foreign investor with more than 78% of FDI stock (2.2billion in 2015), 
and over 1.7 billion Euros worth of investment in Senegal. This can also be seen in terms of 
exports of Senegal’s crucial products such as: Gold (US$ 240m), fresh fish (US$230m), oil 
products (US$212m), cement (US$ 167m), phosphates (US$ 150m) and groundnut products 
(Us$ 123m).  These statistics issued in 2015 retrieved from the sources aforementioned in 
chapter 3, are salient examples that show that Senegal is more dependent on the global economy 
(particularly on France, which is its largest trading partner) than on the national economy.  The 
outcome has been a deregulation of Senegal’s financial market to allow the integration in the 
global market.  This creates trade deficits as well as balance of payment deficits, forcing Senegal 
to borrow from IMF to cover shortfalls in foreign exchange.  The outcome has also been 
economic stagnation, poor economic development and misery that many Senegalese people face 
in their daily lives.  By weakening the Senegalese economy, the colonial dependent situation has 
created conditions of generalized economic poverty and lack of opportunity for young people. 
This situation causes migrations to Europe and elsewhere. 
      The facts support my first hypothesis.  In the interview I conducted with Mamadou Mbengue, 




“The phenomenon of young Senegalese migrations to Europe referred to “Barca or Barsaakh” could be 
linked to the dependent relationship between France and Senegal. Even if the latter got its independence 
since 1960, Senegal is still close to France.  This is because of the bilateral political and economic 
relationship between the two countries. This existing relationship leads to the economic imbalance 
between the formerly colonized country and its former colonizer.  This imbalance can be seen with the 
underdevelopment of Senegal and the inherent poverty people encounter in this country, while France is 
enriching itself from Senegal’s monoculture and natural resources, making it a thriving country and an 
Eldorado (a dream country) in the eyes of many young Senegalese people.  For him, these factors explain 
the will of young Senegalese people to risk their life by using boats or by crossing the desert”. 
       In the interview I held with Pape Fily, a 70-year-old retired professor of history at my high 
school college (Ousmane Soce Diop of Rufisque), who lived in “Arafate” (the Southside of 
Rufisque in Senegal), he asserted that: 
       “The colonial dependency between France and Senegal caused the stagnation of the Senegalese 
economy because of the massive export of its agricultural and fishing products to France and other parts 
of Europe but with low-income revenues for Senegal.  This created a stagnation in the Senegalese 
economy.  In addition to that, Senegal’s trade partner is France.  This makes Senegal to operate in the 
global economy of France and Europe rather in favor of its national economy, leading to the deregulation 
of its financial market to allow Senegal’s integration in the global market.  As a result, there is a recurrent 
trade deficit as well as balance of payment deficit over the years that force Senegal to borrow from IFM 
to cover the shortfalls in foreign exchange.  There is thus need for Foreign Aid.  This should be taken into 





H2: State Power and Elite Appropriation of Resources in Postcolonial Senegal as the 
second explanatory variable of migrations  
       In chapter 4, I provided an explanation related to the role of Senegalese elites in shaping 
these migrations.  In Senegal hailed for its “model” democracy, features associated with 
authoritarianism were and are manifest.  After decades of its independence, the country’s 
political reality displays a state in which all successive political regimes have resorted to 
authoritarian means.  By their control of the Senegalese state, they apply their political authority 
in the decision-making at the presidency and manipulate the country’s institutions by setting up 
reforms that shape elections to their advantage.  They coerce and neutralize the opposition, 
expand and foster corruption within the Senegalese society, and violate the freedom of the press.  
All of them violate the rights and basic needs of many Senegalese people, thus, causing popular 
discontent and disappointment, and making the country less hospitable.  The outcome has been 
the waves of violence that were manifest in Senegal, where people saw revolutionary violence as 
a means to their salvation, which plunged the country into instability.  All of the successive 
rulers in Senegal monopolized power and enhanced themselves as the supreme holders by 
building patronage and clientelist networks with some opposition parties through which they 
privatize the state resources.  By doing all of this, they all have violated the basic tenets of 
democracy that require transparency in the elections, fairness, and evenness in the playing field, 
consistent respect of the civil liberties and freedoms.  They resort to practices that compromise 
and constrain the opposition from winning elections.  Similarly, I also highlighted the fact that 
by using authoritarian means of governance, Senegalese rulers have dissipated the state 
resources. (See chapter 4).  
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        Therefore, in Senegal where features associated with authoritarianism were and are manifest 
and where resources are appropriated or dissipated, it is impossible for young Senegalese people 
to stay because they cannot fulfill their aspirations.  The holders of state power’s looting have 
destroyed the socio-economic landscapes of the country. 
       The field research supports the second hypothesis of the thesis.  In an interview, I conducted 
with Fatou Kine alias Kitieu, a 49-year-old married woman selling fish around the beach of 
Kayar (a small coast of Senegal located in Thies’ region in Senegal), she blames the Senegalese 
rulers.  She argued that: 
    “The Senegalese rulers have always been here for their interests only and not for those of the 
Senegalese nation.  Since our independence, the observation in Senegal is general.  Presidents, ministers, 
administrators and even local officials, enrich themselves with their families by monopolizing the 
country’s main source of wealth and by embezzling the country’s public funds. They have sowed 
corruption at the national level.  This scourge which lasts and which until now marks our societies is a 
fundamental reason, which explains this phenomenon of Barca or Barsaakh of the young people because 
they are well aware that they cannot count on such governments.  As “badola” (Wolof expression 
referring to those coming from a poor family), the only possible solution we find is to support and 
encourage our kids to attempt the adventure whether by sea or desert in order to get out of this misery 
inflicted to the youth by the Senegalese rulers”. 
        Moussa Thiam is an elementary professor in Senegal.  Based on the discussion I had with 
him, he blamed the former political regime led by Abdoulaye Wade as being responsible for all 
these problems.  He pointed out that:  
       “The outgoing regime of Wade has destroyed Senegal with their misrule, massive lootings and 
embezzlements affecting almost the entire Senegal, and leaving only a vacuum in the Senegalese national 
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slush fund.  Senegal, classified in 2015 among the least developed countries, will need clarity in terms of 
governance, national strategies and effective actions in order to tackle these massive young Senegalese 
migrations to Europe”. 
       Maurice Soudieck DIONE, Doctor in Political Science and Professor-Researcher at Gaston 
Berger University of Saint-Louis asserted that: 
       “The Senegalese state cannot adapt the Senegalese educational system to the real needs of economic 
development, which depends on promoting sciences, technology, and innovations.  This culminates in the 
high number of children and adults being excluded from the official education system, the general decline 
in learning and the repetitive and prolonged strikes of teachers and students (both high school and 
university).  Rather than assigning specific objectives and attempt to meet them, the Senegalese state 
seems to manage disorder in education, despite the considerable share of the national budget allocated to 
the education sector.  The recurrence of the same problems over several decades imputes the 
responsibility to the Senegalese state because of a lack of organization and method; weakness in 
forecasting, prevention, anticipation, planning, and strategic management capabilities.  There is an 
authority and credibility crisis, related to the non-respect of the given word and commitments.  The 
Senegalese state then falls easily into authoritarianism: police violence, requisitions, and the threat of 
firing radiation, corruption, and embezzlements.  It seeks to constrain rather than convince! Yet repressive 
solutions do not guarantee either their effectiveness or their viability over time.  They only create 
insecurity and isolation.  As a result, many young Senegalese people have only one solution.  They resort 
to “Barca or Barsaakh” phenomenon to resolve the problem”. 
       The aforementioned Professor Pape Fily also highlighted this authoritarianism tendency of 
the Senegalese leaders and the misrule that comes with it as an explanation of the “Barca or 
Barsaakh” phenomenon.  He said that: 
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      “The authoritarianism tendency of the Senegalese leaders has manifested itself through the crisis in 
the educational system.  The complaints of the Senegalese students are generally heard only through 
strikes, vandalism, and sometimes by the sequestration of the chief education officer.  Violence becomes 
the only way to complain.  It is almost approved and, worse, it is legitimized. The monthly payroll of 
teachers and tutors is a problem, which leads to complaints and strikes.  Instead of trying to solve the 
problem, the Senegalese government issues a warrant for their arrest in such a brutal way. This worsens 
the situation and creates a perennial problem of lack of quality in high education.  It compromises 
students’ development and future.  To these problems, one has to add the difficulties of implementing the 
European system of L.M.D (License, Masters, et Doctorat), “Bachelor, Masters, and Ph.D”, in the new 
Senegalese educational system.  This failure increases the frustrations of the youth.  This explains these 
waves of migrations towards Europe”. 
       Even though most of the empirical evidence supports both of the claims made about my two 
proposed hypotheses above, it must be mentioned, however, that Poverty in Senegal shares 
similarities with that of other poor countries. 
 
Poverty-Driven Migrations 
       I define poverty as a situation in which one lacks the means to meet the basic needs for a 
minimum standard of living.  According to Ndiaye, “It is perceived and understood by 
structuralists as a social and economic phenomenon congenital with institutional forms and a 
specific political and economic environment, and is experienced in a particular way by certain 
social categories and tends to designate a certain social condition because it, first of all, refers to 
low incomes in a social and economic context” (Aina, Chachage and Yao, 2004, p. 116).  
Related to poverty is economic deprivation.  It can be defined as the condition of having 
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inadequate or unjust access to financial resources that result from several circumstances 
including unemployment, unfair eligibility standards for financial benefits and services that make 
them inaccessible to those in need (Kirst-Ashman, 2013, p. 61). 
       The following statistics fully confirm the manifestation and magnitude of poverty as well as 
the economic deprivation in Senegal.  With an estimated population of around 16 million, 
Senegal is a low-income African state where 46.7% are living in poverty.94 Residents in rural 
areas mainly derive their livelihoods from rain-fed agriculture and livestock, and are highly 
vulnerable to external shocks, while residents in the outskirts of Dakar live off informal and 
largely unproductive services (World Bank Group, 2018, p. 23).95  In both of these areas where 
living conditions are very precarious, disparities in poverty even exist between them.  In rural 
areas, 66% of residents are considered poor compared to 23% of residents in Dakar (Lano, 
2017).  About 38% of Senegal’s populations live on $1.90 or less a day.96 Based on the 2000 
Senegal’s socio-economic situation report, the potentially active population aged 15 and over 
went from 5,678,497 to 7,299,215 between 2002 and 2010.97  That is 202,000 potential job 
seekers on average per year.  Almost 87.80% of the population between 15 and 34 years old 
work in the informal sector.  The latter is the ordinary resourcefulness, an unstructured sector 
that offers no security or any form of social protection. Salaried employees, the only secure ones, 
                                                          
94 Statistics retrieved from CIA World Factbook 
https://www.indexmundi.com/senegal/population_below_poverty_line.html 
 












hover around 300,000 across the country.  The majority of them are in the private sector and 
public service (Seck, 2014, p. 69). 
      Whereas 200,000 young people are spilled in the job market each year, the average annual 
creation of new direct jobs by the private sector is 40,000, of which 20,000 are located in 
Dakar’s region (Seck, 2014, p. 69).  As for the Public Service, it does not offer 20,000 jobs even 
during the best years (Seck, 2014, p. 69).  In other words, the supply rises around 20% of the 
demand, thus, leaving 80% of the working population stranded.   
         In terms of its fertility rate, Senegal is almost 4.5 children per woman.  Young people 
comprise 60% of the Senegalese population.  This culminates in the illiteracy rate of 40% and a 
high unemployment rate of 12.7%, both of which provide dim outlooks for Senegalese youth 
(Lano, 2017).  The performance of the education sector is deficient.  More than 44% of the 
Senegalese population are reported to be illiterate.98  Additionally, the health coverage rate in 
Senegal is very low.  Only a minority of the Senegalese population gets access to it, thus, making 
the health’s condition very deteriorating.  According to Ndiaye (Aina, Chachage and Yao, 2004, 
pp. 109-117), “Diseases such as malaria, diarrhea, and malnutrition are widespread in the 
country and killed almost half of the population whom medicines had become inaccessible to 
them”.  Yet, access to water and electricity remains another challenge.  Thousands of Senegal’s 
households daily suffer from water shortages and endless power cuts. 
        Moreover, in terms of GDP, Senegal rose at an average rate of 4.5% from 1995 to 2005 
(Lano, 2017).  While other African countries enjoyed economic growth after 2005, Senegal’s 
economy, however, rose at an average rate of 3.3% (Lano, 2017).  In this perspective, the World 
                                                          




Bank reported that Senegal’s GDP growth is too low for a significant poverty reduction.  There 
has been rapid inflation in the price of manufacturing goods and a decline in economic growth 
especially during the last fifteen years, attributed to the global financial crisis and the rise in fuel 
prices.  This is accompanied by long-standing problems such as high cost of living, poor social 
welfare, unemployment, and persistent power shortages in Dakar and the sub-regions.  
Additionally, there are other problems related to the traditional sectors such as agriculture and 
fisheries, which are the motor of the country’s economy and foreign exchange.  The agricultural 
sector is regularly threatened by ecological condition such as climate changes, drought, floods 
inclement weather, combined with the negative effects of the structural adjustment program, the 
burden of the external debts, and the strong dependency ties that link Senegal and its former 
colonial power France, negatively affect the country’s terms of trade.  Indeed, the dependency on 
France and the traditional monocrop of groundnuts sold in a pattern of unequal exchange render 
the Senegalese economy weak and unproductive.  Fishing also encounters enormous problems 
related to climate change and the state’s mismanagement.  Both types of economic activities no 
longer provide the livelihoods they once did. 
       These data on poverty and economic deprivation were caused or exacerbated by the 
Senegal’s colonial relations and dependency ties with France and the authoritarian-like 
appropriation of state resources by its power holders.  Both help explain the manifestations and 
magnitude of poverty, the economic deprivation in Senegal highlighted by the severe 
deterioration of living conditions in both the rural and urban areas, high unemployment rates and 
low-income revenues, the country’s patchy development, and the financial markets that are out 
of reach for most people.  These are the reasons for migrations. 
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       The country is in a patchy development and its financial markets are out of reach for most 
people.  As a result, it affects the living standards of Senegalese and creates an endemic, chronic, 
and exponential unemployment.  The Senegalese youth feels idle, helpless, and depressed.  
Millions of them, who have reached the working, marrying, and making-a-living stage, mope 
with poverty.  They endure daily a contemptuous, violent, and degrading treatment, and live in a 
total ordeal.  Very frustrated, many of these young Senegalese consider migrations as their only 
way out.  As their economic aspirations are not being met in Senegal, and aware of the enormous 
disparities in terms of development and income between Europe and Senegal, thousands of 
young Senegalese are lured away each year to Europe by any possible means in quest for 
fortunes to improve their living conditions and that of their family.  They are willing to risk their 
lives in order to seize employment opportunities and to take jobs that the more privileged locals 
do not wish to do in the European countries.   
       In the second place, poverty translates into the social stagnation or the inability to fulfill a 
social role in the Senegalese society and within their own family.  As we know, a person is 
conditioned by his social environment, which reflects and anchors his reality.  In the Senegalese 
society, those successful migrants referred to in Wolof as “modou-modou” play an important 
role model in the Senegalese households by their increased remittances that not only provide 
income to their family but also bolster the Senegalese economy.  As those in Senegal witness, 
these “modou-modou” are the owners of many buildings and live in luxurious houses with their 
families in Senegal.  They provide their family with last generation materials and items.  They 
are the ones who can afford to get married to beautiful women or even to buy the last generation 
cars’ model.  Many young Senegalese, who mope with poverty, endure daily a contemptuous and 
degrading treatment within their family.  They are marginalized and are often considered invalid 
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persons because they are not able to fulfill their family expectations.  They are thus evaluated in 
financial terms; who they are in the Senegalese society and within their own family is 
determined by their financial status.  Therefore, living in a total ordeal in the Senegalese society 
and within their own family, many young Senegalese perceive Europe as an “Eldorado” (a dream 
country) where opportunities are widely accessible to all people.  This prevailing perception of 
Europe as paradise is embodied in the image of “modou-modou”.  Influenced or fascinated by 
the latter, who reflect the image of prosperous Europe where it is good to live and to earn money, 
many young Senegalese aspire to migrate to Europe.  For them, migrations are synonymous with 
success, and they feel convinced that this is the only way to escape from poverty and to finally 
liberate themselves from the burden they experience daily in Senegalese society and within their 
own family.  This makes the desires for migrations in them irresistible, like a collective dream or 
even an obsession.  They are attached to the idea of getting to Europe and even dangerous 
methods of traveling seem better than the perils of remaining in Senegal. 
       All of this means that the Senegalese youth’s aspirations to migrate to Europe are driven by 
poverty in Senegal.  This poverty is caused or exacerbated by Senegal’s dependence relations 
and its politics of looting.   
        In an interview held with Mor Mbengue, a 24-year-old student converted into angler, who 
lives in Kayar (a small coast of Senegal located in Thies’ region in Senegal) he agreed that: 
      “Many young Senegalese want to risk their lives in this dangerous adventure because of a lack of 
opportunities in Senegal.  Jobs are rare to find and many young people work in the informal sectors, 
which do not offer long-lasting security and social protection.  Such situations compel many of them to 
migrate in order to seek a better tomorrow”. 
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        Nogaye Mbengue is a 51-year-old widow fish seller.  She sells fish daily at the beaches in 
order to take care of her three children, respectively named Omar (22-year-old), Demba (18-
year-old), and Dieynaba (15-year-old).  For her, life in Senegal is very hard and she is struggling 
daily to take care of her three remaining children, crammed into a tiny apartment.  Her oldest 
son, Madione 29-year-old, passed away two years ago while trying to undertake the treacherous 
adventure of crossing the Atlantic Ocean to Spain with some of his friends.  Eyes in tears, she 
explained to me that she used the money she saved for a long period to provide her oldest son 
with the amount of money required for the adventure ticket to Spain.  With the loss of her oldest 
son, she blames herself for being responsible for the death of her oldest son.  She thought that 
seeing her oldest son in Europe might have brought change she desired to see within her family.  
       “La pirogue” released in 2012 by Moussa Touré, as mentioned earlier, highlighted poverty 
in Senegal as the main cause of Senegalese migrations to Europe.  The hardships of life and the 
complexity of the socio-economic conditions in Senegal compel many young Senegalese to 
migrate to Europe.  They perceive Europe as a paradise where opportunities are widely 
accessible to all people.  
       According to my former high school teacher, Mr. Diop, 52-year-old, who lives in Rufisque 
(a town located in the West of Senegal, which used to be one of the four colonial townships 
founded by the former French colonizers), “The question of Senegalese migrations to Europe and 
the “Barca or Barsaakh” phenomenon is related to difficulties that most Sub-Saharan African 
countries encounter, including Senegal where life’s conditions are difficult.  Young people do 
not have the opportunities to have a job and usually they want to migrate to Europe in order to 
find jobs and make their lives and the ones of their families better.  Most of them are caretakers 
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of their families.  Such conditions compel many of them to migrate to Europe to bring changes in 
their families”. 
       Mass Faye is a 45-year-old Senegalese actor living in Rufisque.  He spent almost 7years in 
the field of theater in Rufisque (Senegal).  Based on the discussion I had with him, he said that:  
       “Migrations have existed for many years.  They are becoming more and more extensive in most 
African countries where poverty is very high.  Such conditions have created favoritism among classes and 
different ethnic tribes in most African countries.  To deal with this situation, young African people only 
see one option: migrating by any means possible towards developed countries or rich countries to make a 
better tomorrow.  For them, migrations are the only way to tackle the distress and precariousness they are 
facing.  The migrations are more often illegal because the formalities to sojourn in most European 
countries such as France, Spain, and Italy are difficult.  The visa is not easy to get.  As a result, the only 
accessible way for these young people is to risk their lives by crossing the desert and the Atlantic Ocean 
by using boats, pirogues or ships.  For him, migrations touch many desperate young people in their quest 
for a better life and future.  Their only way to get out of this horrible situation is to attempt the dangerous 
trip to Europe with the call Barca or Barsaakh”. 
       Mamadou Sy Albert in Nouvelhebdo (June 23-29 no11, 2016) argued that:   
       “There is an emergent poverty in Senegal.  It is growing and is completely invading the Senegalese 
society.  The fight against poverty or its eradication makes more and more skeptical many analysts of the 
Senegalese economy and actors of the civil society.  Macky Sall, President of the Republic of Senegal, 
and his government make it their major concern and despite the considerable efforts they have made with 
their national strategies and action plans to deal with it, poverty is still present.  Dakar, the administrative 
capital of Senegal, offers the evidence every day.  The city is unbearable and residents can no longer have 
three full meals per day.  Resourcefulness remains the privileged mechanism of the economic survival of 
whole sections of the population.  Alongside the poor people who have no monthly wage incomes or 
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other revenues to meet the traditional human needs, there is an army of informal workers coming from 
varied backgrounds with irregular and volatile incomes.  They are in a situation of pronounced social 
precariousness.  Informal workers and all underclass groups are part of this human chain of the urban 
poor.  They live in conditions of pauperization defying all human dignity.  All these explain the 
Senegalese migrations to Europe, particularly the “Barca or Barsaakh” phenomenon”. 
        Ousmane Ndiaye was referred to me by another interviewee, Mr. Diop.  He did the sea 
adventure from Senegal to Canary island (Spain) three times and his boat was intercepted by the 
Spanish coastguard and towed back to Senegal.  He is a 29-year old local angler and soccer 
player living in Thiaroye sur Mer.  Based on the discussion I had with him, he said that: 
        “I chose to migrate because my parents are very poor and I was not able to help them with the 
meager amount of money I collected as an angler and local player.  At one point, I was no longer able to 
stand the miserable conditions my parents were in, and these weighed on me so much that the only 
possible solution I found was to attempt the deadly adventure at sea at my peril during the last 3years.  I 
thought that making it to Spain might change the living conditions of my parents because I was very 
skilled in soccer and my ambitions were to make it to Spain and become a professional soccer player.  I 
made it three times to Spain on the boat but ended up being towed back to Senegal”. 
       Abdoul is a local footballer in Thiaroye Sur Mer (a city slum located in Dakar).  He plays in 
what we call in Wolof “Nawetane”, meaning a small competition between districts of the same 
town.  Based on the record I took while I was interviewing him, he believes that: 
       “Young Senegalese’s migrations to Europe are due to the social conditions and status within their 
family.  In the Senegalese society, those who are given attention in most families are those who have a 
good job and a certain level of social status or conditions.  However, those who are not in the same 
position feel always marginalized within their own family. Such conditions compel many of them to 
migrate for being respected within their own family”.  
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      Babacar Gaye is 32years-old and lives in Leona Valda (Rufisque).  He is an angler with an 
experience of 15years in terms of sea navigation.  He became angler when he was 17years-old 
and started navigating and commuting between places.  In my conversation with him, he argued 
that: 
        “One of the main causes that forced me to migrate was because of those Senegalese migrants 
“modou-modou”, who sent a big amount of money to their family monthly, and who built beautiful and 
big houses in such a short space of time.  For me, these people reflected the image of a prosperous Europe 
where it was good to live and to earn money, while I was struggling so hard in Senegal to find a better 
living because I did not earn much money as an angler.  This compelled me to join in 2013 the Barca or 
Barsaakh phenomenon by playing the role of promoter and with 250 people aboard.  We luckily entered 
Spain with the help of the Spanish Red Cross who was not able to identify the nationality of the migrants 
after detaining them for 30days in their camp.  After being released by the Spanish Red Cross, I started 
small jobs during the summer like shoe polish, washing cars, harvesting citrons in plantations.  I started 
making a good living and sending monthly money to my family during the 4years spent in Spain.  











       Human migrations, generally defined as a displacement of peoples from one place to another 
for many purposes, have long been a source of many scholars’ debates.  In this research, I have 
attempted to address the specific case of Senegalese migrations to Europe known as the “Barca 
or Barsaakh” phenomenon.   Historically, Senegalese migrations to Europe started under 
colonialism with the massive recruitments by the French colonial administration within the 
Senegalese territory.  This practice of European colonial administration caused the first wave of 
Senegalese migrations towards Europe during the colonial time to conform to French colonial 
needs and expectations.  Senegalese migrations to Europe continued in the post-colonial period 
as part of France’s post-war reconstruction and its need for labor to revitalize its economy.  They 
were facilitated by the economic logic of immigration legislation between 1945 and 1973, which 
enabled France to remedy its domestic labor shortage by extracting labor from its former 
colonies thus leading to massive migrations of Senegalese people to Europe during the post-
colonial period.  In the 2000s, Senegalese migrations to Europe increased tremendously with the 
“Barca or Barsaakh” phenomenon, involving a whole generation of Senegalese youth. 
       Throughout this research, I have provided three broad theoretical frameworks (colonialism 
and dependency, post-colonialism, globalization and its neoliberal ideology), to account for the 
factors behind this phenomenon.  Even if globalization and its neoliberal ideology do help 
answer the research question, I did not focus on globalization because the externship time 
constraint did not allow me to collect the type of data that it requires.  Therefore, in the context 
of this study, I have relied on colonialism and dependency and post-colonialism as my 
conceptual and theoretical frameworks to explain Senegalese migrations to Europe. 
        In light of the two theoretical frameworks, I have proposed two hypotheses: 
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H1:  If a dependency relationship develops between a colonial power and its former colony, then 
the former colony’s economy is likely to be weak and unproductive.  France’s relationship with 
Senegal is a dependent relationship in which Senegal’s monoculture economy and general 
development depend on France’s economic, financial and technical assistance.  By weakening 
the Senegalese economy, the colonial dependent situation has created conditions of generalized 
poverty and lack of economic opportunities for young people. This situation causes migrations to 
Europe and elsewhere. 
H2:  The more post-colonial holders of state power resort to authoritarian rule and the 
privatization of the state, the more likely they will loot national resources for their private 
interests.  In Senegal, post-colonial rulers have used authoritarian means of governance and 
appropriated the state resources as personal property.  This has created a situation of generalized 
poverty and lack of economic opportunities for young people.  The outcome has been massive 
migrations to Europe and elsewhere. 
       The evidence in chapter 3, 4, and 5 tends to support my two hypotheses.  Nevertheless, the 
persistence of poverty in Senegal and its similarities in some aspects with other poor countries 
suggest that my two causal factors may not completely explain poverty in Senegal.  Although my 
hypotheses are empirically verified for the most part, poverty in Senegal may be partly caused by 
factors (such as drought and globalization-induced structural adjustment programs of IMF) not 
accounted for in my hypotheses.  Migrations in Senegal are for example exacerbated by the 
requirement imposed on Senegal by Neoliberal policies, such as the reduction of the labor force 
in the public administration and cut in state subsidies for education health and other services.   
       As a young Senegalese student, I find it a major interest to contribute through this study to 
an understanding of the aches and pains of the young Senegalese people in the hope of seeing 
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some change in the Senegalese society.  This research throws some light on the incapacity of the 
African State, and particularly the Senegalese State, to unleash the potential of its youth.  The 
inadequacy of the education system is a good example.  As a result, to leave the country or to 
stay is now a matter of life and death both literally and metaphorically.  This thesis will help 
inform, and hopefully raise the consciousness of Senegalese leaders to consider and to open the 
door to these Senegalese young people who constitute the hope of the nation of tomorrow.  
       As a student in the African American department, the study’s interests also lies in its Pan 
African implications because many of Senegal’s problems are shared by other African countries.  
Senegalese, African American and Afro South Americans share the racial component of 
migrations.  Thus, this study will help to raise the debate of leadership and management in the 
Pan-African world.  Moreover, the light of the proposed hypotheses and the research’s findings 
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                                                  APPENDIX: INTERVIEWS 
Kayar: A small coast of Senegal located in Thies’ region whose artisanal fishing is the main 
activity. 
        Fatou Kine alias Kitieu, a 49-year-old married woman selling fish around Kayar’s beach. 
(July 22, 2019). 
        Mbengue Mor, a 24-year-old student converted into angler. (July 22, 2019).      
        Ndiaye Alioune 64 years-old angler, whose son migrated illegally to France by passing 
through the Canary Islands (Spain) with a local pirogue. (July 22, 2019). 
Thiaroye Sur Mer: A city slum located in Dakar where the main activity is fishing.  The small 
activities in this area are selling coconuts, mangoes, and vegetables.  These are practiced by 
many people, men and women from different ethnic groups. 
       Abdoul, a local footballer who plays in what we call in Wolof “Nawetane”, meaning a small 
competition between districts of the same town. (July 23, 2019). 
       Badara, a retired professor and angler-aged 62-year-old. (July 23, 2019). 
        Mbengue Nogaye, a 51year-old fish seller. Her oldest son, Madione 29-year-old, passed 
away two years ago while trying to undertake the treacherous adventure of crossing the Atlantic 
Ocean to Spain with some of his friends. (July 23, 2019). 
        Ndiaye Ousmane is the one referred to me by Mr. Diop.  He did the sea adventure from 
Senegal to Canary island (Spain) three times and his boat was intercepted by the Spanish 
coastguard and towed back to Senegal.  He is a 29-year old local angler and soccer player living 
in Thiaroye sur Mer (July 31, 2019). 
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Mbour: A city located on the small coast of Senegal.  This city is well known because of the 
many sightseers who come to places like Saly, Ngaparou, Somone to cite few, in Senegal. Mbour 
is also well known due to its important daily fishing activities, making it be known in Wolof as 
“Gokhoume Lebous” (city of anglers). (July 24, 2019). 
         Mbengue Mamadou, angler at Ngaparou (an adjacent town located on the west side of 
Mbour). (July 24, 2019) 
Rufisque: The city where I was born and raised is a town located on West of Dakar, which used 
to be one of those four colonial townships created by the former French colonizers.  It is one of 
the main reasons why this place is marked by its old French colonial architecture.  Rufisque 
served as a transition port of African slaves that were transported to Goree Island, where they 
were temporarily imprisoned and then sent to Europe.  Rufisque is also well known because it is 
mainly composed of Lebous community practicing daily fishing activities in this city.  That is the 
reason why this city is called “Tenguedj” meaning a “Lebou fishing community”. 
         Faye Mass, a 45-year-old Senegalese actor living in Rufisque.  He spent almost 7years in 
the field of theater in Rufisque (Senegal).  He is the one who plays the role of coordinator in “La 
pirogue (The Pirogue)” movie by Moussa Toure. (July 25, 2019). 
         Mr. Diop, a 52-year-old Professor. He was one of my former high school professors. (July 
25, 2019). 
         Gaye Babacar, a 32years-old man who lives in Leona Valda (Rufisque).  He is an angler 
with an experience of 15years in terms of sea navigation.  He became angler when he was 
17years-old and started navigating and commuting between places. (July 31, 2019). 
160 
 
       Pape Fily, a 70-year-old retired professor of history at my high school college (Ousmane 
Soce Diop of Rufisque), who lived in “Arafate” (the Southside of Rufisque in Senegal). (August 
1, 2019). 
Saint-Louis: Commonly surnamed “Ndar” in Wolof, is one of the big cities in Senegal located in 
the North-West coast of Senegal.  Saint-Louis is well known as one of those four townships 
created by the French colonial administration during colonial times.  It is marked by its colonial 
architecture, “le pont Faidherbe” (Faidherbe’s bridge), and “la place Faidherbe” (Faidherbe’s 
place), created around the 18th century where ancient monuments, such as the governor’s Palace 
and Saint-Louis Cathedral, can be found.  There is also the C.R.D.S “Centre de Recherches et de 
Documentation du Senegal” (Research and Documentation Center of Senegal) essentially 
dedicated to traditional arts and crafts. 
         Dione Maurice Soudieck, a doctor in Political Science and Professor-Researcher at Gaston 
Berger University of Saint-Louis. (July 26, 2019). 
         Thiam Moussa, an elementary teacher. 
          I.F.A.N “Fundamental Institute of Black Africa” (DAKAR): An academic and research 
institution that is located at Cheikh Anta Diop University of Dakar.  Its aim is to help students 
and researchers by facilitating access to necessary resources in their field of research. 
          Fall Pape Demba, a senior researcher whose research interest is on international mobility 
in West Africa and in particular that of Senegalese within the African continent and towards the 
countries of the North.  In addition to the extensive research on African and Senegalese 
migrations, I mentioned above, Papa Demba Fall also focuses on issues of migratory politics, the 
impact on group identities and on local development. (July 30, 2019). 
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                                                                        Vita  
My name is Mohamed Thiam. I am 29 years old. My country of origin is Senegal (West Africa).  
I am the youngest in my family. I was raised by my mum and she made me the man I am today. 
She passed away in 2014 due to a long illness. 
During my high school years, I attended Ousmane Socé Diop College and Convergence 
Educative Private School in Rufisque (Senegal). I got my baccalaureate degree (Series L’) at 
Private School Convergence Educative in 2010. 
 I had the opportunity to be oriented at the English department at Cheikh Anta Diop University 
of Dakar. I earned my Bachelor’s degree in Foreign Languages and Civilizations in 2013. 
As a student, I was active in the Pan African group of my University. I was also active in my 
neighborhood program of the fight against insalubrity. Besides, I tutored and helped some 
students in preparing their Baccalaureate Exams. As an engaged citizen, I created the 
neighborhood cleaning initiative which undertakes periodic cleaning of the canal which 
evacuates the rainy season water. 
Years following my Bachelor's Degree, I volunteered for social work and was active in some 
group projects. I worked for some big companies in Senegal as well. 
I have always been interested in the links between languages, arts, humanities, literature, and 
social sciences and researches.  They are the labor process of the production of knowledge and 
help a lot to grasp our social reality.  
In this perspective, I wanted to bring these interests together to a degree that centers on 
interdisciplinary fields of Pan African studies. That is the reason why I chose the College of Arts 
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and Sciences (Department of African American Studies) at Syracuse University. I wanted to 
deepen my knowledge, to be able to acquire new essential complementary academic skills 
related to Pan Africanism, International relations, Comparative State-Society Relations, 
Societies, Political Economies, and Global Migrations. These experiences will be significant for 
the future of Africa as we constitute the hope of the continent's tomorrow. We are the young 
leader of Africa who should bring changes we want to see and to contribute to the unfinished 
work of African nations. So this research is an understanding of the aches that affect many young 
African people.  The problem can only be resolved when one committed himself to address those 
factors that explain Africa’s patchy development and that compel many of them to risk their lives 
to reach Europe. 
